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The transnational Black Lives Matter Movement (Williams 2015) marks and combats structural racism and institutional discrimination as forms of everyday racisms. Current everyday, ›tacit‹ racism in its many forms has not only been handed down, but is also publicly reinvented and partly re-normalized. The social and cultural sciences are undoubtedly called upon to publicly counter these developments. In our opinion,

this implies an extension of scientific responsibility from texts, ideas, knowledge and research programs to include universities as the institutions we work in as well as the social and political contexts in which we are embedded. We hope that the debate on tacit racism initiated by Waverly Duck and Anne Rawls will have some power to support this.

Tacit Racism is Institutionalized in Interaction in the US: What about Elsewhere?¹

Anne Warfield Rawls and Waverly Duck

We were asked to write a summary of our book *Tacit Racism* (Rawls/Duck 2020) to stimulate discussion of our research approach in Europe. In doing so we confront several challenges. First, a summary leaves out details, which is problematic because our argument rests on detailed analysis of social interaction. Summarizing the relationship between our argument and prior theory and research on Race, including the Black American and minority scholarship from which it takes inspiration, is also complicated.² Our research

is unique. But there are important relationships and we address these below (see also Rawls/Whitehead/Duck 2020). That Europe and the US have different histories of Race and colonization, and that the discussion in Europe is in a ›post-colonial‹ phase, is another challenge. There is no corresponding ›colonial‹ phase of relations between Races in the US. The whole country began as a former colony.³ Black Americans were not colonized by White Americans, nor were they ever ›immigrants‹ in the European sense. The language and literature of post-colonialism do not fit.⁴ Furthermore, the idea of Race is itself problematic. As we discuss it, Race is an American invention, a social construction as W.E.B. Du Bois argued, with no basis in biology. Du Bois also argued that while Race is the most significant category dividing the

1 Die deutsche Übersetzung ist unter <https://doi.org/10.25819/ubsi/10116> frei zugänglich.

The German translation is openly accessible at <https://doi.org/10.25819/ubsi/10116>.

2 We capitalize Race and other exclusionary category terms as a possibly irritating reminder that Race is a social fact and not a biological fact in all our publications. Although the social fact status of Race has been acknowledged since Du Bois introduced the idea – there are still too many who consider Race a natural distinction. From there it is easy talk about how natural it is for people to be afraid of differences. What differences? Our answer is that the differences that scare people – the ones that ›count‹ – are socially constructed differences, not natural differences.

3 In our book we do discuss the possibility that White Americans are suffering from a colonial mentality that dates from the 1600's. But it is quite evident that Black Americans are not.

4 However, recent immigrants to the US from former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and elsewhere, have brought the post-colonial mentality to the US, creating problems in the Black American community that we discuss in our book.

US population, it is also the primary unifier within the Black community. The experience of racism that Du Bois called »double consciousness« gives Black Americans insight into racism and democracy that White Americans lack. While aspects of that insight may have been exported along with the concept of Race, it has no European counterpart.

Tacit Racism is a book about how systemic racism in the US has become institutionalized in the taken-for-granted practices of everyday interaction – in what we call »interaction orders of Race« – such that ordinary people are constantly doing racist things without being aware of it. Most discussions of Race and racism have focused either on individual prejudice or on formally institutionalized racism in legal and other formal organizations. This centers the discussion on »racists« rather than »racism« and on formal processes rather than interaction (e.g., the currently popular terms »micro-aggression« and »implicit bias« both focus on individual behavior). We hope to change this narrative by refocusing the discussion on the systemic racism embedded in social interaction. Our research is unique in treating interactional expectations as »structures of racism« that are »institutionalized« at the level of social interaction. Acting on these structures produces racist outcomes – *in what people do* – regardless of individual intent or awareness.

We expect that something similar is happening in Europe, as immigrants seeking to join new societies confront the cultural biases coded into the interactional expectations and social categories of the countries they now live in, and we invite researchers from around the world to join us in documenting this problem. However, we caution that the conceptions of Race and the tacit structures of interaction involved will not be the same across countries (or even regions).

In our book, we consider these issues in the context of a Black/White binary racial category system

that developed in the early North American colonies in the late 1600s and persists today as an American tradition. We do not use the term tradition to refer to differences between societies, but rather to refer to differences within the US that are shaped by the 400-year domination of Black Americans by White Americans, and the resulting privileges that some 60% of White voters in the 2020 presidential election still claimed as their right. These traditions date from slavery, and the racial domination they encode still grounds US economy and society.

Suppression of minority scholarship is also an American tradition. The marginalization of pioneering research on Race and slavery contributed by Black and Jewish scholars, and the trend toward individualism and positivism in research and theory aligned with White ideals that silenced their voices, contribute to the invisibility of racism (Rawls/Duck 2019). Racism and a Race-based system of labor control and oppression sit at the foundation of US society. Treating Race as a side issue, of relevance only to minorities, has trivialized the centrality of the problem, hidden it from view, and allowed it to fester. In the US, those who cling to tradition and resist change are clinging to racist domination and White supremacy whether they realize it or not.

Misunderstandings of what Race is are also problematic. Race is a social category with no biological basis, a point made originally by Du Bois (1940). Until recently, his position was ignored, and Race treated as a natural scientific category. Societies generate the social categories members use to organize themselves and their experiences. As such, Race varies against the history and social organization of any given society or country. How Race categories developed to force Africans to labor as slaves for the benefit of their English owners in the early colonies (which we discuss below) shaped not only the development of conceptions of Race, but how tacit racism is embedded

in the interactional expectations of Black and White Americans today.⁵

Our studies of how tacit racism has become institutionalized in interaction orders are situated within this exclusively American background. While most approaches to racism treat it either as a psychological effect of prejudice and hate, or as an aspect of formal structures, we argue that focusing on individuals and formal structures has had the effect of hiding dimensions of racism that are socially institutionalized in interaction, thus helping to perpetuate it.⁶

The solution we offer is to expose the interactional practices of systemic racism, as they are institutionalized in the daily practices of Americans, while calling attention to the Black and minority scholars whose insights we build on (including key Jewish scholars), and the innovative research practices they developed (ethnomethodology and conversation analysis EM/CA). We hope to produce awareness among majority thinkers of how racism shapes literally everything. Du Bois called the Black American awareness of racism »double consciousness«. In homage to him we call the awareness we hope our research will produce »White double consciousness«.

Our approach involves the claim that some phenomena popularly referred to as »micro« and considered a matter of individual attitudes (»micro-aggressions« and/or »implicit bias«) actually

5 When »scientific« racism emerged in England and at the beginning of the Twentieth century it elaborated on earlier conceptions of Race that had originated in the US colonies.

6 Getting people focused away from individual »good intentions« toward how society is structured is necessary. If the overall structure is fundamentally racist and exclusionary, then good intentions, no matter how good they make us feel about ourselves, will perpetuate systemic racism (as in Mannheim's ([1929]1936) example of how a person who gives money to a beggar is actually supporting the economic system that makes beggars out of people in the first place).

involve structures of interactional expectation that are constitutive of self, social objects and meaning. There are no social selves/identities without society. The popular psychologizing of social action, and the treatment of actors and social objects/meanings as existing independent from interaction – has been an obstacle to getting this point across. The interaction that creates these objects happens *between* people – through seeable, hearable sounds and motions that occur in time and space that cannot be reduced to ideas and intentions. As social structures, interaction orders do not vary with the beliefs and attitudes of individuals, but rather involve structures of shared interactional expectation used by individuals to *make* meaning, self and social objects.

In using the term »structures«, we do not mean either »macro« or »micro« structures. We refer to the structure of interaction orders; sets of expectations that are constitutive of the objects and meanings they produce; something like the rules of a game. The argument parallels Chomsky and Wittgenstein who proposed grammars of syntax and »language games« respectively. Our approach expands the idea to grammars of action or culture (an idea first proposed by Garfinkel and Sacks; see Garfinkel [1967]2020 and Rawls 2019a, Rawls/Turowetz 2019).

Garfinkel (1963) proposed a set of reciprocity conditions – »trust conditions« – as a requirement for »orienting« these rules cooperatively. Working with Garfinkel, Sacks proposed that the rules for a speech exchange system could be identified empirically (Sacks 1962). We recognize Garfinkel and Sacks as pioneers with insights into the processes of exclusion that originated in their own experiences as Jewish minorities (Garfinkel [1947]2012; 1956). For Garfinkel these experiences took place in the American »deep south« (North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, Texas, Mississippi) in the 1930's and 1940's where he was not considered White (Rawls/Whitehead/Duck 2020; Rawls forthcoming a).

The ›trust conditions‹ – constitutive conditions of reciprocity in interaction – which Garfinkel (1963) proposed, are roughly that participants must use the same definition of the situation, orient the same expectations or rules, extend benefit of the doubt to others, assume other participants are competent until they show they are not, confirm competent presentational work by others, and assume that others are doing the same and assuming the same of them. All of this occurs at an unconscious level of taken-for-granted, and thus largely hidden, practices.

Given these conditions, participants can orient shared rules in an infinite number of ways and innovate endlessly. But, for actions to be mutually understood they must be recognizable as ›moves‹ that orient the constitutive expectations of a particular game, or social/cultural practice. As Garfinkel ([1967]2020) argued, taking the other persons' pieces off the board in chess, or putting your mark outside the lines in tic-tac-toe, is not »playing the game« and people cannot play it with you if you do it. The same is true for the interaction orders of everyday life.

The interactional expectations we identify with tacit racism are institutionalized structures in this sense. They are expectations – constitutive grammars of interaction – that belong to a situation of social action such that they are ›constitutive‹ of the *recognizability of an action as action* of a particular sort (greetings, introductions, confirmations, instructions, etc.), for people who share those expectations. When actions do not meet the constitutive expectations of others, those others cannot recognize what has been done, or said. They will typically be troubled by this, and assign motive/blame to the individual who has done the unexpected thing. We find that this happens often between Races in the US because systemic inequality has led to the development of clashing interaction order expectations for Black and White Americans (Rawls/Duck 2020; Duck 2015; Duck 2016).

Failures at the level of interaction order are consequential not only because they result in loss of meaning, but because in violating ›trust conditions‹ they impact judgments of the competence of participants, their motivation and their trustworthiness, reducing the general willingness of people to try interacting again. Discovering and analyzing troubles at this level of interaction order requires detailed ethnographic observation supported by audio/video data, an interactional approach to self and identity, and an approach to meaning that does not focus on concepts, or comprehensive symbolic systems, but rather on how social categories are created and used *in-situ*, and on the ›order properties‹ of the ›sequences‹ of social action that people tacitly orient in making sense together.⁷

In what follows we offer some historical and theoretical background for our approach and then discuss three of our findings in the context of the historical oppression of Black labor in the US and the insights of Black and minority scholars about those conditions. First, we find that there are Race differences in interaction order expectations about what should be said and done when Americans first meet one another, in what we call »introductory sequences«; Second, we find that high status Black Americans experience frequent failures by others to recognize their legitimate identities, which we call »fractured reflections« of their presentations of self; and, third, we document a Black American practice we call »submissive civility«, a conception inspired by Du Bois' argument that the Black American value of submission to the good of the whole is a valuable democratic practice that could offset the undemocratic

7 »Order properties« is being used in both a literal and a technical sense here. Sequences have order properties such that whether something said or done comes first or second, for instance, has implications for what it means (Sacks/Schegloff/Jefferson 1974).

›White strong man‹ ideal.⁸ We analyze this practice through a Black/White Police/Citizen encounter that was video-recorded. Overall, we argue that Black Americans are not only the democratic heart of the US, but that they are consistently punished by the majority for their democratic behavior.

Background for our Conception of Interaction Orders of Race

Our conception of ›interaction orders of Race‹ builds on groundbreaking early work on Race and inequality by Harold Garfinkel (1940; [1942]1949; [1942]2012), in combination with Erving Goffman's conception of interaction orders (joined later by Harvey Sacks' examination of how Race categories are used in conversation). The research is also informed by W.E.B. Du Bois' (1903) foundational writings on Race, and Eric Williams' (1944) pioneering analysis of slavery and capitalism. Our theoretical formulation began in the 1970's (in consultation with Garfinkel) and continued through the 1980's with an initial focus on narratives about slavery (Rawls 1983; 1987; 1989; 1990). After 1987 the empirical research on Race differences in social interaction began. The intent has been to make interactional aspects of Race and inequality that ordinarily remain hidden and taken-for-granted visible. This has been done through an EM/CA inspired analysis of interaction and its expectations as revealed by troubles in interaction

8 ›Submissive civility‹ can be difficult for White people to understand. From a White perspective it has negative connotations of both ›femininity‹ and ›submission‹. But, why should anyone think it is inferior to be feminine? Or, why should anyone think that considering the good of the whole before one's own self-interest is either weak or negative? Black Americans do not think that being democratic and treating people as equals makes a man feminine. White men aggressively refusing to save American lives in the name of their own personal freedom during the COVID-19 pandemic gave us all an important illustration of this point.

and narratives about those troubles. This approach – *to make the hidden visible* by focusing on problems and accounts – is the essence of Garfinkel's studies of ethno-methods in social interaction, which we treat as a method for producing a kind of ›double consciousness‹ about social practices.

While Du Bois is not generally thought of as a social interactionist, we argue that his work provides a starting point for analyzing racism in interaction, and for conceptualizing the Black American worldview and social expectations that developed in opposition to that racism (Rawls 2000). Our approach also acknowledges the contributions of approaches to Race and ›implicit bias‹ developed in Critical Race Theory (Bell 1973; Crenshaw/Gotlanda/Peller/Thomas 1995, Delgado/Stefancic 1995), and the groundbreaking conception of ›intersectionality‹ developed in Black Feminist Thought (Crenshaw 1989; Spillers 1987; Hill-Collins 1990). However, our research focus is different and has independent origins. Whereas Critical Race Theory and Black Feminist Thought focus on experiential and structural implications of Race, gender and inequality, we explore how those inequalities have become institutionalized in the interactional structures of everyday social interaction – in typically unnoticed ways – such that interaction orders vary by Race identity and positioning in American society.

This dimension of racism in interaction has been largely overlooked by other approaches. The question we ask is how the inequalities that have been documented by Critical Race Theorists in the large-scale economic and social relations that characterize the separate worlds of Black and White Americans, and the differences in awareness of the relationship between individual selves and the larger community revealed by research on intersectionality, translate into interactional practices – into clashing ›interaction orders of Race‹. In doing so, we reprise a largely neglected interactional side of Du Bois' argument and connect it to Garfinkel's research.

While Du Bois (1903: 134) did not address the issue of interactional differences in detail, he did include communicative issues in his consideration of ›double consciousness‹, arguing that there are four levels of ›race contact‹: the first level is physical proximity, the second concerns economic relations, and the third, political relations. The fourth level, which he calls ›less tangible‹, involves interaction and conversation. Indeed, his own first experience of racial inequality is described in the context of a schoolroom interaction. It is this fourth level which we take up. According to Du Bois, this interactional level of Race contact consists of:

»[t]he interchange of ideas through conversation and conference, through periodicals and libraries, and, above all, the gradual formation for each community of that curious tertium quid which we call public opinion. Closely allied with this come the various forms of social contact in everyday life« (Du Bois 1903: 135).

Du Bois' treatment of interaction as an essential form of Race contact includes the role that daily interactional practices play in the formation of individual self-consciousness, in the achievement of mutual intelligibility, the creation of narratives, rumors, stereotypes, and finally, in the interplay between those institutional structures that result from, and then place constraints on, differences in communicative practices. Du Bois says:

»It is, in fine, the atmosphere of the land, the thought and feeling, the thousand and one little actions which go to make up life. In any community or nation it is these little things which are most elusive to the grasp and yet most essential to any clear conception of the group life taken as a whole« (Du Bois 1903: 147).

While interaction is essential, its ›elusive‹ workings, he says, are *curiously invisible*. This, for Du Bois, ›is peculiarly true of the South‹. Describing interactions in the south during the first Jim Crow period, Du Bois

(1903: 148) emphasizes the subtlety of the forces at work, which are so unobtrusive, he says, that ›the casual observer visiting the South sees at first little of this‹. People are quite literally living in different socially constructed worlds. Du Bois (1903: 148) says that the visitor: ›realizes at last that silently, resistlessly, the world about flows by him in two great streams; they ripple on in the same sunshine, they approach and mingle their waters in seeming carelessness, then they divide and flow wide apart‹. Between these two worlds, according to Du Bois, there are almost no points of intimate or intellectual contact:

»Now if one notices carefully one will see that between these two worlds, despite much physical contact and daily intermingling, there is almost no community of intellectual life or point of transference where the thoughts and feelings of one race can come into direct contact and sympathy with thoughts and feelings of the other« (Du Bois 1903: 149).

The lack of close contact that began during reconstruction is different from the close daily contact that occurred between Races in the south before the Civil War, and Du Bois dates the separation between Races to the Reconstruction period. C. Van Woodward (1955), in his famous book *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, insists that racial segregation was an invention of the Jim Crow period, and not part of ›southern tradition‹ as those who have resisted civil rights for Black Americans claim. Jim Crow, and its modern iteration in mass incarceration (Alexander 2011) and the *Chokehold* (Butler 2017), have effectively created and sustained two separate worlds, blocking Black Americans from participation in the White world, while requiring the pretense that their submission to Jim Crow is voluntary, and that they are full participants.

In his first publication, Garfinkel (1940) made the hidden, taken-for-granted character of this complicity the central feature of his approach, pointing

out how the tacit social structures of Jim Crow broke down when two Black bus riders made them explicit by refusing to participate in their own humiliation. Making racism explicit undermines the polite surface veneer behind which it hides, which is one reason why the prospect of Black equality is such a fearful thing to those still wedded to traditional Jim Crow assumptions and practices.

The problem, as Du Bois eloquently develops it, includes the idea that not being able to achieve mutual reciprocity and equality with a group of others, particularly through close daily contact, is damaging to the development of both self and mutual understanding. »In a world where it means so much to take a man by the hand and sit beside him, to look frankly into his eyes and feel his heart beating with red blood; in a world where a social cigar or a cup of tea together means more than legislative halls and magazine articles and speeches, one can imagine the consequences of the almost utter absence of such social amenities between estranged races, whose separation extends even to parks and street-cars« (Du Bois 1903: 150).

While Black and White Americans may occupy the same physical space, we rarely occupy the same interactional space. Because interactional expectations developed separately for 160 years, displays of social behavior by members of one Race can look deviant to members of the other. Interaction orders demand compliance with expected use, which is constitutive of the social production of self, social objects and meaning (Goffman 1959; 1961; 1963; Rawls 1987; 1989). Actions within a practice can constitute recognizable social identities and objects that cannot exist without it: But only when they orient expectations in recognizable ways. Because the expectations of the two interaction orders are not the same, White and Black Americans often violate each other's expectations and the resulting judgments of incompetence have a moral tone.

Black Americans experience an added difficulty: as selves who must interact in two conflicting interaction orders, they are held to two conflicting sets of demands. In order to recognizably construct practices in one interaction order, they often must violate the expectations of the other. These conflicting interactional requirements confront the African American self in American society on a daily basis. A degree of social/moral tension greater than the challenge of having one's role or identity differentially shaped and valued from situation to situation is involved. White Americans tend to be unaware of this. In spite of their lack of awareness, however, White academics have been confident in dismissing the insights of Black scholars.

The Invention of Race in the US

The argument, as we make it, is grounded in a Race-based labor system designed by an English colonial empire in the 1600s that shaped the US economy, politics, law and social structure, and persisted across 400 years to become institutionalized in contemporary interaction. Race was invented to support the system of colonial labor in the American colonies when it confronted a sudden scarcity of unfree English/Irish labor (due to the start of industrialization in England around 1660), just as unfree African labor became plentiful (after the treaty of Westminster gave England access to the African slave trade in 1654). This, according to Theodore Allen (1994; 1997), gave birth to the modern idea of Race and explains why English colonies in North America developed a Black/White Race binary while Spanish and Portuguese colonies did not. It has little to do with the colonizing culture and everything to do with labor control issues.

Before this, Race categories were not used in the colonies, or anywhere else in the world. Previous references were to color, physical description, religion, nationality and culture. So, in an important sense *the birth of the modern conception of Race occurred in the US because early plantation owners needed their*

*newly freed English/Irish laborers to begin suppressing their former African workmates, with whom they had previously been allied. The new category ›White‹ was used to encourage that suppression, a development that became so popular that White Americans are now, according to Jonathan Metzl (2019), *Dying of Whiteness*.⁹*

Social categories, and expectations about their use, constrain possible identities and situate people in a status quo. New uses of categories can create a new status quo, or challenge an old one. That the US American Black/White binary developed to serve the purpose of suppressing Black laborers is a moral loading that is inherent in the categories. A person who says they are »proud to be White« invokes that moral loading whether they intend to or not. ›Whiteness‹ has meaning only against that binary. Being »proud to be Black« has very different moral loading.¹⁰

In considering how and why this Race category system has persisted over four centuries and through the development of science, industry, and an allegedly ›free‹ labor system (that continues to suppress Black workers), we invoke Durkheim’s ([1893]1933) distinction between consensus-based social forms that are organized on the basis of traditional beliefs and categories (that resist change), and dynamic practice-based social forms that can self-regulate without consensus in contexts of diversity and specialization.

9 Metzl (2019) documents how the mythology of Whiteness encourages White Americans to support the interests of the rich in ways that lower their own quality of life and health; increases the proliferation of guns and gun violence (including high rates of suicide among White men), defund schools in an effort to hurt minority students, cut taxes for the rich in ways that strip infrastructure budgets, cut social services and vote against affordable health care.

10 In every country there will be ordinary words that have such moral loadings that need to be explored.

This is not a distinction between the US and other societies. Rather, we distinguish between places/situations within the US that cling to traditions based on slavery and Jim Crow segregation, and others, where people have begun to embrace new forms of self-regulating practice-based science, technology and occupations. The latter have multiplied in cities and on the coasts, where populations are more diverse, and specialized occupations have concentrated. In places where resistance to racial equality is strongest, the diverse populations and specialized occupations that generate self-regulating practices have not developed to the same degree, leaving those places dependent on consensus.¹¹

This leaves the US divided between two forms of society with conflicting moral and organizational requirements. Often referred to as a »culture war« we treat it as a conflict between two ways of even having a culture/society (Rawls 2021). Traditional consensus-based societies and businesses not only tolerate inequality, they can thrive on hierarchies within and boundaries between themselves and others. However, in diverse specialized societies and occupations/sciences, where self-regulating practices predominate and experts are essential, the reciprocity requirements of practices – the ›trust conditions‹ – require equality/justice within the practice (Rawls 2019b). While people may adopt a *belief* in justice, unless they do the hard work of rooting out injustice, residual consensus will remain embedded in new

11 It is a sad fact today that tax surpluses from Blue states need to be given to Red states to make up their budget deficits, while the voters in Red states complain that their tax dollars are supporting Black Americans in big cities, and vote to cut their taxes even more. Red states are not supporting Blue states. Red states continue cutting their own social services because they believe this. It is a vicious cycle supported by false beliefs. If Blue states refused to support them most Red states would immediately go bankrupt.

self-regulating orders of practice – such that a belief in justice exists alongside tacit forms of injustice that contradict the social requirements of those practices and keep them from working for all people. This is why a failure to root out the racist foundations of US social structure have been so devastating.

Some places/situations openly embrace a tradition of racism. Others reject that tradition in principle, but because it is so deeply embedded, have not yet been able to reject it in practice. Consequently, while parts of the US that still rely on traditional consensus are more overtly racist, in more diverse and educated communities lingering injustices have become tacit, and tacit racism has become the predominate form perpetuating racism in those places.

Durkheim's classic ([1893]1933) explanation of this clash between traditional consensus and self-regulation is one of the minority insights that have been lost because majority scholars insisted on misinterpreting him as a consensus theorist when he argued against the need for consensus in modernity. One reason White scholars might have missed the point of Durkheim's critique, is that in ordinary times they live in a world where most things accord with their beliefs and challenges their majority views are rare. It feels like consensus. By contrast, minority scholars and women confront constant challenges to the validity of even their own personal experiences, giving them an awareness that there is no consensus holding things together.

All societies have some consensus and some self-regulation. The difference is in the proportion. As societies develop a significant proportion of self-regulating practices, they often still retain enough residual consensus to prevent equality and justice from actualizing – even when people fervently *believe* in justice. This is problematic because self-regulation in diverse modern contexts requires more cooperation and flexibility than consensus permits. Without an explicit program of moral education, Durkheim

(1925) feared that traditional injustices would remain entrenched and societies would take problematic abnormal forms.

The US currently finds itself such an 'abnormal form'. We live in a type of society that requires justice in its scientific and technical practices and between members of a diverse population – but we are without actual justice – and we have not adopted a system of moral/civic education that could solve the problem. In fact, we have been retreating toward a consensus-based educational system that strengthens tradition and weakens self-regulation.

Once a society has diversified and become dependent on science and technology a strong traditional consensus is a problem. Forms of interaction that require equality cannot succeed between unequal categories of people. The illusion of fairness can be maintained for majority people (who can often manage to talk only to people in their category), while at the same time inequality prevents successful interaction across Race. Given this illusion, talk about racism rarely occurs in day-to-day interaction and when it does is problematic, which leads White people to avoid it (DiAngelo 2018). Thus, the majority have the illusion of justice, when the whole system is built on racism.

The excluded tend to be alone in being aware of this. When their voices are eliminated, as they have been, the illusion that there is no problem can be maintained. The theory and methods that support this illusion of fairness are hegemonic, and minority voices that criticize that hegemony (Du Bois; Durkheim; Williams; Garfinkel; Goffman; Sacks), have been marginalized by a combination of misinterpretation and outright suppression of their work. In challenging this hegemony, and arguing that an interactional approach that treats order as constitutive of meaning is necessary to document systemic racism, we build on Du Bois' insight that after reconstruction (after 1876) US society developed two separate streams that flow side-by-side with little contact, and that only

the excluded, who develop »double consciousness«, are aware of this.

It is our position that in a diverse society riddled with systemic racism, and given an academic context that has excluded minority voices and suppressed studies of interaction, huge amounts of tacit racism can be present without majority people being aware of it. Consequently, when Black Americans describe their experiences with racism, most White Americans have not recognized what they are talking about and dismiss their claims. The extraordinary summer of 2020 witnessed a change as White Americans began waking up to the Trump administrations' overtly racist policies/actions (although only 4 in 10 rejected this racism at the polls). But unless we get a better grip on tacit aspects of the problem quickly – interest in it will fade once the more overt aspects of racism become less public – they are no longer so obvious to the majority.

Race Differences in Expectations about »Introductory Sequences«

When people meet each other for the first time they have basic expectations about what information should be shared and how it will be shared. Names are usually exchanged first, and colleagues at the same company might identify the part of the company they work in. But it turns out that beyond those basics, in the US the expectations vary so much by Race that »introductory sequences« between Races are typically fraught with misunderstanding. In the early 1990s, narratives about »nosy White people« relayed by Black colleagues and students, alerted us to problems at the very beginning of interracial interactions in »introductory sequences«. White Americans were routinely asking for information that Black Americans considered private. This was concerning, as it would likely prevent friendships from developing even between Black and White people who wanted to form them. White people we talked to at the time had no idea

what this narrative meant, while almost every Black person we asked recognized the narrative, laughed and then told us a story about their experiences with »nosy White people«.¹²

Garfinkel (2002) called this method of giving a story to get a story a »coathanger«: the story becomes a coathanger for the person you interview to hang their own matching story on. The selection of what story matches the one told by the researcher is done by the interviewee, which is a good exploratory method when a researcher is not a member of a practice. Once we understood more about the narratives, we realized they were evidence of a pervasive phenomenon that should be examined in detail. The challenge was that »introductory sequences« between the same two people only happen once. We needed to be present at such meetings to collect data.

Also, because interaction order expectations are largely tacit, only coming to consciousness when they fail, we realized that the narratives we had collected were likely generated by *failures*, representing the imputing blame and motive phase of post interaction troubles. This left open the question of what success would look like if two Black speakers did not violate one another's expectations? Or, two White speakers?

We did manage to observe a few such introductions ethnographically. But they don't happen often and go by quickly. We decided to make them happen in a setting we controlled and asked for student volunteers. The challenge was to create a context in which »introductory sequences« would occur as naturally as possible so that we could record them on video and analyze how they were organized across an actual interaction. We asked for student volunteers, got their permission to be interviewed on video-tape, and sat them together in a room and then left them to introduce themselves while they waited for us to

12 Waverly Duck, an undergraduate at the time, joined the team in 1996 and has been part of the work ever since.

return. We matched some students in same Race pairs and others in mixed Race pairs. However, we invited only female students, making all pairs female/female, to prevent gender differences from complicating the interactions.

The set-up was designed to allow for the introductory talk Black and White speakers prefer to occur without prompting.¹³ We recorded many such sequences. While each is different in details, we were able to identify preferred characteristics of what we call the Black introductory type and the White introductory type that are constitutive of mutual understanding for those familiar with the expectations, while producing problems for those who are not. We also held dozens of large interracial focus groups, workshops and community meetings about these recordings during which we discussed our analysis and collected feedback.¹⁴

In the original paper (Rawls 2000) and in our book we reproduce transcripts of ›introductory sequences‹ accompanied by an in-depth turn-by-turn analysis of what the order properties involved reveal about Black and White interaction order preferences. We identify a typical White/White introductory sequence that proceeds by asking questions about category information like where a person lives, works, goes to school, their marital status, whether they have children etc. White Americans prefer to *ask and be asked* for this information, and do not generally volunteer information not asked for. Black speakers, by contrast, prefer not to be asked such status and category questions, and prefer to *volunteer* the information they do give. To say that these are preferences means that the occurrence or

13 The videos of ›introductory sequences‹ were made for a 1994 project in which student volunteers participated (discussed in more detail in Rawls 2000; Rawls/Duck 2020).

14 The analysis went on for six years. The recordings were played in class, for focus groups and alumni groups and at public forums.

non-occurrence of asking for category information in the respective interaction orders is meaningful, and that assessments of moral character and mutual commitment are based on whether and how these expectations are fulfilled.

The big point here is that the implications of the same conversational ›move‹ are different in a Black introductory sequence than they are in a White introductory sequence. White speakers *should* ask category questions. If they *don't* it means something and is ›accountable‹ (they are held accountable for the lack). Black speakers *should not* ask. If they *do* it means something and is ›accountable‹. When White Americans talk to Black Americans, who do not answer and ask such questions, it can trigger narratives like ›Black people are rude‹ and ›they were holding back, I don't think they liked me‹. White Americans are apt to feel that they tried their best to be friendly and were rejected. Sometimes they conclude that Black people did not like them because they are White – triggering the narrative that Black people are racist.

For Black Americans such category information is personal. It also quickly reveals social status – which Black Americans avoid – instead focusing on topics drawn from the immediate setting. We find that this does not vary by social class as many scholars expect. If anything, high status Black Americans are more scrupulous about reserving such information about themselves.

This clash explains the Black narrative ›White people are nosy‹. The Black American introductory sequence prefers to proceed on the basis of topics available in the local setting, while avoiding category identifiers that reveal social status and inequality. The emphasis is on what can be seen, heard, smelled, etc., in the immediate surroundings: on ›personhood‹ instead of social status identifiers. *The Black preference is the mirror opposite of the White preference.*

Avoiding categories leads to intimacy among African Americans, whereas it is treated as a way of

avoiding intimacy by White Americans. Maynard and Zimmerman (1984: 304f.), for instance, found that talk focused on the immediate setting seemed to function as a technique for avoiding intimacy and maintaining anonymity in conversations between White college students. By contrast, African Americans in our data report that talk focused on immediate surroundings is respectful of them as persons, and thus preferred. Furthermore, the quest for category identifiers by White participants is treated by Black Americans as devaluing their personhood.

Expectations about this are not the same in Europe, where the White American practice is often considered pushy and rude.

The differences can be both confusing and upsetting. Whereas the preferred White sequence has several clearly identifiable elements that usually come up (residence, job, education, marriage, children), there are no such identifiable elements of a preferred Black American introductory sequence because of its focus on the immediate setting. Avoiding the use of stereotypical identities and categories, participants are expected to talk about things in the setting, such as: »You in the class?« »What's this interview about?« »How you doing?« This preference preserves equality and dignity against the inequalities encountered by Black Americans daily in White American society.

In not relying on category identification as the foundation for building new relationships, Black Americans are engaging in a purer form of reciprocity that promotes equality by relying more exclusively on the self-organizing mutual exhibition of preferences and reciprocities face-to-face and move-by-move, and less on category information. Whereas the African American preference avoids information that would locate persons in a social hierarchy – where most Black Americans are at a disadvantage because of systemic racism – White ›introductory sequences‹ focus on category information that places people into status and role categories. As Goffman (1959)

maintained, the meaning of words and actions depends on the *definition of the situation* and the *role* or *identity* a speaker has within that definition. *This gives status and stereotypes relevance* in ways that bring racial inequalities into interaction from the start. White speakers focus on getting information to settle such identity issues – without being aware of its relationship to systemic racism – while Black speakers work to minimize the relevance of stereotypes and unequally distributed identities: in the process neutralizing inequalities.

»Fractured Reflections« of High Status Black American Presentations of Self

400 years of systemic racism have created a White racial framing of American life (Feagin 2014). Living within this frame Americans – Black and White – learn not to expect to see Black men and women in high status locations and identities. It should be obvious that this racialized way of ›seeing‹ Black people would impact on their ability to perform high status identities. But the general belief seems to be that success can neutralize racism for high status Black Americans.

Our first observation of Fracturing occurred in 2003 when the authors witnessed a puzzling interaction in which a Black man who was confronted with a failure to recognize his competent performance of his high status identity refused to acknowledge that failure. After much discussion and the collection of additional instances, we realized that we had witnessed something important. As with our other findings, it took extensive discussion and observation to achieve an understanding of this phenomenon from both a White and a Black perspective.

Black men and women are constantly confronted by failures to recognize their high status identities (not only by White people). However, they often do not either recognize or repair these failures. Nor do they respond the way the literature on the internalization of negative self-image would predict (Fanon 1952).

Instead, they often refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of those who denied them recognition. They were also talking to each other about these occurrences.

We found that this interaction order preference for refusing to acknowledge such failures, combined with systemic racialized expectations about status and identity was producing what we call »fractured reflections« of self-presentation, a type of interactional event we argue is frequently experienced by Black Americans (Rawls/Duck 2017). Approaches that assume a colonial, post-colonial model of Race expect a loss of self-esteem and/or attempts to repair presentation of self that were not occurring. Approaches that treat self and identity as given prior to interaction also miss the significance of this interactional event.

As with the »introductory sequences« discussed in the prior section, our data collection focused on narratives about the Fracturing event. Like the experiences Du Bois drew on for his conception of »double consciousness«, »fractured reflections« are a well-known »experience« that high status Black men and women tell each other stories about. But they remain unknown to the White Americans who produce them by failing to recognize legitimate Black identities.

To get more detailed descriptions of the existence and contours of the phenomenon we recorded in-depth interviews with 38 high status Black men who were top executives, collecting and transcribing their narratives about Fracturing. We focused on Black men for two reasons: First, Black men are the targets of the most extreme stereotypes about violence and crime, which we had good reason to believe followed them into high status positions; Second, one of the authors is a Black man who had better access to men to discuss this sensitive topic. As with our earlier study of »introductory sequences«, which focused only on women, we decided to avoid confusing gender with Race by focusing only on men. All 38 of the high status Black men we interviewed recognized our narrative

about a Fractured Reflection and told us stories about their own experiences with it. Our original paper (Rawls/Duck 2017) reproduced transcripts of these narratives, and our analysis establishes that Fracturing occurs frequently, provides a description of how it occurs, and, takes up implications. Here we offer only a short description.

During any interaction, people are expected to present an identity they have a right to and that is appropriate to the situation they are in (Goffman 1959). A Black corporate Vice-President we call Robert giving his administrative assistant a task is an exercise of appropriate identity. There is an essential moment in the process when a presentation of identity/self has been made and it is the turn of Other(s) present to recognize, respond to, and ratify that presentation. The integrity, legitimacy, the very existence of the self *as presented*, depends on (and can be changed by) that response. In Robert's narrative, he describes how, when he asks his assistant to do something, she goes behind his back to ask other people (including the company President) if she should do what he says. This is a Fracturing event that Robert refuses to acknowledge to her – but it leads him not to trust, even though he believes that she wants him to succeed. He calls her actions »insubordinate«, interpreting her »checking« as evidence that she does not think he is competent.

Fracturing occurs when the person presenting self, in this case Robert, is given back a reflection of their identity performance that is not recognizable to them (indicating that the Other did not recognize the appropriateness of their identity, or their competence in presenting it), and this happens not only once, but so often that over time they learn not to treat it as accurate feedback that they are doing something wrong.

Typically, we expect a presentation of self that is not confirmed to be repaired by the presenter. For Black Americans, however, there are so many situa-

tions in which, what Joe Feagin (2014) calls a »White racial frame«, prevents Others from recognizing their competent high status identities, that they learn to ignore the problem. Failures to recognize and ratify competent presentations of self, reported frequently by the high status Black men interviewed, threaten to strip them of the social identities they are entitled to, and the dignity, power, and authority associated with those identities. Not only is this an injustice in the conventional sense, it violates the »trust conditions« (Garfinkel 1963), and equality (Durkheim [1893]1933) necessary to make self and social objects together in societies where self-regulating practices predominate.

The »Non-Recognition« of identity experienced by Black Americans (and White women in high status positions) threatens the process of sense and self-making, and led the Black men we studied to take the evasive action we call a »Null-Response«. ¹⁵ Because these men can retreat into their own Black interaction order to confirm their sense of self they are not destroyed by Non-Recognition. But it makes their jobs more difficult and they are constantly faced with inappropriate responses that test their creativity and ingenuity. While the high status Black Americans who have this experience are well aware of it, when it occurs, the White Americans who initiate the Fracturing typically do not understand why their Black friend or boss is doing a Null-Response, or how upsetting it is.

When Black Americans say they experience racism on the job *every day* this is one of the things they mean. There is no place in White American society where a Black American, however accomplished, can count on having their competence and qualifications recognized.

.....
 15 This lack of response is also familiar to the White female author as a preservation technique. But it is doubtful if many White women manage to use it with any consistency.

»Submissive Civility«: *An Orientation of Black Masculinity to Oppression and Inequality*

Du Bois (1890) argued that being submissive to the good of the whole is an important strength highly valued by Black Americans that is not valued enough by White Americans. He referred to the Black ideal in terms of a »submissive man« who is submissive to the good of the whole, contrasting it with what he called the »White strong man« ideal. Du Bois' offered Jefferson Davis, president of the confederacy during the Civil War, as an example of a »strong man«. Davis, who sacrificed the country to serve his own interest in continuing slavery was not orienting the good of the whole. Today Donald Trump represents the same willingness to sacrifice others. In the context of the 2020 presidential election, we offer Joe Biden as an example of a »submissive man« who puts the good of the whole before his own interest. The »strong man« ideal does not represent strength, but wanton self-interest. Similarly, in being submissive to the good of the whole the »submissive man« is strong. The labels do not carry literal meaning.

A just social contract requires citizens to give up some things for the good of the whole. As Hobbes ([1651]1909) initially argued, it is the exchange of the full freedom of animals – to eat and be eaten – for the benefits of living in a society. Debates since Hobbes have mainly been over what a fair social contract would look like, not over the need for one. The question is why so many people revere the »strong man« who takes whatever he can from the whole, while feeling that there is something less admirable in »submission« to the good of the whole.

Given the existence of two such conflicting ideals, we expected that there would be empirical evidence of this in interaction that would be observable as clashes in interactional preferences. It also seemed likely that »submissive civility« would lead to trouble in inter-racial interactions, when the actions of

Black men (in particular) in being ›submissive‹ were misunderstood by White Americans.

While writing up our research on ›fractured reflections‹ around 2015 we observed several interactional responses to racist violence and threat by Black men and women that exhibited a cooperative posture we thought could best be described in Du Bois' terms. After collecting ethnographic observations, we realized there might be recorded instances in archival video of Black/White police/citizen encounters that would facilitate a detailed sequential analysis.

In our original article (Rawls/Duck/Turowetz 2018) we introduced the interactional practice we call ›submissive civility‹, in the context of video data from a Black/White police-citizen encounter. We reproduced a partial transcript of a 16-minute video accompanied by a turn-by-turn CA analysis of the sequential structure of the interaction. The transcript is long and the analysis extensive. Here we summarize only one part of that analysis. The Black male citizen caught up in the encounter, in trying to establish his identity as a resident of the house and city neighborhood where the police approach him, adopts a submissive and cooperative posture. We argue that this is a preferred resource for Black Americans in situations where they are confronted by racialized domination and threat.¹⁶ Because it clashes with the individualistic White American ideal, however, this preference for ›submissive civility‹, which relies on heightened-cooperation and formal respect, is often misunderstood by White Americans, *who tend to interpret social action as if White interactional preferences were the only legitimate expectations*. The two police officers wonder aloud why this Black man is being so cooperative and suggest that he is trying to hide something. That he is trying to show them everything

16 Gabbidon (2007) has argued that Du Bois also laid the foundations for a sociological approach to criminology.

so that they will not suspect him does not occur to them: It is not a practice they recognize.

While ›submissive civility‹ is a Black American preference with strong democratic virtues, the police in our data do not recognize either its preferred status, or its legitimacy. Instead, they treat this Black citizen's cooperation as grounds for suspicion and a pretext for arrest, enforcing White interaction order preferences as if they were legal requirements.

In a democratic society, *access* to situated identities – like ›neighborhood resident‹ – should be equally available by Race. Because of racial oppression and exclusion, however, African Americans are not expected to hold legitimate identities in many situations. When identity problems do occur, interaction order differences in how Black and White Americans try to resolve these problems can create additional misunderstandings.

›Submissive civility‹, is being smart, polite, and civil, going above and beyond what is required to avoid trouble.¹⁷ For Black men, particularly in talking to White police officers, this can be challenging. We find several identity issues at work in the encounter that have particular relevance to how the event unfolds. The Black citizen resident (CR) could not get the officers to recognize him as a person who belongs at his mother's house: a common problem for Black men that is a Fractured Reflection of their identity. Instead, the officers orient a criminal/illegitimate identity from the beginning; a racial stereotype CR refuses to accept. There is a second identity issue working at a deeper level of reciprocity failure. The officers do not see the ›ordinary reasonableness‹ of CR's actions. If he does live here, and is waiting for his mom, his actions are *all* reasonable, and due to the public nature of the case *we know they were*. But the

17 Fassin (2013: 93) found that Arab/Black youth adopt a similar submissive posture when confronted by the French police.

two White officers (PO2 and PO1) keep saying that the situation and his behavior are strange.

From the White male officer's (PO2) initial attempt at ›humor‹ (line 33), which makes fun of CR for trying to break into his mother's house, we see that from the officer's perspective this ›Black guy‹, was acting in a way he did not consider ›normal‹ from the beginning. But he can't arrest him without a reason: a pretext. Resisting is a preferred pretext (Bittner 1967; 1973; Chevigny 1969). However, CR will be ›submissively‹ civil, but he will not laugh at a joke that demeans his identity, and it is unreasonable to expect him to do so. While the opening ›joke‹ may (or may not) have been intended as an ›icebreaker‹, it positions CR as a deviant, and PO2 told the ›joke‹ and laughed at it (by himself) four times over the course of the incident. Regardless of the officer's initial intent, this is a serious failure of reciprocity (Jefferson 1979), indicating that PO2 is not engaged in mutuality with CR: He is being disrespectful, and not responsive to how CR feels about it.

Already, in the first seconds of the interaction the parties can be seen orienting two different definitions of the situation, a misalignment that continues. PO2 projects a ›humorous‹ conversational course that CR refuses to follow, instead interpreting the situation as serious. If PO2 had wanted to produce a problem in the interaction (so that he can accuse CR of resisting, which he later does), he has been effective. If he was hoping to communicate, then he has undercut his own purpose.

At line 33 PO2 indicates that it seems funny that he has accused a man of breaking into his mother's house and, that when the police get there, he is still sitting on the porch. As PO2 says several times over the course of the interaction, it is a very unlikely scenario. Nevertheless, he will continue to say this and laugh about it four separate times as he questions CR in front of his house. CR's responses display that the situation does not seem funny to him. It is in fact happening

to him. He told the first officer who he was and she indicated that she was satisfied. But, after the two officers conferred at the police car, PO2 approached for the first time and opened with the ›joke‹ that CR treats as an accusation. CR's responses indicate that he treats the encounter as having immediately become much more serious.

#2: Greensboro Part Two: PO2 Body Cam time Code: 01:34

- 33 PO2: What are you doing breaking into your mom's house?
 34 (0.6)
 35 CR: I'm not breaking in here.
 36 (0.2)
 37 O2: Uh(h) heh huh heh
 38 (1.4)
 39 PO2: What's with the shovel?
 40 (0.6)
 41 CR: The shovel was here before.=I just picked it up off the yard when I got here sir.
 42 (0.6)
 43 PO2: Yeah they said you tried to open the garage door with it.
 44 (0.5)
 45 CR: No I didn't.=I want- all- this is what I did.=This is what I did.
 46 (3.7) ((CR walks over to garage door and demonstrates))
 47 CR: This is what I did.
 48 (1.1)
 49 CR: I got to make sure the dog wasn't in the- uh: garage. That's all I tried to do.
 50 (1.4.)
 51 CR: That's all I tried to do.
 52 (0.7)
 53 PO2: Alright.
 54 (0.4)

After a pause in which CR does not respond to his laughter (line 38), PO2 asks another question hearable

as an accusation, »What's with the shovel?« (line 39), and CR treats it as such. In asking for an account for the shovel, PO2 implies that CR's possession of it is problematic and requires justification. The female officer had introduced the shovel in the context of her description of the citizen call to the police. But, PO2 asks a direct question: »What's with the shovel?« (line 39). As Bolden and Robinson (2011: 96) observe, questions that solicit accounts and/or justifications embody »a type of suspension of ›trust conditions‹ (Garfinkel 1963) by claiming that [the speaker] cannot make ›typical‹ sense of the causes of, or motives for, the event«.

CR responds with an account of what he did with the shovel (line 41). PO2 follows this with a more explicit accusation – the third from CR's perspective: »Yeah they said you tried to open the garage door with it« (line 43). But, this time PO2 does so indirectly, reporting the speech of an absent third party, likely another reference to the citizen caller: »they said«. In response, CR makes an explicit denial, »No I didn't« (line 45), followed by a *physical reenactment* of »what I did« (line 46), during which he gets off the porch, walks to the garage, and then returns to the porch. The reenactment is accompanied by an account: »I got to make sure« (line 49), that refers to his concern about whether his dog is locked in the garage. CR's turn-final »That's all I tried to do« (line 49), which he repeats (line 51), is an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz 1986): *All* places a maximal boundary around his actions, and the intent behind them, as does his subsequent turn, »[t]hat's it. Nothin' more nothing less« (line 55).

We refer to this reenactment as a sequence of ›submissive civility‹ in the face of a series of what CR treats as accusations – all following an initial misalignment occasioned by PO2's ›joke‹. The reenactment is elaborate: going above and beyond what he is asked to avoid trouble.

In a democratic society, ›submissive civility‹ *should* be preferred. By contrast, the ›strong man‹ ideal aligns with the racist/sexist/classist ideology that those who can't ›pull themselves up by their own bootstraps‹, don't deserve voting rights, health care, food, shelter, or education; that those who are different weaken society; that government should let the strong do what they choose to the weak; and that White people ›have made the most important contributions‹ to the country and its culture. This undemocratic ideology equates contributions to society with the ›strong man‹; freedom with the unrestricted right to dominate others; and considers the weak and poor unimportant except insofar as they can be forced to make profits for the rich (Mayer 2016). It is important also to point out that in the US the so-called strong men at the top, who are said to have made it on their own, have always had others to pull their ›bootstraps‹ up for them: first through literal slave labor and now through forms of labor that pay so little that people can be forced to work under any conditions.

Du Bois offered submission to democratic principles as a counter-narrative to this hyper-individualistic ›American Dream‹, ›bootstraps‹, ›free market‹ ideology: positioning Black Americans as the democratic heart of the nation. They still are. For democracy to work, each individual must commit to the principle that equality and democracy are more important than any individual's self-interest: The modern civic person must be submissive before the principle of civil democratic publics, and the interests of the ›strong man‹ must bow before the general interest – or there is no democracy. In this regard, Du Bois proposed that *the Black American grasp of democracy is stronger than the White American grasp*, precisely because the Black American *experience of racial oppression*, and the development of a »double consciousness« about that oppression, creates a commitment to equality and democracy among Black Americans. We argue that ›submissive civility‹ exemplifies that commitment.

How will the Situation in Europe and Elsewhere Be Different?

One of the warnings to take from the US experience is that Race and exclusion can be efficiently exploited to support an anti-democratic agenda in ways that can seem reasonable on the surface. Every social group has some apparently reasonable complaints: They have been left out of the economy; they don't want their ›freedoms‹ impinged on; they don't want their taxes to support people they don't approve of; they don't want their way of life to change. Finding the systemic racism hidden behind these complaints requires a broad consideration of how the ›way of life‹ being defended and the freedoms being claimed not only originate in inequality, and in case of the US in slavery and segregation, but continue to be maintained by racial inequality: That ›our‹ traditions in the US have always meant White traditions that actively exclude minorities; that the people ›we don't approve of‹ are Black and Brown; that the reasons we don't approve of them involve false stereotypes that rationalize slavery and the suppression of Black civil rights; that White freedoms have never been available to Black Americans; that the wealth and privilege of White workers still comes at the expense of the mass incarceration and under-employment of Black and Brown workers, which is why they need social support; and, finally that the reason White people feel threatened by the prospect of racial equality is that it not only requires giving up those unfair and unearned traditions and privileges, but will also require finally acknowledging that the whole thing has been built on racism all along.

What had been invisible until recently is how false fronts backed by *Dark Money* (Mayer 2016) that funded the rise of a radical Right in the US had organized to exploit those ›reasonable‹ complaints. It turns out that powerful actors have infiltrated universities with false ›science‹ designed to convince White people that their real complaints were not

about the poor jobs and bad pay they actually have, but about Black people and foreigners who they are told have taken their jobs. These false fronts push false stereotypes to hide the very real inequalities among White Americans that have been increasing year-by-year through legislation supported by the same dark money that has stripped American citizens of rights, social programs, education and jobs. The apparent reasonableness of these complaints has also been supported by ways of speaking publicly about racism through ›dog-whistles‹ (coded language) that can only be heard by those who are aware of the hidden racist positions (Anderson 2016; 2018; Haney-Lopez 2013).

Each country, or political/economic area, should expect to find that it has developed similar problems of its own – even if they are just beginning. But, in each country the process will work differently – and what it takes to make it visible and reveal those who are manipulating things behind the scenes – will be different in each case. It will require a focus on the details of interaction that can make what has been taken-for-granted visible.

In areas still organized by traditional consensus, Race and exclusion should be more obvious and overt than in diverse places where traditional consensus has begun to be replaced by self-regulating practices. This does not mean that there is less systemic racism in places with more diversity, however. In the latter, overt racism will likely have gone underground and become embedded in ordinary interactional practices as tacit racism. Because these diverse places have an even greater need for equality and reciprocity to support self-regulating practices – it is precisely here that racism can do the most damage.

Every colonial empire was structured differently in how it used racism and exclusion to support labor relations, and every country or area will have its own unique hidden dynamics. Sometimes the response to oppression by minorities will have taken the form of a ›colonial mentality‹, as described by Franz Fanon

(1952), in which the excluded emulate their colonizers and collude in their own suppression. This response was sometimes characteristic of the public responses of Black Americans in the Jim Crow South in the US before WWII (although according to Du Bois it never accurately conveyed their private response). In other cases, the response may have led to the development of alternate forms of identity and social solidarity – like the ones we found in Black and White interaction orders in the US – because assimilation was not either possible or desirable.

All of these issues will be filtered through a ›color‹ lens that sometimes operates more like the US binary, while in other cases – like Brazil, which has at least 23 ›color‹ distinctions – many categories developed. But, everywhere, social and identity expectations are assigned by color to some extent, although in varying ways. In Latinx culture the phrase »there is no Latinx without Black« has become a new way of acknowledging that all people who identify as Latinx have some African/native heritage that in the US binary is categorized as Black – even though many Latinx here identify as White.

Black communities in the US have openly and broadly embraced an awareness of Blackness as a positive status since at least the 1950s – and have typically rejected calls to assimilate since that time, insisting that there is something wrong with the majority culture that they do not want to emulate. Our findings document how these criticisms of majority expectations as dishonest, fake, individualistic, and disrespectful of personhood, manifest in the preferences of the Black American interaction order, which orient equality and democracy.

One of the advantages of the US binary, according to Du Bois, is ironically, that because it did not allow Black Americans to assimilate, it forced the best and brightest people with African ancestry to remain in the Black community to shape its ideals and fight

for its freedom. It is not surprising that under these conditions the ideals of the Black American interaction order and its interactional preferences are more vibrant and democratic than the status-oriented preferences of the White interaction order and its ›White strong man‹ ideal.

The way social theory and research methods developed in each country, and how they have either supported the status quo and silenced minority voices or, promoted awareness, will also be different. Critical theory, which was developed in Germany in the 1930s by Jewish intellectuals on the basis of their experience of exclusion has been one important source of awareness. Du Bois, Garfinkel, Eric Williams, and more recently Critical Race Theory and Black Feminist Thought, have played a similar role in the US. But, in most countries such movements did not occur, and apart from some European universities in the 1960s and early 1970s Critical Theory did not become dominant anywhere. The international thrust has rather been driven by developments in US sociology during WWII toward a type of statistical quantitative methodology that naively treats secondary data sets as facts in a way that supports majority White thinking (Rawls 2018).

No matter what the history of a country or area has been, every new disaster, natural or man-made, that produces refugees and/or asylum seekers will generate its own exclusionary dynamics and stigmatized categories of people. Some will create entirely new categories of Race and exclusion, but most will play out against an embedded historical background, and many of the dynamics should be similar. All will provide fodder for elites who strive to benefit from exploitation – and the processes will often become tacit and hidden.

Our work is intended to suggest a pathway for uncovering what has been hidden.