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Adnan Hadzi and Denis Roio

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CRIMES

In order to lay the foundations for a discussion around the argument that the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies benefits the powerful few, focusing on their own existential concerns, we decided to narrow down our analysis of the argument to jurisprudence (i.e. the philosophy of law), considering also the historical context. This paper signifies an edited version of Adnan Hadzi’s text on Social Justice and Artificial Intelligence, exploring the notion of humanised artificial intelligence in order to discuss potential challenges society might face in the future. The paper does not discuss current forms and applications of artificial intelligence, as, so far, there is no AI technology, which is self-conscious and self-aware, being able to deal with emotional and social intelligence. It is a discussion around AI as a speculative hypothetical entity. One could then ask, if such a speculative self-conscious

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hardware/software system were created, at what point could one talk of personhood? And what criteria could there be in order to say an AI system was capable of committing AI crimes?

In order to address AI crimes, the paper will start by outlining what might constitute personhood in discussing legal positivism and natural law. Concerning what constitutes AI crimes the paper uses the criteria given in Thomas King et al.’s paper Artificial Intelligence Crime: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Foreseeable Threats and Solutions,6 where King et al. coin the term “AI crime”, mapping five areas in which AI might, in the foreseeable future, commit crimes, namely:

- commerce, financial markets, and insolvency;
- harmful or dangerous drugs;
- offences against persons;
- sexual offences;
- theft and fraud, and forgery and personation.

We discuss the construction of the legal system through the lens of political involvement of what one may want to consider to be ‘powerful elites’7. In doing so we will be demonstrating that it is difficult to prove that the adoption of AI technologies is undertaken in a way, which mainly serves a powerful class in society. Nevertheless, analysing the culture around AI technologies with regard to the nature of law with a philosophical and sociological focus enables us to demonstrate a utilitarian and authoritarian trend in the adoption of AI technologies. We will narrow down our discussion of utilitarian and authoritarian trends through the use of Tim Crook’s notion on power elites,8 and Paul Mason’s analysis of power elites through four main ethical systems,9 drawing on Karl Marx’s class concept.10 Namely Mason is discussing, in regards to power elites: utilitarianism, social justice, Nietzsche’s ‘higher men’ approach, and finally Aristotle’s virtue ethics.

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Mason argues that “virtue ethics is the only ethics fit for the task of imposing collective human control on thinking machines”\(^\text{11}\) and AI. We will apply virtue ethics to our discourse around artificial intelligence and ethics. Furthermore, Mason brings forward the notion of radical humanism and in three points Mason outlines how AI could be designed and implemented:

1. The most comprehensive human-centric ethical system for AI has to be one based on virtue. All other systems – for example safety codes or ‘maximum happiness’ objectives – would have to be sub-systems of an ethical approach based on virtue, which instructs the technology to create and maintain human freedom.

2. You resolve the class, gender, national and other competing claims through democracy and regulation (i.e. form of social contract [restorative justice] more prescriptive than the one required by fairness ethics).

3. You need industry standards regulated by law and should refrain from developing AI without first signing up to these standards; nor should you deploy it into any rules-free space.\(^\text{12}\)

As expert in AI safety Steve Omohundro believes that AI is “likely to behave in antisocial and harmful ways unless they are very carefully designed.”\(^\text{13}\) It is through virtue ethics that this paper will propose for such a design to be centred around restorative justice in order to take control over AI and thinking machines, following Mason’s radical defence of the human and his critique of current thoughts within trans- and post-humanism as a submission to machine logic.

Following Mason and Crook we introduce our discussion around power elites with the notions of legal positivism and natural law, as discussed in the academic fields of philosophy and sociology. The paper will then look, in a more detailed manner, into theories analysing the historical and social systematisation, or one may say disposition, of laws, and the impingement of neo-liberal tendencies upon the adoption of AI technologies.\(^\text{14}\) Salvador Pueyo demonstrates those tendencies with a thought experiment around superintelligence in a neoliberal scenario.\(^\text{15}\) In Pueyo’s thought experiment the system becomes techno-

\(^{11}\) Mason, Clear Bright Future, p. 166.

\(^{12}\) Cp. ibid.


social-psychological with the progressive incorporation of decision-making algorithms and the increasing opacity of such algorithms, with human thinking partly shaped by firms themselves.  

The regulatory, self-governing potential of AI algorithms and the justification by authority of the current adoption of AI technologies within society, mainly through investments into AI implementation within the armed forces, surveillance technologies, and the military-industrial complex, will be analysed next. The paper will conclude by proposing an alternative practically unattainable, approach to the current legal system by looking into restorative justice for AI crimes, and how the ethics of care could be applied to AI technologies. In conclusion the paper will discuss affect and humanised artificial intelligence with regards to the emotion of shame, when dealing with AI crimes.

LEGAL POSITIVISM AND NATURAL LAW

In order to discuss AI in relation to personhood this paper follows the descriptive psychology method of the paradigm case formulation developed by Peter Ossorio. Similar to how some animal rights activists call for

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certain animals to be recognised as non-human persons, this paper speculates on the notion of AI as a non-human person being able to reflect on ethical concerns. Here Wynn Schwartz argues that “it is reasonable to include non-humans as persons and to have legitimate grounds for disagreeing where the line is properly drawn. In good faith, competent judges using this formulation can clearly point to where and why they agree or disagree on what is to be included in the category of persons.”

According to Ossorio a deliberate action is a form of behaviour in which a person a) engages in an intentional action, b) is cognizant of that, and c) has chosen to do that. Ossorio gives four classifications: ethical, hedonic, aesthetic, and prudent as fundamental motivations. Ethical motivations, as well as aesthetic motivations, can be distinguished from prudent (and hedonic) motivations due to the agent making a choice: “In the service of being able to choose, and perhaps think through the available options, a person’s aesthetic and ethical motives are often consciously available.”

In the fields of philosophy and sociology countless theories have been advanced concerning the nature of law, addressing questions such as: Can unethical law be binding? Should there be a legal code for civil society? Can such a legal code be equitable, unbiased, and just, or, is the legal code always biased? In the case of AI technologies we ask whether the current vision for the adoption of AI technologies, a vision which is mainly supporting the military-industrial complex through vast investments in army AI, is a vision that benefits mainly powerful elites.

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28 Ossorio, The Behavior of Persons.


To address the question, we need to discuss the idea of equality. Here we refer to Aristotle’s account on how the legal code should be enacted in an unbiased manner. Aristotle differentiated between an unbalanced and balanced application of the legal code, pointing out that the balanced juridical discussion of a case should be courteous. Here, as with the above mentioned animal rights activists, in Dependent Rational Animals, Alasdair MacIntyre argued, drawing on Thomas Aquina’s discussion of misericordia, for the recognition of our kinship to some species calling for the “virtues of acknowledged dependence”. Austin, on the other hand, suggests that the legal code is defined by a higher power, “God”, to establish justice over society. For John Austin the legal code is an obligation, a mandate to control society.

Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart goes on to discuss the social aspect of legal code and how society apprehends the enactment of such legal code. Hart argues that the legal code is a strategy, a manipulation of standards accepted by society. Contrary to Hart, Ronald Dworkin proposes for the legal code to allow for non-rule standards reflecting ethical conventions of society. Dworkin discusses legislation as an assimilation of these conventions, where legislators do not define the legal code, but analyse the already existing conventions to derive conclusions, which then in turn define the legal code. Nevertheless, Dworkin fails to explain how those conventions come into being. Here for Hans Kelsen legal code is a product of the political, cultural and historical circumstances society finds itself in. For Kelsen the legal code is a standardising arrangement which defines how society should operate.

The theories discussed above serve to explain and analyse how legal codes deal with the emergence of legal issues concerning AI technologies or AI crimes. Nevertheless, in trying to evaluate the argument that the adoption of AI technologies is a process controlled by powerful elites who wield the law to their benefit, we also need to discuss the notion of power elites.

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William Chambliss and Robert Seidman argue that powerful interests have shaped the writing of legal codes for a long time.\(^{40}\) However, Chambliss and Seidman also state that legislation derives from a variety of interests, which are often in conflict with each other. We need to extend our analysis not only to powerful elites, but also to examine the notion of power itself, and the extent to which power shapes legislation, or, on the contrary, if it is legislation itself that controls power.

In an attempt to identify the source of legislation, Max Weber argues that legal code is powerfully interlinked with the economy. Weber goes on to argue that this link is the basis of our capitalist society.\(^{41}\) Here we can refer back to Marx’s idea of materialism and the influence of class society on legislation.\(^{42}\) For Marx legislation, legal code is an outcome of the capitalist mode of production.\(^{43}\) Marx’s ideas have been widely discussed with regards to the ideology behind the legal code. Nevertheless, Marx’s argumentation limits legal code to the notion of class domination.

Here Colin Sumner extended on Marx’s theories regarding legislation and ideology and discussed the legal code as an outcome of political and cultural discussions, based on the economic class domination.\(^{44}\) Sumner expands the conception of the legal code not only as a product of the ruling class but also as bearing the imprint of other classes, including blue-collar workers, through culture and politics. Sumner argues that with the emergence of capitalist society, “the social relations of legal practice were transformed into commercial relations.”\(^{45}\) However, Sumner does not discuss why parts of society are side-lined by legislation, and how capitalist society not only impacts on legislation, but also has its roots in the neo-liberal writing of legal code.

To apprehend how ownership, property and intellectual rights became enshrined in legal code and adapted by society we turn to Locke’s theories.\(^{46}\) Locke argued that politicians ought to look after ownership rights and to support circumstances allowing for the growth of wealth (capital). Following Locke one can conclude that

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contemporary society is one in which politicians influence legislation in the interest of a powerful upper-class – a neo-liberal society. Still, we need to ask, should this be the case, and should powerful elites have the authority over legal code, how legislation is enacted and maintained?

**THE DISCIPLINARY POWER OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE**

In order to discuss these questions, one has to analyse the history of AI technologies leading to the kind of ‘humanised’ AI system this paper posits. Already in the 50s, Alan Turing, the inventor of the Turing test, had stated that:

“We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in all purely intellectual fields. But which are the best ones to start with? Even this is a difficult decision. Many people think that a very abstract activity, like the playing of chess, would be best. It can also be maintained that it is best to provide the machine with the best sense organs that money can buy, and then teach it to understand and speak English. This process could follow the normal teaching of a child. Things would be pointed out and named, etc. Again, I do not know what the right answer is, but I think both approaches should be tried. We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.”

The old-fashioned approach, some may still say contemporary approach, was to primarily research into ‘mind-only’ AI technologies/systems. Through high level reasoning, researchers were optimistic that AI technology would quickly become a reality. Those early AI technologies were a disembodied approach using high level logical and abstract symbols. By the end of the 80s researchers found that the disembodied approach was not even achieving low level tasks humans could easily perform. During that period many researchers stopped working on AI technologies and

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systems, and the period is often referred to as the “AI winter”.  

Rodney Brooks then came forward with the proposition of “Nouvelle AI”, arguing that the old-fashioned approach did not take into consideration motor skills and neural networks. Only by the end of the 90s did researchers develop statistical AI systems without the need for any high-level logical reasoning; instead AI systems were ‘guessing’ through algorithms and machine learning. This signalled a first step towards humanistic artificial intelligence, as this resembles how humans make intuitive decisions; here researchers suggest that embodiment improves cognition.

With embodiment theory Brooks argued that AI systems would operate best when computing only the data that was absolutely necessary. Further in Developing Embodied Multisensory Dialogue Agents Michal Paradowski argues that without considering embodiment, e.g. the physics of the brain, it is not possible to create AI technologies/systems capable of comprehension, and that AI technology “could benefit from strengthened associative connections in the optimization of their processes and their reactivity and sensitivity to environmental stimuli, and in situated human-machine interaction. The concept of multisensory integration should be extended to cover linguistic input and the complementary information combined from temporally coincident sensory impressions.”

Today we have reached the point where AI technology is being deployed by the armed forces on a large scale:

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54 Cp. Brooks, Cambrian Intelligence.
“The Pentagon and the U.S. government have been put on notice that the only way to mitigate the risk of being at a technological disadvantage is by investing billions […] in artificial intelligence, machine learning and future technologies that will require no support from civilian companies.”

With this historical analysis in mind we can now discuss the paper’s focus on power elites. Joseph Raz studied the procedures through which elites attain disciplinary power in society. Raz argues that the notion of the disciplinary power of elites in society is exchangeable with the disciplinary power of legislation and legal code. For Raz legal code is perceived by society as the custodian of public order. He further explains that by precluding objectionable actions, legislation directs society’s activities in a manner appropriate to jurisprudence. Nevertheless, Raz did not demonstrate how legislation impacts on personal actions. This is where Michel Foucault’s theories on discipline and power come in. According to Foucault the disciplinary power of legislation leads to a self-discipline of individuals. Foucault argues that the institutions of courts and judges motivate such a self-disciplining of individuals, and that self-disciplining rules serve “more and more as a norm”.

Foucault’s theories are especially helpful in discussing how the “rule of truth” has disciplined civilisation, allowing for an adoption of AI technologies which seem to benefit mainly the upper-class. But then should we think of a notion of ‘deep-truth’ as the unwieldy product of deep learning AI algorithms? Discussions around truth, Foucault states, form legislation into something that “decides, transmits and itself extends upon the effects of power”. Foucault’s theories help to explain how legislation, as an institution, is rolled out throughout society with very little resistance, or “proletarian counter-justice”. Foucault explains that this has made the justice system and legislation a for-profit system. With this understanding of legislation, and social

justice, one does need to reflect further on Foucault’s notion of how
disciplinary power seeks to express its distributed nature in the modern
state. Namely one has to analyse the distributed nature of those AI
technologies, especially through networks and protocols, so that the
link can now be made to AI technologies becoming ‘legally’ more
profitable, in the hands of the upper-class.

If power generates new opportunities rather than simply repressing
them, then, following Foucault, more interaction and participation can
extend and not simply challenge power relations. Foucault offers a
valuable insight into power relationships relevant also within AI
technologies. It is the product of research that was undertaken by
Foucault over a period of over twenty years. Foucault uses the
metaphor of a chemical catalyst for a resistance which can bring to light
power relationships, and thus allow an analysis of the methods this
power uses: “[r]ather than analysing power from the point of view of its
internal rationality, it consists of analysing power relations through the
antagonism of strategies.”

In Protocol, Alexander Galloway describes how these protocols
changed the notion of power and how “control exists after
decentralization”. Galloway argues that protocol has a close
connection to both Deleuze’s concept of control and Foucault’s
concept of biopolitics by claiming that the key to perceiving protocol
as power is to acknowledge that “protocol is an affective, aesthetic
force that has control over life itself.” Galloway suggests that it is
important to discuss more than the technologies, and to look into the
structures of control within technological systems, which also include
underlying codes and protocols, in order to distinguish between
methods that can support collective production, e.g. sharing of AI
technologies within society, and those that put the AI technologies in
the hands of the powerful few. Galloway’s argument in the chapter
Hacking is that the existence of protocols “not only installs control into
a terrain that on its surface appears actively to resist it”, but goes on to
create the highly controlled network environment. For Galloway
hacking is “an index of protocological transformations taking place in

66 Cp. Foucault, Power.
68 Foucault, “The Subject and Power”, p. 780.
69 A.R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization, Cambridge, MA,
71 Galloway, Protocol, p. 81.
73 Galloway, Protocol, p. 146.
the broader world of techno-culture.”

In order to be able to regulate networks and AI technologies, control and censorship mechanisms are introduced to networks by applying them to devices and nodes. This form of surveillance, or dataveillance, might constitute a development akin to Michel Foucault’s concept of “panopticism” or “panoptic apparatus” defined as both massive collections and storage of vast quantities of personal data and the systemic use of such data in the investigation or monitoring of one or more persons. Laws and agreements like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, the Digital Economy Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act require surveillance of the AI technologies that consumers use in their “private spheres”, and can be used to silence “critical voices”. The censorship of truth, and the creation of fear of law through moral panics stand in opposition to the development of a healthy democratic use of AI technologies. Issues regarding the ethics of AI arise from this debate.

Peter Fitzpatrick expands on Foucault’s theory, investigating the

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74 Galloway, Protoool, p. 157.
“symbiotic link between the rule of law and modern administration.”

Here again we can make the link to ethical questionable advances with AI technologies. Legislation, or legal code, Fitzpatrick argues, corrects “the disturbance of things in their course and reassert the nature of things.” For Fitzpatrick legislation is not an all-embracing, comprehensive concept as argued by Dworkin and Hart, but rather legislation is defined by elites. For Fitzpatrick legislation “changes as society changes and it can even disappear when the social conditions that created it disappear or when they change into conditions antithetical to it.” Furthermore, Robin West suggests that the impact of disciplinary power through legislation on the belief system of individuals does not allow for an analytical, critical engagement by individuals with the issues at stake. Legislation is simply regarded as given.

John Adams and Roger Brownsword give a more nuanced view of contemporary legislation. They argue that legislation aims to institute public order. Legislation sets up authoritative mechanisms whereby social order can be established and maintained, social change managed, disputes settled and policies and goals for the community adopted. Adams and Brownsword go on to argue that legal code is skewed in favour of the upper-class and those who engage more with politics in society – examples of which could be the corporate sector producing AI technologies and business elites seeking to use AI technologies for profit. According to Adams and Brownsword there seems to be no unbiased, fair legislation or legal code, and the maintenance of public order must simply reproduce an unfair class society. If this is the case, following Adams and Brownsword argumentation, one can argue that indeed the adoption of AI technologies does not follow a utilitarian ethical code, benefiting society, but rather conforms to the interests of a small group, those owning AI technologies.

A further discussion of disciplinary power within the process of writing legal code is that of William Chamblis and Robert Seidman, who argue that legislation is not produced through a process characterised by balanced, fair development, but rather by powerful elites writing legal code by themselves. Translating this again back to

87 Cp. Chamblis and Seidman, Law, Order, and Power.
the adoption of AI technologies, it becomes evident that the freedom to engage with those technologies is left to those who have the financial means, and with it the legal means, to do so. According to Chamblis and Seidman, in a culture dominated by economics, legislation and technologies are being outlined and modelled by those powerful elites.

The analysis of the theories above has attempted to show that the implementation of AI technologies might be construed as a project deriving from, and serving the interests of, the dominant class; following Foucault’s terminology, this is achieved using the disciplinary power of legislation, through regimes of truths, over individuals. AI technologies, rather than benefiting society, could very well be implemented against society. The implementation of AI technologies follows legislation set out by elites, raising issues connected with privacy, national security, or intellectual property laws.

We will conclude our analysis of the disciplinary power of AI technologies by discussing issues concerning privacy and secrecy laws, as examples of how powerful elites use such legislation to safeguard their political and economic influence in the implementation of AI technologies. Crook argues that a fear of legislation is being cultivated as a check on the analysis of how elites abuse their power. For Crook the “moral panic of invasion of privacy has been constructed as a mischief perpetrated by media when there is scant scrutiny of the state’s invasion of personal privacy by surveillance, covert investigation, collection and misuse of data.”

With the implementation of AI technologies come national security concerns. The legislation covering national security, in the example of the UK the Official Secrets Acts, was initiated stressing the notion of the security of the nation state. Nevertheless, Crook states that the “Official Secrets Acts have been repeatedly used by governments to suppress revelations that were, and are, politically embarrassing rather than genuine threats to national security.” Crook explains further that the Official Secrets Act is being used to not only to censor, but also to spy on citizens. As AI technology is deeply implemented within the army, we cannot but wonder if this legislation is only safeguarding the interests of the political elite. Also, for Steven Warner the Official Secrets Act is legislation used “to suppress embarrassing or controversial revelations and to undermine the public’s right to

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90 Crook, *Comparative Media Law and Ethics*, p. 322.
know.” Warner argues that legislation in the hands of the power elites is profoundly against democratic principles and criticizes therefore the lack of support for whistle-blowers who bring to light such disciplinary use of power. The censorship of truth stands in opposition to the development of a healthy democratic use of AI technologies.

**AI Technologies and Restorative Justice: The Ethics of Care**

Most institutions concerned by the debate on the ethics of automatisation today have resorted to the adoption of the “Open World Assumption” principle providing a sort of safety valve: a last-resort civil right to raise a flag and ask for the intervention of a human in the analysis and consideration of judicial decisions: in such a case institutional operators can always override decisions established by automated systems, posing risks of different nature to the integrity of the process.

Having said this, the prospect could be raised that restorative justice might offer “a solution that could deliver more meaningful justice”.

With respect to AI technologies, and the potential inherent in them for AI crimes, instead of following a retributive legislative approach, an ethical discourse, with a deeper consideration for the sufferers of AI crimes should be adopted. Acting ethically is more difficult than ever, due to the hyper expansion of big data and artificial intelligence.

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93 Crook, *Comparative Media Law and Ethics*, p. 310.


“University” to that of “Enterprise”, research into artificial intelligence has gone from being a public service undertaken mainly at universities to being run (and regarded) as businesses, run by big corporations such as Alphabet (parent company of Google) and Facebook, created to generate profit. The companies need to attract a large number of paying customers. AI technologies have become workers in the market economy, rarely following any ethical guidelines. We ask: could restorative justice offer an alternative way of dealing with the occurrence of AI crimes?

Dale Millar and Neil Vidmar described two psychological perceptions of justice. One is behavioural control, following the legal code as strictly as possible, punishing any wrongdoer, and second the restorative justice system, which focuses on restoration where harm was done. Thus an alternative approach for the ethical implementation of AI technologies, with respect to legislation, might be to follow restorative justice principles. Restorative justice would allow for AI technologies to learn how to care about ethics. Julia Fionda describes restorative justice as a conciliation between victim and offender, during which the offence is deliberated upon. Both parties try to come to an agreement on how to achieve restoration for the damage done, to the situation before the crime (here an AI crime) happened. Restorative justice advocates compassion for the victim and offender, and a consciousness on the part of the offenders as to the repercussion of their crimes.

One can argue that these evils are becoming more evident nowadays with the advance of AI technologies. For AI crimes punishment in the

classical sense may seem to be adequate. Robert Duff argues that using a punitive approach to punish offences educates the public. Tyler Okimoto and Michael Wenzel refer to Emile Durkheim’s studies on the social function of punishment, serving to establish a societal awareness of what ought to be right or wrong. Nils Christie, however, criticises this form of execution of the law. He argues that, through conflict, there is the potential to discuss the rules given by law, allowing for a restorative process, rather than a process characterised by punishment and a strict following of rules. Christie states that those suffering most from crimes are suffering twice, as although it is the offenders being put on trial, the victims have very little say in courtroom hearings where mainly lawyers argue with one-another. It basically boils down to guilty or not guilty, and no discussion in between. Christie argues that running restorative conferencing sessions helps both sides to come to terms with what happened. The victims of AI crimes would not only be placed in front of a court, but also be offered engagement in the process of seeking justice and restoration.

Restorative justice might support victims of AI crimes better than the punitive legal system, as it allows for the sufferers of AI crimes to be heard in a personalised way, which could be adopted to the needs of the victims (and offenders). As victims and offenders represent themselves in restorative conferencing sessions, these become much more affordable, meaning that the barrier to seeking justice due to the financial costs would be partly eliminated, allowing for poor parties to be able to contribute to the process of justice. This would benefit wider society and AI technologies would not only be defined by a powerful elite. Restorative justice could hold the potential not only to discuss the AI crimes themselves, but also to get to the root of the problem and discuss the cause of an AI crime. For John Braithwaite restorative justice makes re-offending harder.

In such a scenario, a future AI system capable of committing AI crimes would need to have knowledge of ethics around the particular discourse of restorative justice. The implementation of AI technologies

will lead to a discourse around who is responsible for actions taken by AI technologies. Even when considering clearly defined ethical guidelines, these might be difficult to implement, due to the pressure of competition AI systems find themselves in.

That said, this speculation is restricted to humanised artificial intelligence systems. The main hindrance for AI technologies to be part of a restorative justice system might be that of the very human emotion of shame. Without a clear understanding of shame it will be impossible to resolve AI crimes in a restorative manner. Thus one might want to think about a humanised symbiosis between humans and technology, along the lines of Garry Kasparov’s advanced chess, as in advanced jurisprudence. A legal system where human and machine work together on restoring justice, for social justice.

Furthering this perspective, we suggest that reflections brought by new materialism should also be taken into account: not only as a critical perspective on the engendering and anthropomorphic representation of AI, but also to broaden the spectrum of what we consider to be justice in relation to all the living world. Without this new perspective the sort of idealized AI image of a non-living intelligence that deals with enormous amounts of information risks to serve the abstraction of anthropocentric views into a computationalist acceleration, with deafening results. Rather than such an implosive perspective, the application of law and jurisprudence may take advantage of AI’s computational and sensorial enhanced capabilities by including all information gathered from the environment, also that produced by plants, animals and soil.