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What Must Remain Hidden to Picture-Men. Notes on So-Called Semantic Enclaves

Abstract

Im zweiten Teil der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (1968) bemerkte Wittgenstein angesichts eines schematischen Gesichts, er verhalte sich zu diesem in mancher Beziehung wie zu einem menschlichen Gesicht, könne »seinen Ausdruck studieren, auf ihn wie auf den Ausdruck des Menschengesichtes reagieren. Ein Kind kann zum Bildmenschen, oder Bildtier reden, sie behandeln, wie es Puppen behandelt« (WITTGENSTEIN 1968: 309). Aus dieser kindlichen Sicht lässt sich zudem erkennen, wohin Bildmenschen blicken, was ihren Blicken prinzipiell zugänglich wäre, was ihnen andererseits, aus projektiv-geometrischen Gründen, verborgen bleiben müsste. Eine semantische Enklave definiert Wallis als »a part of a work of art consisting of signs of another kind or from another system than the signs forming the whole work« (WALLIS 1970: 525). Beispiele: »quotations in French in a novel written in English, inscriptions in medieval pictures«. Das zweite Beispiel Wallis' ist von bildmenschlichem Interesse. Den Fragen, wie welche semantischen Enklaven – es gibt auch ikonische – im Bildraum untergebracht werden, wieweit sie ihm überhaupt angehören, wird ein Katalog gewidmet. Der Enklaven-Komplex steht offensichtlich in einer Beziehung zum Konstrukt der semantischen Stufen. Die in Kupfer gestochene, als Standbild unbelebte Galathea in Goltzius' Stich ist im Vergleich zum ebenfalls gestochenen Pygmalion ein Bildmensch zweiter Klasse – steht sie auf einer höheren semantischen Stufe?

In dealing with a diagrammatical drawing, Wittgenstein noticed in the second part of his philosophical investigations that in some respect he stands towards it as he does towards a human face: »I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face. A child can talk to the picture-men or picture-animals, can treat them as it treats dolls« (WITTGENSTEIN 1968: 194). It can from a childlike angle, moreover, be known where picture-animals look, what may be gleaned from their glances in principle, and what on the contrary, will always be hidden to them.

Wallis thinks of a semantic enclave as »a part of a work of art consisting of signs of another kind or from another system then the signs forming the whole work. Some examples: quotations in French in a novel written in English, inscriptions in medieval pictures« (WALLIS 1970: 525). This observation shall be carried on; Wallis' second example deserves picture-man's interest. The question of how which semantic enclaves—aren't there iconic ones, too?—are located within pictorial space renders the basis of a taxonomy to be developed. The problem of semantic enclaves is obviously related, though not in a clear fashion, to the one of semantic degrees. For example: The copper-etching of Galatea's yet not statue and the likewise copper-engraved Pygmalion are picture-beings which belong to disparate classes; holding unequal semantic station they cannot be in communication. Seeing such icon items—though that would be sensible in a way—in terms of semantic degrees, however, would not account for the grounds, which caused Stachowiak to place oral language on the second and written text on a third semantic step. These reasons are, however, not cogent in the view of the present author, who tries to carry out instead the authentic semantic-degree-concept of Russell and Whitehead in the field of iconics.[1]

Fig. 1:
WITTGENSTEIN 1968: 194.

1. Wittgenstein's ›Picture-Man‹ and the ›Intended Picture‹

To look at a drama or a picture properly one must understand that both are *shows*, simply *denoting* something real. A certain preponderance of the intellectual life over the sensuous life is requisite for such an achievement, where the intellectual elements are

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> safe from destruction by the direct sensuous impressions. A certain liberty in choosing one's point of view is necessary, a sort of humor [...]. (MACH 1898: 77, original emphasis)

What must remain hidden to picture-men, if only the humorless answer ›everything‹ is valid here, then the game which what we are ultimately concerned with here would have been lost before it had started. The answer is indeed not unreasonable. Picture-men have (as we now know) no proper sensorium. Those days, which were friendly to artificers, when portraits of crowned heads were wedded to each other, when escaped criminals were—if necessary—punished fatally in effigy, when a Chinese emperor thought of shielding himself forever by means of a terracotta-army, are, as it were, over. Among the terracotta-warriors were also bowmen. Among the terracotta-warriors were also bowmen. »›[I]ntendere arcum in‹, to draw a bow at« (MACKAY 1972:18) is behind our present-day ›intend‹. The present-day colloquial synonymy of ›intention‹ with ›aim‹ catches its proper meaning only in part. In accordance with an old philosophical tradition, Brunswik for instance defined intending an object as »wanting to attain, or to discern (perceive) or to ›mean‹ it« (BRUNSWIK 1934: 18, translation H.K.).[2] In this sense, familiar to Wittgenstein and described by him as ›empathically‹ accentuated, a picture may be intended. ›Only the intended picture‹, it can be read in the bilingual version of his *Zettel* which has been edited by Anscombe and von Wright:

> »reaches up to reality like a yard-stick. Looked at from outside, there it is, lifeless and isolated«.—It is as if at first we looked at a picture so as to enter into it and the objects in it surrounded us like real ones; and then we stepped back, and were now outside of it; we saw the frame, and the picture was a painted surface. In this way, when we intend, we are surrounded by our own intention's *pictures*, and we are inside them. But when we step outside intention, they are mere patches on a canvas, without life [...]. (WITTGENSTEIN 1967: § 233, original emphasis)

In his *Fundamental Questions of the Theory of Perception*[3] Wundt's student Paul Ferdinand Linke, influenced, too, by Brentano and Husserl,—stated: »intentionality is never and nevermore interpretation« (LINKE 1929: 364, translation H.K.).[4] He explicated the issue in a roundabout manner:

> Likewise, one is not allowed to confound, as it is very popular, stimuli with the intentional external objects. These objects stand as a matter of fact by no means in a real causal relation to the respective acts which apprehend them, even though just this seems to be the case to the immediate impression: they emerge and vanish instantaneously with the latter—in sharp relief to the stimuli. (LINKE 1929: 365, translation H.K.)[5]

The ›mere patches‹ persist! It is here not so much the point to recognize act-psychological axioms and object-theorems—Linke read also Meinong—in a

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[2] »ihn erlangen bzw. erkennen (wahrnehmen) wollen oder auch ihn ›meinen‹«
[3] *Grundfragen der Wahrnehmungslehre* (1929).
[4] »Intentionalität ist nie und nimmermehr Interpretation«
[5] »Auch darf man Reize nicht, wie das sehr beliebt ist, mit den intentionalen Außengegenständen verwechseln. Diese Gegenstände stehen nämlich, sosehr gerade dies dem unmittelbaren Eindruck nach der Fall zu sein scheint, durchaus in keinem realen Kausalverhältnis zu den sie jeweils erfassenden Akten: sie entstehen und verschwinden instantan mit ihnen –in scharfem Gegensatze zu den Reizen«.

present-day perspective, but to reconstruct the background of Wittgenstein's picture-intending in a way that might be acceptable to historians of psychology. Linke continues:

> The relation of the stimulus (the ›Wahrnehmungsreal‹ as which we try to define it more precisely from the psychological standpoint) to the respective perceived object (the ›Wahrnehmungsintentional‹) for instance the blue stimulus to the perceived blue, is therefore no real-causal one, too, and anyway else (following the parallelistic hypothesis) no real one but the naturally real stimulus effects first of all the equally real physiological excitation which is incident (causally or otherwise) then with the not less real psychical act experience; together with this act yet the perceived intentional object exists which no doubt presents itself immediately as real, yet joints up even just as immediately the impression of the causal influence on the mind, which is, however, neutral in fact and has to be, therefore, not at all real: it belongs to another layer. (LINKE 1929: 365, translation H.K.)[6]

Against a background of this kind it could seem useful to Wittgenstein in Part II of the *Philosophical Investigations*

> to introduce the idea of a picture-object. For instance [Fig. 1] could be a picture-face. In some respects I stand towards it as I do towards a human face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face. A child can talk to the picture-man or picture-animals, can treat them as it treats dolls. (WITTGENSTEIN 1968: 194)

With this jocular attribution of meaning it might be also appraised where such picture-men are looking, still more, what would be approachable to their looks in principle and what—on the other hand—for projective-geometrical reasons ought to be hidden from these looks forever.

Picture-men are men-designating signs, which function—the sign-recipient's appropriate intention given—similarly to men. Georg Klaus' division of semiotics considers the following factors: »1. the objects of the mental mirroring (O) 2. the linguistic signs (Z)[7] 3. the mental images (A) 4. the men (M) which produce, use, understand the signs« (KLAUS/SEGETH 1962: 1248, translation H.K).[8] She who would believe to recognize behind O, Z, A, M the Morrisian designate, the sign vehicle, the interpretant, the interpreter—in that order—will not be altogether mistaken. I base myself in the following on Klaus' nomenclature but understand Z as substitutive signs of any kind, i.e., iconic ones, too. M be a signs sending, M' a signs receiving man. Let a Witt-

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[6] »Das Verhältnis des Reizes (des ›Wahrnehmungsreales‹, als welches wir ihn vom psychologischen Standpunkt aus präziser zu bestimmen suchten) zum entsprechenden wahrgenommenen Gegenstande (dem ›Wahrnehmungsintentional‹) etwa des Blaureizes zum gesehenen Blau, ist also ebenfalls kein real-kausales und überhaupt auch sonst (bei parallelistischer Hypothese) kein reales; sondern der natürliche reale Reiz bewirkt zunächst die ebenfalls reale physiologische Erregung, die sodann mit dem nicht minder realen psychischen Akterlebnis (kausal oder sonstwie) verbunden ist; zugleich mit diesem Akte besteht aber der wahrgenommene intentionale Gegenstand, der sich zwar unmittelbar als wirklich darstellt, ja sogar ebenso unmittelbar den Eindruck der kausalen Beeinflussung des Bewußtseins mit sich führt, der aber in Wahrheit neutral ist und also keineswegs wirklich zu sein braucht: er gehört einer anderen Schicht an…«

[7] /Z/ = abbreviaton of /Zeichen/; /A/ = abbreviation of /Abbild/.

[8] »1. die Objekte der gedanklichen Widerspiegelung (O) 2. Die sprachlichen Zeichen (Z) 3. die gedanklichen Abbilder (A) 4. die Menschen (M), die die Zeichen hervorbringen, benützen, verstehen«

gensteinian picture-man be called Z_M respectively $Z_{M'}$ as well as m respectively m' in the same meaning.[9]

2. Bühler's ›Faithful Picture‹, Alberti's ›Window‹, and its playful modification

Bühler's definition[10] of »erscheinungstreues Bild«, translated here, faut de mieux, as »faithful picture«, is found in the photograph as well as in

> any picture constructed in accordance with the principles of photographic representation, that means first and foremost, that which takes perspective (›Formen- und Größenperspektive‹), the distribution of light and shadow etc., into account, whether the object depicted really exists or not, whether the artist draws it on the basis of a perception or on the basis of an idea, whether he reproduces it, as he had seen it, or whether recreating imagination had been in play—all that is unsubstantial regarding the conception of pictorial faithfulness. (BÜHLER 1925:113, translation H.K.)[11]

Not until the time of Renaissance artists were pictures brought off which, as we know, were faithful in this sense; let the responsibility for the handy definition be Bühler's.

Alberti, Dürer, Leonardo recommended for proper understanding of projection and perspective an—as it goes without saying: real—object worth to be represented and a station point, to place a sheet of clear glass between station point and object and, without leaving the station point all the while, to go over the to be represented object on the sheet of glass, to study then the faithful picture—the representing object—acquired in this manner. This method has as it seems first been proposed by Alberti (cf. HABER 1980, HOCHBERG 1962). What is here called (for this very reason) an Albertian Window, operates elsewhere—not quite substantiated as far as I am able to tell—as Leonardo Window. That Dürer propagated the method figure 2 permits us to perceive.

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[9] Instances of linguistic Z_M are the proper names. The distinction between Z_M and $Z_{M'}$ is superfluous with nomina. m and m' be always productive Z_M, $Z_{M'}$ (cf. ECO 1977).

[10] So to speak cutting a Gordian knot; ignoring in this combat, however, that his courageous definition would declare quite possibly also the photocopy of a picture.

[11] »Bild, das nach den Darstellungsprinzipien der Photographie, also vor allem unter Berücksichtigung der Formen- und Größenperspektive, der Verteilung von Licht und Schatten usw., konstruiert ist; ob der dargestellte Gegenstand wirklich existiert oder nicht, ob ihn der Künstler aus der Wahrnehmung oder Vorstellung zeichnet, ob er ihn so wiedergibt, wie er ihn gesehen, oder ob eine umbildende Phantasietätigkeit mit im Spiel war, dies alles ist für den Begriff der Erscheinungstreue nicht maßgebend.«

Fig. 2:
Albrecht Dürer*: Underweysung der Messung (1525)
ULLMANN 1971: 281.

It will have been a lady's audience to which Ernst Mach in 1866 delivered a lecture with the title *Why Has Man Two Eyes?*. There it is said about monocular viewing:

> Usually both eyes work together. As certain views are frequently repeated, and lead always to substantially the same judgments of distances, the eyes in time must acquire a special skill in geometrical constructions. In the end, undoubtedly, the skill is so increased that a single eye alone is often tempted to exercise that office.
> Permit me to elucidate this point by an example. Is any sight more familiar to you than that of a vista down a long street? Who has not looked with hopeful eyes time and again into a street and measured its depth. I will take you now into an art-gallery where I will suppose you to see a picture representing a vista into a street. The artist has not spared his rulers to get his perspective perfect. The geometrician in your left eye thinks, »Ah ha! I have computed that case a hundred times or more. I know it by heart. It is a vista into a street« he continues; »where the houses are lower is the remote end.« The geometrician in the right eye, too much at his ease to question his possibly peevish comrade in the matter, answers the same. But the sense of duty of these punctual little fellows is at once rearoused. They set to work at their calculations and immediately find that all the points of the picture are equally distant from them, that is, lie all on a plane surface.
> What opinion will you now accept, the first or the second? If you accept the first you will see distinctly the vista. If you accept the second you will see nothing but a painted sheet of distorted images. (MACH 1898:75f.)

3. A Faithful Picture Game

Rule (1) of a game with faithful pictures which lies in store for us, requires us to place full trust in the ›unpunctual‹ statement of the Machian geometricians[12], in other words, to understand a faithful picture's picture plane as Albertiian window glass, that confines a real vista frontally, and to take, furthermore, the m which in it appear for real in the way of a ›Living Picture‹.

Rule (2) implies that this vitreous dihedron is a one-way translucent screen. m could notice the—thus semipermeable—Alberti-window's interface boundary plane turned to his space, but could not penetrate this opaque wall with his views. M, however, could on his part look through it.

M could, Rule (3), view out of the intended vista only the section that the window with its fixed perspective releases to him. Shift of viewing axis or dislocation of station point would yield no new information to him.

In contrast could m, Rule (4), if only awakened from his picture-specific catatonia, move in a human manner within the space which contains him and look around, for instance look at a statue from all sides or unfold a paper, could, in short, gain optically obtainable information of any kind, but, and this is Rule (5), only that.

If, however, Rule (6), a picture resides within the space containing the picture-man, this picture in the picture behaves towards m as the entire picture behaves towards M; Rule (3) continues to hold true.

Picture-men can, Rule (7), interact and communicate with each other as far, Rule (8), as time permits.

4. Wallis' ›Semantic Enclaves‹

The notion yet to be introduced has been proposed by Wallis. In his essay *The History of Art as the History of Semantic Structures* the author defines it as follows: »By a ›semantic enclave‹ I understand a part of a work of art consisting of signs of another kind or from another system than the signs forming the whole work« (WALLIS 1970: 525). Let me announce early on that the »signs forming the whole work« shall in this multi-paged album leaf for Martin Krampen[13] be understood throughout as iconic signs. Wallis gives »some examples: quotations in French in a novel written in English, inscriptions in medieval pictures« (WALLIS 1970: 525), but he also refers to Egyptian painting

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[12] That we anyway thus monocularly proceed is related to us by Enwright: »One of the important differences between viewing the real world and looking at a picture of a natural object or scene is that the angle between the eyes (vergence state) ordinally will not change when we shift our gaze within the picture between two points that are at different implied distances. The data here demonstrate, however, that vergence does change if we shift fixation within a picture and have one eye covered, and that these eye movements correspond in direction to the spatial relationships implied by the content of the illustration« (ENWRIGHT 1987: 731).

[13] Martin Krampen died March 18, 2015. RIP.

and sculpture which work »often with semantic enclaves in the form of inscriptions in hieroglyphic writing«. The medieval art has »on a large scale semantic enclaves, particularly in the form of inscriptions and coats-of-arms« (WALLIS 1970: 530) employed. In the art of the Italian High Renaissance—which developed the faithful picture—the instances run out: »The nimbuses, the inscriptions disappear. The shields with coats-of-arms are no more placed in a top corner of the picture, without connexion with the rest, but become a part of the represented reality« (WALLIS 1970: 530f.). »Represented reality«—the works of visual art on the whole may be divided—as Wallis explains:

> into works representing,—›reproducing‹, ›depicting‹, ›portraying‹ definite objects—real or fantastic—men, houses, angels, the ›objective‹ or ›semantic‹ works, and the works which don't represent definite objects, which renounce the evocation of the images of definite objects in principle, the ›non-objective‹ or ›asemantic‹ works. [...] I divide the objective works, in turn, into ›concrete‹ and ›abstract‹ works. By ›concrete‹ works I understand works in which lines, color spots, shapes both stimulate our sensibility and emotionality and represent in an easily recognizable way definite objects, works in which iconic elements are strongly marked, in which we have, as it were, a balance of the representative and the stimulative factors. Almost all Western pictures before the rise of impressionism are concrete works. (WALLIS 1970: 527)

Someone might say that was all rather long ago now. Faithful pictures—Wallis' ›semantic‹ concrete works are no different matter of course—have gone out of fashion for quite some time in the visual arts and that which Wallis means by semantic enclaves has not existed since the Renaissance. To this notional someone a contemporary (although not too aesthetic) issue may be pointed out: advertisements are typically faithful pictures with semantic enclaves.[14] To him—a historic example again—the silent film may be pointed out: It struck Hugo Münsterberg right way,

> how often the words on the screen serve as substitutes for the speech of the actors. They appear sometimes as so-called »leaders« between the pictures, sometimes even thrown into the picture itself, sometimes as content of a written letter or of a telegram or of a newspaper clipping which is projected like a picture, strongly enlarged on the screen. In all these cases the words themselves prescribe the line in which the attention must move and force the interest of the spectator toward the new goal. But such help by the writing on the wall is, after all, extraneous to the original character of the photoplay. (MÜNSTERBERG 1916: 78)

Does the art critic allude there to the biblical fiery script on the wall? Anyway—to him it is not all just »writing on the wall« when he rules plainly that the writing in the film is too light.

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[14] The author is at last bound to admit that it has been the treatment of these trivialities in a seminar *Psychology of signs: Specimens of advertising* (Institut für Wirtschafts- und Sozialpsychologie der Universität Göttingen, Sommersemester 1990) which gave an additional, if not decisive reason for his ongoing occupation with picture-men and Wallis' enclaves. The announcement of the seminar tried to counter misunderstandings: »The seminar's central topics are not signs and their systems as means of advertising; it is not about advertising psychology. Advertising—a kind of persuasive communication—, however, offers a demonstration material, that at least with regard to plentitude and variety of instances, but also respectively everyday ordinariness and precisely thus regarding ecological validity leaves little to be desired«.

In this we find one of the leading points of the classification which we will be concerned with in what follows. Wallis himself also gave us hints in this direction, when he called ›nimbuses‹ and ›coats-of-arms‹ semantic enclaves as well—in addition to ›inscriptions‹, thereby referring not only to our Middle Ages, but also to hieroglyphic Egypt.

5. Game with Semantic Enclaves

Back to the Alberti-Window modified—according to Rule (2); the one of its two planes ended the picture(-men)space, the other the observer's space, the M-space. By this division the first criterion of the classification is already gained with which the game is concerned: In case of faithful pictures semantic enclaves can be divided from the view of M into enclaves behind and into—a priori hidden to m—enclaves onto the Alberti-Window. This design feature (DF) may be put as a question:

(a) E behind the Alberti-Window?

If Dürer's illustration to the *Underweysung der Messung* (1525; fig. 2), would contain an enclave—Wallis could say he had not meant thus at all—then an enclave (a). Would contain? If »quotations in French in a novel written in English« (WALLIS 1970: 525) shall count as semantic enclaves, then by the same right also ›pictures in pictures‹. For the consequently identified Dürer-enclave holds in addition—and exactly this makes it so inconspicuous—the DF—already recognized by Münsterberg—put in interrogative form again:

(b) E projectively integrated?[15]

And the superbly illustrated question can be answered in the affirmative (though only just):

(c) E accessible to M?

Which has to be negated if Dürer had depicted the vista of the Alberti-Window—or did he adopt the latter as his own?—with a perspective rotated only a few degrees clockwise.

But now we quote an example—we will come back to this one—in which Wallis, too, must recognize semantic enclaves, Springinklee's *Apotheosis of Emperor Maximilian I.* (around 1519; fig. 3). Disregarding the small sculptures to the observer's left, onto the column foot and the capital—here we have more than enough enclaves sensu Wallis. We would have ~(a)—enclaves—where ›~‹ is a sign for negation—if the inscribed upper border and the lower section of the page still belonged to the somewhat alienated Alberti-Window. The inscriptions which are actually located—because they are behind the window—in the pictorial space, are cartouches.

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[15] Alternatively integrated by ›projection‹.

Fig. 3:
Hans Springinklee: *Kaiser Maximilian I. mit seinen Schutzheiligen*
STAATLICHE MUSEEN ZU BERLIN 1983: 167.

(a) is given, whereas ~(b) also holds true, as shall be explained. In contrast, (c) can be fully affirmed. Cartouches show M what m and the other depicted persons are saying. They do not exist at all—though they are written into the pictorial space, and although the kneeling emperor exhibits that which he is saying legibly to the saviour—with reference to m, m'. We have to observe Rule (5); picture-men themselves are not able to see what they say.[16] With this oppressive insight—one should remember Rule (6) anyhow—we already attain a design feature which has not yet been treated: Cartouches are, if written alphabetically or in syllabic script, phonosignificative.—A ›conservative‹ phrasing[17] of this design feature makes a double negative unavoidable:

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[16] Saussure noticed indeed, »the spoken word is so intimately bound to its written image« (1970: 24). We assume that the written word can become a picture only of the written word but thus indeed: a picture. A precise description of a text consists in its transcription; but then its faithful picture is one, too.

[17] These design features are poled in such a way that in the case of a picture without enclaves all of them would be taken as given.

(d) E ~phonosign?

›~phonosign‹ does not mean quite the same as ›iconic‹ or as the ›analogue‹ preferred here in view of a circumstance that fig. 4 illustrates.

Fig. 4:
Schnorr von Carolsfeld: *Nathans Bußpredigt* (1851-1860)
https://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/stichwort/11136/ [accessed March 15, 2017]

(e) E analogue?

We bring this (fig. 5) exquisite picture by Gossaert alias Mabuse, *St Luke Drawing the Virgin* (1515) into the game, though not without scruple; and this is true for the following ones as well.—It reproduces on the left a hand sign— pursuant to Wundt a symbolic gesture—which may according to de Jorio signify ›love‹ (cf. WUNDT 1911: 195). As a gestural logogram it is no doubt (d), yet ~(e).

Fig, 5:
Jan Gossaert: *St. Luke Drawing the Virgin* (1515)
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Jan_Gossaert_005.jpg [accessed March 15, 2017]

Enclaves of this kind are, if nothing else, inconspicuous because they are connected with m, contiguous to it. DF:

(f) E contiguous to m?

holds also for the picture-man-picture which St. Luke to the Virgin Mary's right drafts for himself and this is what Dürer demonstrates; it applies for the cartouches in Springinklees apotheosis, too. In contrast, the pretty sculptural embellishment in Mabuses picture is ~(f). Now at last comes the DF which had to wait its turn above; we are at Rule(5) again:

(g) E optically accessible?

Could that which M sees be photographed by m?—to pose the question clearly, but with embarrassing tastelessness. Not only the Springinkleeian cartouches, no, the nimbi and cherubs at the picture's top, are also: ~(g).[18] And let the airy remonstrances that the vituperating prophet Nathan gives for the atrocities of the already remorseful king be also ~(g)—as is seen in

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[18] If somebody would identify here grotesque excrescences of a vulgar materialism which is no longer opportune, one could reply at the utmost that it is only a game; as picture-human photography (sensu stricto) cannot seriously be expected before the middle of the nineteenth century.

Schnorr von Carolsfeld's nineteenth century picture. Finally, the last DF in this succession asks (h) sub eventu?

This Latin question, wherein E does not especially figure, is—embarrassingly enough—in some degree equivalent to the English one whether a picture that comes up against M, whether it contains enclaves or not, can be thought of as being a snapshot. As an educated person perceives immediately, neither that which Springinklee—apart from his phantasms—nor that which Mabuse depicts, is thinkable in this sense. Since in fig. 6 the unity of the person is transcended along with the unity of time, this ~(h) appears particularly striking in the *Last Supper* by Rosselli (1482). This is true regardless of whether we would prefer to recognize in the background untimely painted murals of later stages in Christ's ordeal or three window cutouts with fantastic sights of the outer space.[19]

Fig. 6:
Cosimo Rosselli and Biagio d'Antonio: *The last Supper* (1482)
https://www.puzzle-portal.com/de/puzzle/teileanzahl/1...rosselli...puzzle/a-69710/
[accessed March 15, 2017]

The logical consistency of this design feature catalogue must be tested some place else; here we assume—perhaps too confidently—that it is not too badly formulated and deal further with pictures. Rosselli's nimbi are—as shall be appended—indeed projectively integrated, (b), but ~(g) is likewise valid here.

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[19] There is, however, a reading in sense of the sub eventu which we will not think of yet: The group in the foreground be a group of pious actors with two pairs of sponsors at the sides.—As—sad to say—is not surprising, there are for fig.4 and 7, too, such like more ›rational‹ readings that are at least conceivable. Alas, ›intentionality is never and nevermore interpretation‹!

A more sophisticated picture: the *Madonna delle Harpie* by Andrea del Sarto (1517; fig. 7) »stands elevated on a small harpie-decorated plinth in front of a shallow niche and presents herself like a saint's monumental, distance-keeping statue for adoration« (HEYDENREICH/PASSAVANT 1975: 240, translation H.K.).[20] Like a statue—yet her eyes indicate that a living human is meant. A person, however, with whom the two other ones cannot actually deal, see Rule (8), ~(h).

Fig. 7:
Andrea del Sarto: *Madonna delle Harpie* (1517)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madonna_of_the_Harpies [accessed March 15, 2017]

Unity of time is yielded to semantic égalité. The painter shows that he well knew how this unity could be established, but that he deliberately did not use the necessary means of Mary's ›desincarnation‹. It's a matter of taste whether

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[20] »steht erhöht auf einem schmalen harpyengeschmückten Sockel vor einer flachen Wandnische und bietet sich wie eine monumentale, distanzgebietende Heiligenstatue der Verehrung dar«

one should speak of temporal enclaves here. Semantic enclaves are the harpies, the two putti, the cross and the book, whose pages are opened by a holy m, and are inaccessible to M's sight, ~(c).[21]

Titian's portrait of Caterina Cornaro (fig. 8) renders a terrestrial queen[22] who casually ruins with her left hand the rare example of an analogue on-enclave. The minute hand movement transforms the »stone plate with the low relief that once more renders the represented objects in idealized profile view all' antica« (HEYDENREICH/PASSAVANT 1975: 291, translation H.K.) into a component part of the picture-men space. The represented one smiles, also as a »painted relief« (»gemahltes Relief«, cf. BREYSIG 1798); if you will: the profile plane of a projection on two planes. Towards which of the two Cornaros in the picture which smile is directed is clear to us as if it were a matter of course.

Fig. 8:
Titian: *La Schiavona / Portrait of Caterina Cornaro* (1510-1512)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La_Schiavona [accessed March 15, 2017]

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[21] He who would hence recognize not an enclave here, must fancy also that a picture-man given in form of a Friedrichian view from behind owns no face, the half-length portrait no belly. He would not adhere to the rules!

[22] The picture commonly known as *La schiavona* depicts, (cf. HEYDENREICH/PASSAVANT 1976: 289), Caterina Cornaro (1454–1510)—a Venetian of noble family who married in 1468 the King of Cyprus thereby putting Cyprus under the protection of Venice. Widowed in 1473, she ruled in her own right until forced to resign in 1489 and lived thereafter, surrounded by poets and artists, in her villa in Ascio near Treviso (cf. HEYDENREICH/PASSAVANT 1976: 431).

Fig. 9:
Lorenzo Lotto: *The Legend of St. Barbara* (1524)
https://www.wikiart.org/en/lorenzo-lotto/the-legend-of-st-barbara-1524 [accessed March 15, 2017]

Lorenzo Lottos mural painting in the oratory of the Villa Suardi in Trescore (fig. 9), which originated in the onset of the 16th century, shall be put into consideration as a splendid instance of an analogue on-enclave, ~(a); (e), the picture on the picture. The picture on the picture and the picture of »the in the entire width of the wall extended landscape underlying the figure of Christ« (HEYDENREICH/PASSAVANT 1975: 309, translation H.K.) both are separately (~h), wherefore it may not be said that an earlier time than the time of the ›underlying‹ picture corresponds throughout to the picture on the picture. But had Lotto it in mind at all to create a faithful picture in our yet trivial understanding? His old-fashioned return to medieval forms is obvious. He doesn't play our game. According to our rules the on-picture would be an enclave—he probably meant it differently.—The imperial coat of arms in Springinklee's apotheosis, in contrast, could be an on-enclave instance except that a bit of its under part is overlapped by the cartouche of Mary, which according to our rules, is located behind Alberti's window. The impression that, here as elsewhere, a downright game is being played with our rules—this suspicion is not easily dismissed.

Picture-men always necessitate someone who pictures them. Thus a painter Pencz paints in 1545 a portrait of the painter Erhard Schwetzer's wife (fig. 10) and adds as an ›onscription‹, so to speak, to the picture the name of his colleague's spouse depicted; script-on-the-picture, ~(a); ~(e), a genuine superimposition which had just come up in Münsterberg's time and which then annoyed him.[23]

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[23] Compare the mien of Frau Schwetzer with that of the former queen Caterina; there presumably are not only financial standings reflected.

Fig. 10:
Georg Pencz: *Elisabeth Schwetzer* (1544-1545)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6c/Elisabeth_Schwetzer%2C_by_Georg_Pencz
%2C_Nurnbuerg%2C_1544-1545%2C_linden_wood_-_Bode-Museum_-_DSC03047.JPG
[accessed March 15, 2017]

Holbein the Younger's anamorphic joke with the name that the Elder previously had borne, which was presented 1533 in the London picture *The Ambassadors*, is too well-known as to need describing here. *The Double Portrait of Sir Thomas and His Son John* (1528; fig. 11), reveals heightened picturesque humor, too. In this creation Holbein the Younger makes Godsalve the Elder (as if it were sub eventu) write down, almost as in a state of trance, who he is.[24] It came to be (too) plain in fig. 10 that this belongs to the duties the artist is paid for. Bruegel the Elder presumably carries, however, the game with the semantic enclaves to extremes in his drawing *The Painter and the Art Lover* (1565; fig. 12). Here occurs after all no more and no less than an almost dramatic demonstration of ›our‹ Rule (4). May it be only an accident that one of the depicted two is a painter-colleague? And—is the mien of the bespectacled consumer not also an expression of the deplorable contentment

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[24] An untenable assertion! Whatever Godsalve the Elder is writing down there — is in all likelihood not his name. The author did not realize his embarrassing mistake until 2016.

that this which he, m', so palpably intends, must remain hidden forever to the M' who regards him? What a nasty game!


Fig. 11:
Holbein the Younger: *The Double Portrait of Sir Thomas and His Son John* (1528)
www.abcgallery.com/H/holbein/holbein56.html [accessed March 15, 2017]

Fig. 12:
Bruegel the Elder: *The Painter and the Art Lover* (1565)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pieter_Bruegel_the_Elder [accessed March 15, 2017]

—This would have been not so bad an end, but there exists yet a popular game which we cannot simply pass over. When Wallis mentions ›inscriptions in medieval pictures‹ above as instances of semantic enclaves, then it is not entirely beside the point to question whether they, in addition to their foreign body quality, do not in the first place have the attribute of standing on a higher semantic level than that in which they are foreign bodies. The answer depends, of course, on what we shall take such levels to be.

6. Forms of the Theory of ›Semantic Levels‹

When we start with the original variant, it is concerned with the task

> to found the system of the semantic levels as it is expressed by the distinction between object language and metalanguage and between metalanguages of distinct levels, to develop the principles of the construction of hierarchies of semantic levels as well as ways and means to eliminate the semantic antinomies. The theory is also concerned with the specification of technical aids for the identification of diverse levels. (KLAUS/BUHR 1970: 1047)[25]

This immediately reminds us of the principle of ›desincarnation‹ that Andrea del Sarto would not use here, however, it's not about pictures but about languages here as Klaus clearly states: »A major means for the distinction of various language levels is the utilization of quotation marks« (KLAUS/BUHR 1970: 1047, translation H.K.).[26] Thus the sentence ›Berlin consists of six letters‹ be to follow Klaus a semantically senseless construction, but ›Berlin consists of six letters‹ a correct sentence of the metalanguage.[27] Where can we find references to our iconic problems in this?—In its original form the theory of semantic levels is undoubtedly tied to language. It would conceivably be valid to ask here whether the French quotation in Wallis' English novel belongs to the meta- or rather to the object language. Thus far we do not learn anything about how texts relate to pictures in which they are inscribed, about how configurations of signs that are parts of different categories are to be placed in this hierarchy.

The theory of semantic levels was, however, developed further and elaborated—primarily by Herbert Stachowiak—within the framework of the general model theory. Martin Krampen was quick to point out the considerable picture-semiotical importance of this (cf. KRAMPEN 1973a). In this new variant are to be differentiated:

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[25] »das System der semantischen Stufen, wie es in der Unterscheidung zwischen Objektsprache und Metasprache sowie zwischen Metasprachen verschiedener Stufen zum Ausdruck kommt, zu begründen, die Prinzipien für die Konstruktion von Hierarchien semantischer Stufen auszuarbeiten und Mittel und Wege zur Ausmerzung der semantischen Antinomien«.

[26] »Ein wichtiges Mittel zur Unterscheidung verschiedener Sprachstufen ist die Verwendung von Anführungszeichen«.

[27] Klaus traces the distinction between object- and metalanguage back to Tarski, who, in turn, follows Whitehead and Russell.

The »improper, zero semantic level ...: the level of the material-energetic, and thus physical states, that (as so-called material outer world) are received by men«[28] (STACHOWIAK 1965: 446, translation H.K.).

These should be objects of the external reality which are not artificial signs; otherwise pictures would also be placed on this level as »physical states«. Further:

> The first semantic level is internal modelling [regarding a communicant]. It is interposed between the domains of the material information (...) on the one hand and of the proper communication, based on explicit use of signs, on the other hand. (STACHOWIAK 1973: 207, translation H.K.)[29]

The class of internal models consists of perceptual models—our perception, too, has model character—and cogitational models (cf. KRAMPEN 1973b: 117). The ›thought bubbles‹ of Nathan (fig. 4)—is Schnorr von Carolsfeld thereby referring to the latter's internal models? Or does he become iconic for the very reason that it would optoverbally not fit into the picture? But onwards:

> The models of the second semantic level are also called explicit[30] signs of the entities of the first semantic level. The entirety of these signs—including the rules for their use—is called a primary communication system or a communication system of the 1st order. Amongst humans, visual, auditory, and tactile communication systems are distinguished. Spoken language—as language in the strictest sense—is especially noteworthy among the auditory systems. It constitutes the main instrument of primary human communication within the semantic levels scheme. (STACHOWIAK 1965: 448, translation H.K)[31]

Krampen goes beyond Stachowiak and speaks in accordance with Gibson (cf. 1954) of »communicative externalized models which the individual constructs without the aid of artificial instruments (e.g. in speech, singing, gestures)« (KRAMPEN 1973b: 117). Prominent on this second semantic level is therefore the language—which need not necessarily be spoken (gestures!)—on the one hand, and that external tools are not needed on the other.

> On the third semantic step, signs of the signs of the second semantic level are attained. [...] the pre-eminent type of human communication on the third semantic level is the system of script (as word-, syllable- or phonetic script). One must remember here that

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[28] Die »uneigentliche, nullte semantische Stufe ...: die Stufe der materiell energetischen, also physikalischen Zuständlichkeiten, die als sogenannte materielle Außenwelt von Menschen (...) empfangen werden«.

[29] »Die erste semantische Stufe ist die Stufe der [bezüglich eines Kommunikanten] internen Modellbildungen. Sie ist eingefügt zwischen die Bereiche der materiellen Information (...) einerseits und der eigentlichen, auf explizitem Zeichengebrauch beruhenden Modelle andererseits«.

[30] It could be stated in reply that signs in order to be intersubjective have, strictly speaking, to be explicit, that thus instead of ›internal‹ signs (cf. STACHOWIAK 1973: 210) it would be better to speak merely of signals.

[31] »Die Modelle der zweiten semantischen Stufe werden auch explizierte[31] Zeichen für die Gebilde der ersten semantischen Stufe genannt. Die Gesamtheit dieser Zeichen einschließlich der Regeln ihrer Verwendung heißt ein primäres Kommunikationssystem oder ein Kommunikationssystem 1. Ordnung. Zu unterscheiden sind beim Menschen visuelle, auditive und taktile Kommunikation. Unter den auditiven Systemen ragt besonders die gesprochene Sprache als Sprache im engsten Sinne hervor. Sie stellt das Hauptinstrument der im semantischen Stufenschema primären Kommunikation«.

the alphabetic script is related to sound, that script, in fact, mirrors the audible, spoken language. (STACHOWIAK 1973: 216, translation H.K.)[32]

The comparable passage in Krampen is: »Semantic degree 3 designates external communication models which require additional instruments in the representation of internal or external communication models of degree 1 or 2 (e.g. writing, playing a musical instrument etc.)« (KRAMPEN 1973b: 117).

Thus far the exposition—for the sake of exactly adapting its body surface to the ocean floor a flatfish, e.g. the common sole Solea solea, needs some time but no extraneous instrument (cf. WICKLER 1973), in contrast to us when we make a picture of it. And if one would remark that biosemiotics are out of place here, the question still arises: Is that which Stachowiak has introduced, and Krampen semiotically reflected, just another variant—or perhaps already another game?

The grading of the language in which one speaks and the language about which one speaks (cf. KIPARSKY 1976: 97)[33] would happen on one and the same viz. the second semantic level—and therefore actually not at all. What has been gained instead of this? Stachowiak and Krampen alike regard the »transition from the second to the third semantic level« as »first transition of levels within the space of communication systems proper« (STACHOWIAK 1973: 216, translation H.K.). For Krampen it is, apart from the substitution of a primary communication system, the use of tools which marks this categorisation. It is, however, for him and Stachowiak, too, not certain that the script in fact stands on a higher semantic level than the speech it substitutes for:

> It should be noted for spoken language and the writing modelling it that the semantic level must be reduced to an abbreviated scheme by cutting out the level of the linguistic models (in the strictest sense), in case a direct transition from the internal to the written language models is to be performed.[34] (STACHOWIAK 1973: 219, translation H.K.)

Is such a direct transition conceivable? In terms of social history, the phonographic alphabet does indeed replace spoken sounds. But how are, currently and individually, the deaf getting on, who are acquainted with language mainly as phonographic writing? He who perceives here only a fortunately rare exception may recollect ideographic scripts that do not have to take into account that their readers speak (cf. KÜMMEL 1969). If thus a »direct transition

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[32] »Auf der dritten semantischen Stufe gelangt man zu Zeichen für Zeichen der zweiten semantischen Stufe – [...] Der Haupttypus der menschlichen Kommunikation auf der dritten semantischen Stufe ist das System der Schrift (als Wort-, Silben- oder Lautschrift). Hier ist die Lautbezogenheit der Buchstabenschrift zu erinnern, die Tatsache, daß sich in der Schrift lautliche, gesprochene Sprache widerspiegelt«.

[33] »It will be useful to distinguish between two aspects of having language – having an internal system of semantic representations, or ›language of thought‹ and having a system of signs expressing thoughts« The term ›language of thought‹ borrowed Kiparsky from FODOR 1975.

[34] »Für gesprochene Sprache und die sie modellierende Schrift ist anzumerken, daß man das semantische Stufenschema auf ein um die Stufe der (im engsten Sinne) sprachlichen Modelle verkürztes Schema zu reduzieren hat, falls ein direkter Übergang von den internen zu schriftsprachlichen Modellen vollzogen wird«. Continuation: »All the modifications of the levels scheme resulting from this are readily seen and may be easily demonstrated one by one« (STACHOWIAK 1973: 219, translation H.K.). Certainly; but is the scheme then of high value?

from the internal to the written language models« (STACHOWIAK 1973: 219, translation H.K.) cannot be excluded, and if it appears more likely with the graphic models that we call pictures, then picture and written word alike would be located on the self-same second semantic level. If instead we take into account the criterion of tool use, then it would be the third level and thus the same thing again.

Even if we would go along with the newer form of the theory of the semantic levels, the expectation disclosed above would go un-fulfilled, namely that ›inscriptions in pictures‹ would in a sense automatically evince a higher semantic status than that in which they are enclaves and thus be de-finable in such a way. But how much does our game with the pictures benefit if it be so? Well—it was maybe not correct that we established Rule (6) to count pictures, too, as semantic enclaves. But we chose not to deny ourselves that!

The application of quotation marks was, we recall, an important tool for the discernment of different linguistic levels in the older theory of seman-tic levels. Are there signs comparable to quotation marks for picture-›reading‹? About a step at least it is in this engraving by Goltzius *Pygmalion and Galatea*, (1593; fig. 13). Galatea—one could translate ›goddess of milk‹ and think that is why she is such a milky white, except that Pygmalion is as well—is presented to the ›American People‹ as:

> Galatea, in ancient Greek legends, a sea nymph who loved Acis and was loved by the one-eyed cyclops Polyphemus, who finding his love unrequited, crushed Acis under a rock. The grief-stricken Galatea wept so much she turned into a fountain. According to a more modern legend, Pygmalion made a statue of Galatea—who may or may not have been the nymph of the ancient legend; the sculptor prayed that the statue might come to life, and the goddess Aphrodite brought about the miracle. (Anonymus 1971)

If we—in order to make things not immoderately complicated—had not de-termined that the G. presented here is not identical with the »nymph of the ancient legend«, but rather (in a way) her own portrayal, then we must add here that Pygmalion had offered Aphrodite—for fear of Polyphemus?—his own life in exchange for the requested animation. With Goltzius she is still very much a statue when looked at in isolation—regard the eyes; and com-pare them with the eyes of Mary in fig. 7—. But Pygmalion could also be de-picted in this way. Well, the bunch of flowers in his right hand would be too filigree, the chisel in the left hand may be of iron. By now he has added the finishing touches to the soon-to-be spouse and does not need the hammer any more. It's plain to see that the *Madonna delle Harpie* is alive, but Galatea? It nearly seems that her garb merges below the knees into a stony support. The Christian counterpart stands throughout on her pedestal. The left foot of the Galatea gently only just deserts the plinth and leaves—Pygmalion has only just noted it—her semantic enclave existence. If there are such things as pictorial ›quotation marks‹ or—one is very much at a loss for words here—iconic ›clefs‹—then they might possibly be found here.

Fig. 13:
Hendrick Goltzius: *Pygmalion and Galatea* (1593)
http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/Mythology/PygmalionAndGalateaHendrikGoltzius.html
[accessed March 15, 2017]

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