Article:

Dinge im Kollektiv. Zur Differenz phänomenologischer und ANTistischer Denkansätze

Husserl’s analysis of perception and Heidegger’s theory of time are both fi xated on the objectivity of objects - or the objectrelation of experience and its essential constitution. This refl ects - and in the case of Heidegger quite explicitly - Kantian heritage. This phenomenological, transcendental relevance of the object essentially refers to intentionality - and thus an object-related fi gure of self-transcending subjectivity. Quite diff erently, Latour determines the status of things in the collective, ascribing to them an agency that brackets the traditional opposition between acting subjects and passive objects. The contribution encircles precisely that critical point which leads to the separation of phenomenological and ANTistical approaches. While phenomenology grounds itself by reconstructing the experience of objects, ANT focuses on the description of the structures of action, which are composed of actants of all kinds. Finally, the question arises whether Latour’s collectivist sociology can learn from phenomenology’s methodological solipsism that there is a constructive dimension and plenitude of power in the work of description that is not just left to actors in general, but above all to the analyst herself ?