

The Shadow of the Sublime: On *Les Immatériaux*

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A recent article by Vivek Chibber, “Capitalism, Class and Universalism”,¹ denounced the ideological devastation wrought by what, on the other side of the Atlantic, is referred to as poststructuralism, and by variations on this theme such as postcolonial studies. Chibber seems to see no virtue in the questions raised by those currents of French thought collectively described as poststructuralist – and this is a serious mistake.

But for those who, like me, affirm the necessity of continuing to examine the works of poststructuralism, an even greater mistake would consist in ignoring the questions raised by Chibber – or, in other words, to dismiss such questions.

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In relation to these questions, my own thesis – which I attempted to synthesize in *States of Shock* by proposing an “internal critique” of poststructuralism (“internal”, that is, a critique that proceeds by taking up as my own the expectations of poststructuralism, in order to analyse and overcome its limits, and in order to elaborate what I call a “new critique”) – is that what poststructuralism (which resembles and is often confused with postmodernism) has proven itself incapable of thinking is *echnics*.²

- 1 Vivek Chibber, “Capitalism, Class and Universalism: Escaping the Cul-de-Sac of Postcolonial Theory,” *Socialist Register* 50 (2014), p. 63–79, available from the author at: http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/225/Capitalism_Class_and_Universalism.pdf. An abridged version appeared in the May 2014 edition of *Le Monde Diplomatique*.
- 2 Bernard Stiegler, *States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the Twenty-First Century*, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).

Les Immatériaux was presented to the public at the Centre Georges Pompidou in 1985, and obviously formed a “discourse figure” about matter, and thus materialism, and a “discourse figure” that was perceived as a veritable “postmodern manifesto”. *Les Immatériaux*, then, did indeed give some thought to technics, and did so eloquently, but also mysteriously and tacitly – the technology of “language machines”³ constituting a major indicator of “postmodernity”, as was already the case in *The Postmodern Condition*.⁴ And Lyotard clearly apprehends these machines in terms of a *question of writing* – machines through which Lyotard was led to link writers together in an operation he called *Épreuves d’écriture* – and this was thus a prescient approach insofar as it foresaw that the *network* would soon be a major issue for “postmodernity”.

For reasons I explain at greater length in *States of Shock*, however, the question of technics that lies behind that of writing is not yet thought as such in *Les Immatériaux*.⁵ This is not only because this exhibition does not have a didactic relation to its public, but because Lyotard sees the technical writing that he refers to as “telegraphy”, which is the writing of “development”, as being in opposition to anamnestic writing, which according to Lyotard would be what “resists” this development.

Furthermore, if the exhibition could not have been and should not have been didactic, this was because *Les Immatériaux* needed to grant access to the experience of what Lyotard called “*the figural*”, even though the problematic of *Discourse, Figure*⁶ gives way here to the question of *bearing witness to a différend in reason* that goes beyond the modern, *Lyotard affirming this by bearing witness to it on the basis of Kant read through Wittgenstein*.

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It is on the basis of what at that time was referred to as the *linguistic turn* – an expression coined by Gustav Bergmann⁷ and taken up by Lyotard on the back cover of *The Differend*⁸ – that *Les Immatériaux* presented what, 30 years later, we ourselves instead understand as a *technological turn*.

Les Immatériaux was an exhibition conceived and presented in the context of what was then, in France, called *la télématique* – France being in those days

- 3 Jean-François Lyotard, “New Technologies”, *Political Writings*, trans. Bill Readings and Kevin Paul Geiman (London: UCL Press, 1993), p. 18.
- 4 Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
- 5 See Stiegler, *States of Shock*, chap. 4.
- 6 Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lydon (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).
- 7 Gustav Bergmann, *Logic and Reality* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964).
- 8 Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

ahead of its time in terms of digital technology, telematics having been developed through the Minitel and its messaging systems thanks to the political will reflected in the Minc and Nora report on *The Computerization of Society*,⁹ already cited in *The Postmodern Condition* six years before *Les Immatériaux*. *The Differend* was published two years before *Les Immatériaux* (and 11 years after the publication of *Libidinal Economy*¹⁰).

In the *telematic shock* that *calls language into question* through technics (through the appearance of what Derrida, in *Echographies of Television*, called “teletechnologies”¹¹) – that is, that calls *logos* into question through *tekhnē* – there occurs what I refer to as a *doubly epokhal redoubling*.¹² Between the two moments of the doubly epokhal redoubling work is performed, work in relation to the question of shock itself, that is, in relation to the question of the turn and of epokhality, of the *Kehre*, and finally of *Gestell*. In saying this, I am thinking not just of Lyotard reading Heidegger, but of Blanchot and Nietzsche – that is, of the “exigency of return” and the “change of epoch” to which Blanchot referred in *The Infinite Conversation*.¹³

Les Immatériaux undoubtedly set the scene in a premonitory way for what, from our standpoint today, began to unfold 21 years ago (at the end of April 1993), and that opened up the hyper-industrial scene of the twenty-first century. Just as Derrida, in *Archive Fever*,¹⁴ foresaw the advent of today’s retentive question, so too Lyotard saw coming the *digital condition* – that is, the *computational condition* – borne by “language machines”, as he called them. And what will be heard over the infrared headphones offered to visitors to the exhibition is a strikingly clear noetico-sensory anticipation of the everyday digital realities of the twenty-first century.

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Like *Libidinal Economy* and like *The Postmodern Condition*, and for reasons that may be different in each case but that are part of a single line of inquiry, for

- 9 Simon Nora and Alain Minc, *The Computerization of Society: A Report to the President of France*, no translator listed (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981). First delivered in French in 1978.
- 10 Jean-François Lyotard, *Libidinal Economy*, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993).
- 11 Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler, *Echographies of Television: Filmed Interviews*, trans. Jennifer Bajorek (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
- 12 On the “doubly epokhal redoubling” see Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 233–238; Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 2: Disorientation*, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 72–77; Bernard Stiegler, *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology*, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 34–36 and p. 112–116.
- 13 Maurice Blanchot, *The Infinite Conversation*, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 264–281.
- 14 Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

me *Les Immatériaux* triggered both doubt and unease, but also admiration and even (though this is not true of *Libidinal Economy*) fascination. The doubt is both political and conceptual: the scene that opens up with *Les Immatériaux* (and in a way that will, by 2014, come to seem perfectly faithful in advance to the scene of the twenty-first century) is that of a *performativity of discourse*, a performativity that seems to *legitimate illegitimacy*, that seems to legitimate the end of narratives of legitimation founded on *the affirmation of law* as what always lies beyond any state of fact – the end of narratives founded on the *affirmation* of this *difference*.

What struck me then as a malaise – or what I would later refer to as a *mal-être* – and that strikes me today as denial and as *submission to a state of fact*, a denial and a submission *caused by a technological shock* consisting in the radical transformation of the world by telematics, is the very thing that seems, in the eyes of Vivek Chibber, if not to pave the way for, then at least to *legitimate*, a form of capitalist organization that leads to financialization, that is, to globalization as universalization by the market (as described, for example, by Deleuze¹⁵).

Nobody was clear-sighted about this at the beginning of the 1980s (except perhaps, precisely, Deleuze). But today we *must* be so – while nevertheless insisting that there is no light that does not cast a shadow: hence we must practise a pharmacology of enlightenments, which is also to say, a pharmacological critique of the *Aufklärung*, and we must do so in an epoch where technology functions at the speed of light. Without such a leap, we are finished: this is, for us, a duty and a historical task – where this “us” refers in particular to “digital studies”. The article published in *The Independent* on May 1st, 2014 by Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark and Frank Wilczek testifies to the extreme urgency of the need to think this situation (even if their argument is conducted on bases other than those I am advocating here).¹⁶

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I read *The Postmodern Condition* in 1983, on the advice of Derrida and because he recommended taking Lyotard as my master’s degree supervisor. And this reading was undoubtedly what then allowed me to project myself beyond

- 15 Gilles Deleuze, “Control and Becoming”, *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 172-173; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 106.
- 16 Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark and Frank Wilczek, “Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence – but are we taking AI seriously enough?”, *The Independent (London)*, May 1, 2014, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence--but-are-we-taking-ai-seriously-enough-9313474.html>.

Derrida and towards the question of technics and industry – even if, on the one hand, my immediate impression was that Lyotard had got caught up, along with Alain Touraine,¹⁷ Talcott Parsons¹⁸ and Daniel Bell,¹⁹ in the fable of post-industrial society; and even if, on the other hand, I quickly came to the conclusion that his posture in relation to technics ultimately remained quite metaphysical (if not modern).

I believe that what remains metaphysical about technics in Lyotard must be related back to Kant: this is what I will now endeavour to show. I will try to do so, not by referring to “Theory and Practice”,²⁰ as I did in the final chapter of *Technics and Time*,³²¹ when I wanted to show the continuity that runs from Aristotle to Kant in terms of their common thought of technics in relation to “that which can be otherwise than it is”, *to endekhomenon allos ekhein*, but instead by returning to what, in my commentary on the transcendental deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*,²² I referred to as the fourth synthesis:²³ that of the *transcendental imagination as the power of exteriorization that founds tertiary retention and is founded on it, and that constitutes as such organological power and knowledge* (that is, the power and knowledge that arranges living, technical and social organs into a noetico-pharmacological becoming).

If the last *grand question* posed by Lyotard is that of the *differend*, if this question is *just* – in the sense of *Au juste*, of *Just Gaming*²⁴ – so that the four critiques (of pure reason, practical reason, aesthetic judgement, and the works on history) would be language games; and if *these games are not separable from an organology and from a process of grammatization that encompasses all grammatical questioning*, including in Wittgenstein’s sense; all this inclines towards and conjugates the experience of a *pharmacological default that must be*. And Lyotard *is incapable of* problematizing this pharmacological necessity *for the same reasons that so prevented Adorno*. Like Adorno, *Lyotard leaves in*

- 17 Alain Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society. Tomorrow’s Social History: Classes, Conflicts and Culture in the Programmed Society*, trans. Leonard F. X. Mayhew (New York: Random House, 1971).
- 18 Talcott Parsons, “Some Reflections on Post-Industrial Society”, *Japanese Sociological Review* 24 (1973), p. 109–113.
- 19 Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
- 20 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’”, *Political Writings*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 61–92.
- 21 Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), chap. 6.
- 22 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929).
- 23 Stiegler, *Technics and Time, 3*, p. 140–141, and see chap. 2.
- 24 Jean-François Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud, *Just Gaming*, trans. Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985).

the shadows the question of the schematism – and in this case, he leaves it *in the aesthetic shadow of the sublime*, that is, of the *infinite as the beginning and end of desire*.

And he thereby takes a turn that is not just linguistic, but aestheticizing, as do most of the philosophers of that period, and as does, today, Jacques Rancière – all thereby fleeing from the new question of political economy concealed in the becoming-techno-logical of the technics of grammatization, a becoming that has struck *logos* with an unprecedented shock.

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If we propose that there is a fourth synthesis, which makes possible the work of the three syntheses of the imagination as presented in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and as their arrangement; and if we posit that this synthesis is *tekhne* – and I am here taking up Lyotard's theme in "*Logos and Techne*"²⁵ – then it is with Kant that we must discuss the *immatériau*.

For if the *schema* becomes *tertiary retention*, as I have argued in *Technics and Time*, 3, then it is an *immatériau* – as well as being what I call a *hyper-material*, supported and formed by *hyper-matter*.

(A word on this word, *immatériau* – which emerged from a seminar on the root "*mât*" given by Lyotard at the Collège international de philosophie: Lyotard was originally asked by the Centre de création industrielle of the Centre Pompidou to create an exhibition on new materials. The *immatériau* is *anything but immaterial*. It is not simply a material, but it is *very material*. This material is, notably, that of language machines – that is, of language, and with it of *logos*, deemed since the advent of metaphysics (that is, since Plato) to proceed from or originate in those immaterials that are the spiritual, the suprasensible, the intelligible, and so on. I would have liked to speak to you in these terms about what I call *hyper-matter*, but I cannot do this on this occasion. Were I able, I would have tried to show that the *immatériau* requires us to think what I have called the *organized inorganic* and the *power of organization* that results from the organological and pharmacological situation of this technical form of life that is, according to Georges Canguilhem, the non-inhuman²⁶ – but there is insufficient time for this here.)

In the economic and political context that was being engineered in the 1980s as the conservative revolution and ultra-liberalism – an economic and political context that exceeded thought, that thought was no longer capable of understanding – it is precisely the functioning and *dysfunction* of this schematism

25 Jean-François Lyotard, "*Logos and Techne, or Telegraphy*", *The Inhuman: Reflections on Time*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

26 Georges Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological*, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett and Robert S. Cohen (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 200–201.

that fails to be understood. Soviet “materialism”, too, which was ultimately a dogma more than a philosophical position, a Stalinist and vulgar metaphysics, was incapable of conceiving, on the basis of Marxist concepts, the epistemological, philosophical, scientific and industrial stakes of information technologies; while in the West, these stakes were increasingly and in a very superficial way conceived as the advent of a “post-industrial” age (a term promoted by Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine, among others) – yet beyond this fable, the American computer and information industry continued to develop at an ever-increasing pace. The delusional discourse of the Soviets, Stalinists and ordinary Marxists about American power with respect to computational technologies was thus a clear historical symptom of the denial of the organological, pharmacological and hyper-material power of America: such a denial is symptomatic of the inability to think what is at stake, namely, the schematism concretized through what in *Technics and Time*, 3 I call *retentional systems*.

These systems are what, three years after *Les Immatériaux*, in Lyotard’s analysis of anamnesis and hypomnesis on the basis of the notions of breaching, scanning and passing, *The Inhuman* renders unthinkable.

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Les Immatériaux, as I have said, set the scene for Lyotard’s thesis on Kant, the relations between the four *Critiques*, and the impossibility of overcoming what Lyotard called their *differend* – which is a correlate of *différance*.

This interpretation of Kant constitutes the real issue of what, in 1979, Lyotard described as the “postmodern” condition – which I, some 30 years later, understand as being, rather, a techno-logical, organo-logical and pharmaco-logical condition.

This discourse of the *differend* posits that the cognitive is never enough, and argues that the didactic cannot *bear witness* to the *differend*, where the witness is a singularity that cannot be reduced and where this irreducibility is that of the figural. And this discourse is extended in *The Inhuman* into a discourse on technics – and on a technics omnipresent in *Les Immatériaux* that in my view Lyotard was unable to think other than as a *deceptive machine* attesting to the “postmodern condition” – as that which leads to rationalization, as Adorno and Horkheimer and then Habermas refer to or describe it after Max Weber.²⁷ But confronted with this rationalization, Lyotard concludes that nothing can be done.

27 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: Allen and Unwin, 1930); Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Jürgen Habermas, “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’”, *Toward a Rational Society*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 81–121.

Nothing can be done because no unification is possible for the *differend*, nor for the One, and so on. No unitive synthesis is possible. And hence there is no possibility of making or inscribing a difference of fact and law, in the sense of a subjective and unifying principle of differentiation.

Unification, however, *does occur*, and it does so, precisely, techno-logically – as a techno-logical synthesis that is the condition of the ana-mnesic synthesis; that is, of writing, and not as resistance, but rather as invention; that is, as the *après-coup* that constitutes the second moment of the doubly epokhal redoubling as a new process of transindividuation, constituting a new therapeutic of this *pharmakon* to which Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark and Frank Wilczek refer without realizing it.

As for the notion that the second moment cannot take place due to the *speed* of a *pharmakon* that operates at the speed of light – that is, as *automaton* and absolute *pharmakon* – this is what in *States of Shock* I tried to show is an *ideological fable* that must be relentlessly combated. This question of speed requires us to think completely differently, and this includes, precisely, thinking the *pharmakon* as such – which is also to say, in its therapeutic positivity. But all this has become an obvious fact in relation to which we are obviously still very impoverished, and for this reason it calls upon us with the greatest urgency: all this can thus also mean we sink into deep melancholy, regardless of how “intelligent” we are purportedly becoming.

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Postmodernity would be the end of the emancipatory possibility and of “narratives” affirming and realizing a state of law: if it is true that rational knowledge is the capacity to decide this difference that is law within a state of fact, then this amounts to the problem that knowledge has become a commodity and is performatively submitted to a *factual systemic constraint* that *dissolves in advance* any extra-performative legitimacy (in the sense that Lyotard gives to “performative”, a sense that never quite seems clear, but that can clearly *not* be reduced to the Austinian definition, nor to the exegesis on this proposed by Derrida).

As for the differentiation of law within fact, this is an extremely timely question – as we will soon see in relation to “big data”, that is, high-performance computing applied to massive data sets. And here, we must resume the reading of Kant via *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*,²⁸ in order to recall that such a re-reading *today*, that is, *in the epoch of language machines*, is possible only *through a re-definition of the schematism on the basis of this immaterial hyper-material that is tertiary retention*, as literal tertiary retention

28 Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Cambridge, 2009).

as well as digital tertiary retention, but also as analogue tertiary retention – these three retentional types constituting what in *Technics and Time*, 2 I call *orthothetic hypomneses*. And at this point I would like to recall my analysis of these questions in *Technics and Time*, 3:

In dismissing this retentional fabric of the originary constituting of time, of what he calls the “ownmost time” of Dasein, and through his opposition to the “time of preoccupation” of the *They* or the *One*, under the pretext that tertiary retention is also the material support for the calculation and measurement of time, Heidegger is prevented from engaging a true critique of either Kant or Husserl: he does precisely the same thing he accuses Kant of doing.

If Kant was not able to detect this *contradiction*, in which he attempts to call the world back to an a priori principle, which is *his* contradiction – which shows that it is not possible for any flux of consciousness, even that of Kant himself, to respect his unifying principles, even when they have been formalized by that consciousness itself – this is, as Philonenko points out,

the result of his conception of space, which he conceives as the frame within which the world will lay itself out; in other words, *the Kantian subject has no originary relation to a world, but only to a space*; he is originally subject-without-world; it is because he has a space that he can have a world, and not because he has a world that he can have a space. Consequently, if space logically precedes the world and conditions its dimensions, the principle that allows the operation of an a priori distinction in space – the sense of left and right – will also allow me to operate a posteriori distinctions in the world. *It can thus be seen that the foundation of the Kantian analysis is at the same time its contradiction: it is the apriority of space, and yet it is nothing other than this apriority that is brought into question through the critique of the Kantian principle of orientation in space.* The true a priori, as the *need for a memory of any object’s position* clearly shows, is not space in the Kantian sense, but being-in-the-world.

But in fact, to have a world can *be* Dasein’s spatiality only because this in-the-world-ness is itself the in-the-world-ness of the *temporality* that is Dasein. Spatiality *is* the in-the-world-ness of Dasein. And Dasein’s in-the-world-ness *is first and foremost, as the already-there, its temporality*. Thus Dasein’s spatiality is its temporality. In other words, temporality must *itself be worldly* in a sense different from that which Heidegger accords to this qualifier when referring to “innerworldly” temporality, but which *operates through* this “innerworldliness” so that the in-the-world-ness

of the temporality of Dasein, as having-to-be *its* time, *weaves* it (Dasein's temporality) *as what conditions its synthesis*.²⁹

None of this is problematized by Lyotard, even at the very moment he discusses the question of the unitive synthesis in Kant, or when he makes reference to the "immaterials" that are language machines; and this seems to me, today, highly problematic. Because it is *this* that constitutes the question of the *im-matériaux*, which is the question that, between the immaterial and the material, requires us to exceed the opposition between materialism and idealism, and to revisit the notion of "objects invested with spirit,"³⁰ notions of *hau*, *mana*,³¹ *totem*, of categorization in Durkheim's sense,³² and that can be thought only as what, exceeding the opposition of form and matter, and as hyper-matter, constitutes a tertiary retention forming the *imateriau* of all *Weltgeschichtlichkeit*, so to speak.

Les Immatériaux did set the scene for digital tertiary retention, but what it lacked was a hyper-materialist conception – a conception not postmodern, but *ultramodern*. Beyond the primacy of time over space (as internal sense) or of space over time (as *Umwelt* constituting a sphere or a *Lichtung*), there lies the question of speed; and, beyond this question, that of the relationship between automatization and dis-automatization – of automatization in the service of dis-automatization.

In *The Differend*, there is no One that would be reason. Do we therefore conclude that the reduction of knowledge to informational commodity would then be either possible or acceptable? About this reduction, Lyotard suggests we must "resist". I believe that we must, on the contrary, *invent*. We must invent a pharmacological critique (for the duplicity of the pharmacological situation is what the *default of the one* really means), a pharmacological critique that calls for an organology both theoretical and practical, that is: inventing and configuring its instruments according to the therapies and therapeutics that are the anamnestic transindividuation processes wherein disciplines are formed. This would be an organology that instantiates the *differend* – each time differently – through the *epochs* of tertiary retention and through the two moments of the doubly epokhal redoubling.

29 Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, 3, p. 161–162, translation modified.

30 Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), p. 250. And see Bernard Stiegler, *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology*, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 72–74.

31 On *mana* and *hau*, see Marcel Mauss, *A General Theory of Magic*, trans. Robert Brain (London and New York: Routledge, 1972), p. 133–134; and Marcel Mauss, *The Gift*, trans. W. D. Halls (London: Routledge: 1990), p. 1–12.

32 Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 21–33.

But there can be no organology, nor any pharmacology, without a new critique of political economy, and this must also be a positive critique of *The German Ideology*³³ – of the way it outlines an organology, and of its non-pharmacological character.

To look back in this way at the critical aftermath of the contemporary doubly epokhal redoubling, *where Lyotard would in the final reckoning have borne witness to the first moment*, we must re-read those pages of *Discourse, Figure* in which Lyotard raises the question of writing. For if, in *The Inhuman*, Lyotard opposes writing to telegraphy – and it is this opposition that constitutes the regression leading to the “philosophy of resistance” – in *Discourse, Figure* he apprehends writing from an extremely fruitful perspective, in relation to what I myself analyse as a retentional system:

Writing, unlike speech, institutes a dimension of visibility, of sensory spatiality ... [T]he discourse of signification haunted from within by the deconstructions specific to Mallarmean stylistics [is] affected in the exteriority of its (graphic) signifier by the same “primary” spatial play.³⁴

One might then be able to reinvest anamnesis in terms of retentional systems *older than* drive-based systems. But if this is a site for construction, it must wait for another occasion. And our goal must be invention, conceived as an individuation at once psychic, collective and technical, where individuation is defined *essentially* as a technical and technological situation in which *tekhnē* and *logos* must not be opposed to each other, nor conflated, but where *logos* must be treated as an historical modality of the transindividuation of *tekhnē* qua process of grammatization – and in a situation that, today, produces a process of generalized proletarianization, a situation that is a matter of over-coming through the *invention of a new libidinal economy*.

Translated from the French by Daniel Ross.

33 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, no translator listed (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976).

34 Jean-François Lyotard, *Discourse, Figure*, p. 63, and 482, translation modified.