FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 
 
Editors: Nikolaus Koenig, Natalie Denk, Alexander 
Pfeiffer, Thomas Wernbacher, Simon Wimmer 
 
 

  



 

 
 
 

© 2023 

 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) 

 
Editors: Nikolaus Koenig, Natalie Denk, Alexander 
Pfeiffer, Thomas Wernbacher, Simon Wimmer 
 
Cover, Illustrations: Constantin Kraus 
 
Publisher: University of Krems Press 
 
Print: tredition GmbH, Halenreie 40-44, 22359 Hamburg 
 
ISBN Paperback: 978-3-903470-07-1 
ISBN e-Book: 978-3-903470-08-8 
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.48341/TTMB-RZ82 
 
Contact: 
Center for Applied Game Studies 
Department for Arts and Cultural Studies 
University for Continuing Education Krems 
www.donau-uni.ac.at/ags 
ags@donau-uni.ac.at 
 
Produced with the financial support of the Federal 
Chancellery of Austria 
 
 

 
 

  

https://doi.org/10.48341/TTMB-RZ82
http://www.donau-uni.ac.at/ags
mailto:ags@donau-uni.ac.at
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CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 7 

SECTION I  HOW FREEDOM AND OPPRESSION ARE  PART OF PLAYING & CREATING 
GAMES ............................................................. 16 

Xavier Aranda 
Between Agency and the Normative Space ............................ 17 

Paula Goerke  
(Un)Restricted Play ............................................... 37 

Wolfgang Hochleitner, Jeremiah Diephuis, Anke Schneider,  
Julia Himmelsbach 
Designing Game-based Moral Courage ................................ 61 

Harald Koberg 
For Play’s Sake ................................................... 83 

Ralph J. Möller 
Endangered Species ................................................ 99 

Juan Carlos Ponce Reyes 
Agency and Codephagy in Mexican Video Games ...................... 115 

Felix Schniz, Christoph Kaindel 
A Walk in the Park? .............................................. 133 

Michaela Wawra, Alexander Pfeiffer 
The Freedom of Choice ............................................ 161 

 
SECTION II  HOW REPRESENTATIONS OF FREEDOM AND OPPRESSION CAN FUEL 
EDUCATIONAL EFFORTS  AND SOCIAL DISCOURSE ........................ 171 

Kübra Aksay 
Work, Play, Escape ............................................... 173 

Alon Kfir, Rebekah Tumasus 
Further Discussion on Companion NPC Design ....................... 185 

James Baillie 
From Vardzia to Val Royeaux ...................................... 207 

Sonja Gabriel 
Teaching Ethical Decision Taking with Serious Games .............. 233 

Katrina HB Keefer  
Freedom and Slavery .............................................. 255 

Gunnar Gräsbeck, Swen Koerner, Mario Staller 
Nonlinear Pedagogy in Olympic Fencing ............................ 281 



 

Swen Körner, Mario s. Staller  
The Violence of Violence ......................................... 297 

F. S. Schönberg 
All Work and No Play ............................................. 311 

Stephanie Wössner 
Let’s Play for a Better Future ................................... 323 

 
SECTION III  HOW PEOPLE ARE OPPRESSED THROUGH  GAMES, OR IN THE WORLD 
OF GAMING ........................................................ 347 

Daria Balakina, Alesha Serada 
Escaping the Vicious Circle in Women’s CS:GO Scene ............... 349 

Nils Bühler 
Taking it Public ................................................. 375 

Ricarda Goetz-Preisner 
A short Story of the last seven Years of Oppressive Mechanisms for 
Women in Game Development Culture ................................ 391 

Rudolf Inderst 
A Certain Kind of ‘Freedom’ ...................................... 401 

Hossein Mohammadzade, Atefe Najjar Mansoor 
Democracy or “Tyranny by Morons”? ................................ 411 

Lulamile Mohapi 
Video Games and the New Apartheid ................................ 429 

Nikita Stulikov 
Is there a Rise of Totalitarian Propaganda in Russian Game Culture?
 ................................................................. 449 

 
 

 

 

 



 

 

 
 

INTRODUCTION 

 



 

 



 

9 

File #0 

Title: Introduction 

Subtitle: - 
Author(s): Nikolaus Koenig, Natalie Denk, Alexander 
Pfeiffer, Thomas Wernbacher, Simon Wimmer 

As conflicts between liberal democracies and authoritarian 
regimes rampage throughout Europe and across the world, we 
are once again reminded that the opposition between Freedom 
and Oppression rests firmly at the center of any conceivable 
human struggle: the inner struggles that tear us between our 
desires and anxieties, our hopes and limitations; the 
struggles in our relationships to others, where we are torn 
between commitment and intuition, between hedonism and 
responsibility; and finally, the struggle between 
communities, nations, and ideologies, the struggles of 
class, gender, race, tearing us apart between different ways 
of thinking, of living, of loving.  

The questions are always the same: how much freedom do we 
need? How much oppression can we bear? Can we resist the 
urge to oppress? How much freedom do we grant others? And 
how much freedom can we bear ourselves?  

Freedom and oppression are determining factors of the human 
condition, but they are not simple opposites. They form a 
dialectic relationship, in which one cannot exist without 
the other. Freedom is an ephemeral state that we can hardly 
grasp when we experience it in full, but even the slightest 
threat of oppression can make it almost physically tangible; 
freedom begins to shine once it contrasts against oppressive 
forces. At the same time, oppression becomes the most 
effective not when it is absolute, but when it gives a 
certain, calculated amount of leeway to the oppressed.  

These are the insidious mechanisms of oppressive regimes, 
but they also lead us right into the realm of Games & Play, 
where the mutual facilitation of freedom and oppression is 
a driving force of the medium and its experiential 
capabilities: the art of game design rests on the designers’ 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

10 

capability to limit player actions in such a way that the 
experience of those freedoms still available is maximized; 
and from the players’ perspective, playing a game does not 
simply mean to be free, but to struggle for freedom against 
constant attempts to oppress it.   

In most cases, this is a benevolent oppression, aimed at 
enabling enjoyment, insight or even empowerment through 
play. But the calculated freedom of play can also make us 
oblivious to the persuasive power of the game’s rules and 
can even serve to oppress our critical capacities in order 
to impose questionable ideologies on us: just as oppression 
can sometimes urge us to strive for freedom with even more 
dedication, the promise of freedom can make us submit into 
oppression and deceit even more willingly.  

This carries over into all those areas which have the air 
of playful freedom about them, and which are therefore all 
the more in danger of being governed by oppression: we look 
behind the curtains of the gaming industry, and instead of 
playful creativity and artistic freedom, we often find 
inequality and exploitation; we turn to gaming cultures, and 
instead of liberating play and community spirit, we often 
encounter sexism, peer-pressure and hate-speech; and even 
in academia, a domain very particularly associated with 
“freedom”, the supplement “games-” makes it significantly 
harder to criticize the oppressive elements inherent to the 
system. After all, how serious can oppression mechanisms be 
if they evolve around a free activity such as play?  

This difficult relationship between freedom and oppression, 
games & play, gains yet another dimension in the pedagogical 
context. Not unsimilar to game designers, we expect 
educators to take a role of benevolent guides, who 
temporarily steer those entrusted to them in certain 
directions, but with the aim to help them define and reach 
their own goals in the end. But this relationship can take 
a darker turn when these goals are already predetermined by 
hidden interests, secretly pushed on students by a corrupted 
pedagogical process, unbeknownst not only to them, but often 
even to the educators themselves? And what could better 
conceal these interests than the seemingly inconspicuous and 
freedom-promising act of play?   



INTRODUCTION 

11 

It almost seems as if freedom and oppression were so tightly 
interwoven that any step towards one will also bring us 
closer to the other. And so we might think that it might not 
even be worth the effort to strive for freedom when 
oppression follows so closely on its heels. And even worse, 
play and games cannot only give us a motivating taste of 
freedom, but might make us overlook or disregard existing 
oppression just as easily. But as freedom and oppression 
intersect with matters of Games & Play on so many levels – 
theoretically, creatively, academically, and performatively 
– there is a powerful twist that should keep us from despair: 
as game scholars, creators, enthusiasts and activists, we 
are true experts on the complex relationship between freedom 
and oppression. What do we make of it?   

Can we expand our knowledge of play and games to uncover new 
aspects of freedom and oppression in the real world, to 
understand how to achieve one and avoid the other? Do we 
look ever more closely into the oppression mechanisms in our 
own turf by studying oppressions and injustices in the games 
industry, in gaming cultures, in academia, how they leech 
on the idea of freedom, and how true freedom can be won 
back? Are we creating games to promote freedom, to sharpen 
the senses for oppression, and to unravel the complex and 
deceptive relationship between both?  

The 16th Vienna Games Conference “Future and Reality of 
Gaming” (FROG) 2022 – hosted by the University of Krems’ 
Center for Applied Game Studies in cooperation with the 
Austrian Federal Chancellery – has brought together game 
scholars, creators, educators and activists to reflect on 
the often complex relationships between freedom, oppression, 
games & play.   

During the resulting discussions, three distinct basic areas 
of investigation have emerged, which also inform the 
structure of this anthology.  

1. The first section revolves around the idea that matters 
of freedom and oppression always play into the act of playing 
a game, as well as into the process of making games. In 
other words, it explores players’ and designers’ experiences 
of freedom and oppression.  



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

12 

Shifting the analogy of “language as a game” to “games as 
language”, XAVIER ARANDA ARREDONDO delves into a 
philosophical investigation of agency and norms that aims 
to touch on the very foundations of our field; PAULA GOERKE 
takes an interest in game designers’ awareness of their own 
power, as they set limitations in their in their games that 
also perpetuate real life restrictions  – and in the 
potential of games to work against these real-life 
boundaries; WOLFGANG HOCHLEITNER, JEREMIAH DIEPHUIS, ANKE 
SCHNEIDER, JULIA HIMMELSBACH and DAVID SELLITSCH present a 
design approach that focuses on “moral courage” as a game 
mechanic, and discuss the challenges of balancing out the 
limitations of social impact games with players’ expectation 
of agency; this is taken to a more general level by by HARALD 
KOBERG’s argument that play, while usually considered free 
and voluntary, is indeed forced upon us by coercive demands 
– but there might still be a (Brechtian-informed) way to 
break free of these demands.  

The corporate grip on modern media franchises and the strict 
limitations it imposes on otherwise great creative 
potentials is the focus of RALPH J. MOELLER’s contribution; 
JUAN CARLOS PONCE REYES uses four case studies to discuss 
different forms of agency, and relates them to the idea of 
codephagy – the mutual “devouring” of cultural codes; FELIX 
SCHNIZ and CHRISTOPH KAINDEL present a game based on 
landscape gardening, and examine how freedom and constraint 
play into as a design principle, from both the players’ and 
designers’ perspective; and MICHAELA WAWRA and ALEXANDER 
PFEIFFER present a literature review on lootboxes, in 
preparation of a closer examination of players’ freedom of 
choice in regard to financial investments in games.  

2. The second section deals with representations of 
oppression in games, and how they can be used in educational 
context, or as contributions to critical social discourse?   

This section starts off with KÜBRA AKSAY‘s discussion of 
games about tedious office work, which shows how even play 
experiences based on oppressive bureaucracies in dystopian 
environments can be engaging and even joyful, while at the 
same time making clear statements about freedom and 
oppression; ALON KFIR and REBEKAH TUMASUS focus on narrative 
hierarchies and ludic affordances underlying the relation 
between player characters and NPCs, and specifically the 



INTRODUCTION 

13 

power (im)balance between players and their companion 
characters, and use case studies to examine the “Ludo-
Narrative Co-Evolution” that marks possible changes of this 
relationship; JAMES BAILLIE takes a close look into history 
to show us how the imaginations about the oppressive dark 
ages that fuel many historic and fantasy games have little 
to do with actual medieval societies – and how this 
misconception makes us miss out on some great games; SONJA 
GABRIEL examines possible connections between digital games 
and ethical thinking – the former providing safe spaces to 
explore and consider complex ethical dilemmas, the latter 
being a potential safeguard against oppressive tendencies 
in politics and society; 

KATRINA HB KEEFER discusses the challenges of creating a 
game about the trans-Atlantic slave-trade in the 18th 
century – and the ethical considerations that limit the 
freedoms of game designers when they approach complex 
heritages that carry matters of trauma and responsibility 
until today; GUNNAR GRAESBECK, SWEN KOERNER and MARIO S. 
STALLER examine how video games can make the holistic 
teaching approach of “Nonlinear Pedagogy” available to the 
world of fencing, before Swen Körner joins forces with Mario 
S. Staller to trace a pedagogical potential of violence in 
videogames, as an instance that triggers reflections on the 
meaning of violence, and the conditions under which players 
are encouraged to ask why, rather than how, violence is used 
in specific situations;  

With her concept of “imposed bleed”, FIONA SPENCER 
SCHOENBERG proposes a way to make systemic oppression 
tangible in games – and uses a case study to show how this 
may contradict expectations of play, but can in exchange 
provide a deeper understanding of human experiences that is 
valuable on a very different level; and finally, drawing on 
practical examples, STEPHANIE WOESSNER explores the 
potential of game-based, future-oriented learning to promote 
freedom, tolerance, and democratic principles as means to 
meet the challenges of our time.  

3. The third and final section puts the focus on how people 
are oppressed either with the help of games, or in the world 
of gaming.  



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

14 

Here, DARIA BALAKINA and ALESHA SERADA show how the Esports 
sector – in spite of proclamations to the contrary – still 
presents significant barriers for women striving to become 
Esports professionals; NILS BUEHLER discusses the oppressive 
dimension of game regulations, as well as their ability to 
facilitate a kind of freedom on another level; and, taking 
#GamerGate as a starting point, RICARDA GOETZ-PREISNER makes 
oppression mechanisms geared toward women in the world of 
game development tangible, while also considering the 
preconditions for a more inclusive future;   

RUDOLF INDERST argues that, at least in Germany, game 
studies are still in a “liminal state”, which can on the one 
hand foster academic freedom, but at the same time poses its 
own limitations on game scholars; Distinguishing between 
obvious and subtle forms of political oppression, HOSSEIN 
MOHAMMADZADE and ATEFE NAJJAR MANSOOR take a close look on 
how video games can either criticize or promote oppressive 
ideas; LULAMILE MOHAPI applies South African protest-dance 
(toyi-toyi) to video game design, and discusses the 
potential of such games to serve as tools against the “New 
Apartheid”; and NIKITA STULIKOV investigates how the Russian 
game industry and game culture might have become entangled 
with propagandistic efforts during Russia’s shift from 
authoritarian to totalitarian politics. 

Please note that – in accordance with the publications theme 
– the authors were free to use whatever citation style they 
chose for their papers; the unusual variety in this regard 
is not due to an accidental lack of editorial oppression, 
but to a dedication to freedom in every way possible.  

Also, talking about possibilities – we would like to express 
our heartfelt thanks to all the amazing contributors who – 
as speakers, authors, and reviewers - have made the 
conference and this publication possible and satisfying. Our 
special thanks, as always, go to Herbert Rosenstingl, whose 
patronage has once again given us the freedom to bring 
together colleagues from all over the world, to explore new 
and exciting ideas, and to let the FROG community grow yet 
another bit further.   

And it is this community that we want to thank above all 
else: it is your commitment over the years and across all 
distances that keeps us going, and the inclusive and 



INTRODUCTION 

15 

affectionate environment that you create ensures that even 
during the most heated debates, no opinions are oppressed, 
and every thought can be expressed freely. This is truly 
appreciated. 

 



 

 

 
SECTION I 

 
HOW FREEDOM AND OPPRESSION ARE  
PART OF PLAYING & CREATING GAMES 

 



 

17 

 
 
 
File #1 

Title: Between Agency and the Normative Space 

Subtitle: Game as a Constitutive Unit of Meaning 
Author(s): Xavier Aranda 

The following paper will provide an attempt to 
philosophically ground the study of games, finding the 
conditions for a general concept of ‘game’, where such 
conditions must be able: 1) to delimit what a game is 
(distinct from another while preserving the same universal 
features), 2) to provide a demarcative notion (which defines 
what a game is but also what a game isn’t), and 3) to explain 
how a game can be constitutive of meaning (that is a kind 
of content), such that can be subject of analysis 
independently of an specific context (whilst always 
presupposing a context that is). The current approach to 
this philosophical grounding will take inspiration from 
contemporary epistemology, and philosophy of mind and 
language. Starting from the analogy of ‘language as a game’ 
I’ll provide an argument to reverse it so there’s a way to 
understand ‘game as a language’ and apply several 
philosophical concepts valid to language analysis. 
Therefore, my aim is to show that to ground the notion of 
game, and by extension a general study of games, there is 
no possible a priori starting point, so a holistic non-
reductive approach is a requiremente as well. I’ll show this 
by underlining the obstacles of choosing an a priori starting 
point (focused on norms or agency), proposing to understand 
the constitutive relation between rules and agents as 
immanent. 

Keywords: Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Freedom, 
Agency, Normativism 

----- 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

18 

1. GROUNDING THE STUDY OF GAMES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
JUSTIFICATION 

In the context of multidisciplinary studies the idea of 
‘grounding’ might suggest a stubborn pursuit that leads to 
a kind of reductionism (the idea that a less objective 
discipline can be simplified, reduced or explained by a more 
objective discipline therefore giving it the status of 
secondary, or epistemologically dependent), or a position 
contrary to epistemological pluralism (the idea that there 
are several valuable ways of knowing that which be 
complementary and enriching, contrary to the idea that there 
is only one type of objective knowledge, i. e. scientific 
knowledge). 

Grounding a discipline in the philosophical sense of this 
proposed task, implies to determine more clearly its object 
of study to show the possible performance of its theoretical 
activity, as well as its possible results. To ground ‘game’ 
as a concept that provides us with a type of novel and 
interesting analysis implies a serious interest in game 
studies, but not a displacement or theoretical imposition 
of a predominantly philosophical perspective. This idea is 
not in conflict with the plurality of multidisciplinary 
backgrounds of game studies, though it does raise the need 
for a ‘general theory of games’ (GTG  as I will refer to it 
onwards) as a general approach to the concept of game, but 
placed a posteriori, that is, in a way that the alleged GTG 
presupposes game studies as pre-existing and without 
disrupting them1, interested first in the notion of game 
itself and in the manifestations and implications of games 
later. 

In the previous sense, it is crucial to understand the game 
as a unit of conceptual analysis, to delimit it so that its 

 
1 This approach to ‘grounding’ has its inspiration in Hegel’s 
speculative philosophy. Hegel’s understanding of ground represents 
an alternative to a traditional grounding approach (a priori and 
metaphysically necessary, in Hegel Werke, Bd. 6 L II, 80-81), 
which I believe is crucial to overcome some of the more serious 
difficulties of the present work exposed at the end of section 4 
(as the problem of chosing either having norms or content as 
methaphysically prior). Due the difficulty of Hegel’s works it’s 
necessary to point out that this interpretation relies in a 
‘revised’ or ‘contemporary’ metaphysical interpretation of his 
philosophy (Houlgate 2005, Stern 2002, and Westhpal 2003, among 
others). 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

19 

study provides us with different results from what the mere 
application of tools from other disciplines can produce and 
that may well dilute the concept of game or sucit it to a 
reduction, this, so the future application of 
interdisciplinary tools enriches the analysis and does not 
turn it into a derivative or non-novel result (this is a 
purely theoretical or philosophical enterprise at its core). 

For the precise reason this grounding attempt is a 
predominant philosophical effort since the philosophical 
questions that arise within every discipline lead to a 
‘philosophy of’ and not to a reduction of these theories by 
revealing themselves as epistemologically dependent on 
philosophy. At the same time, philosophy has the freedom to 
relate various fields of study, streams of thought, and 
theories, without diluting the critical and necessary 
questioning of the problems it confronts. 

From this perspective I’d like to emphasize that a GTG 
interested in a general notion of game which links all the 
manifestations of play under a concept with demarcative 
performance (a concept that can explain what a game is but 
also what a game isn’t), can bring new light to the way in 
which other related concepts are assumed in all the possible 
approaches within game studies. 

This drives the question to what is the purpose of 
understanding the concept of game as a constitutive unit of 
meaning? Since our interest lies in understanding games, 
finding a general definition (and not only assuming that all 
types of games are so because of a contextual classification 
system) would allow this general stance to link all the 
different manifestations of ‘play’ (that I propose to take 
only initially as the development of a game from the point 
of view of an agent), while granting a conceptual 
delimitation necessary to give a direct account of the game 
phenomenon and not only presuppose its nature as that of a 
diffuse entity which possibly cuts through all facets of 
human activity. 

However, before acting on such a philosophical undertaking, 
it is necessary to clarify what kind of performance a GTG 
would seek to obtain from a definition of game, that is, 
what kind of results it would expect to obtain from that 
analysis. On the one hand, it can take inspiration from the 
common goal of an aesthetics of game, application of 
narrative studies, semiotics, anthropology, sociology and 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

20 

even psychology of games (among many other possible 
approaches), which together show a reflective purpose 
(although not exclusively) in their examination: to 
understand the nature of game, relevance, and other 
implications in their respective fields. On the other hand, 
it could take inspiration from approaches focused on the 
study of game as an analysis on rational decision making, 
such as game theory in mathematics, where the driving 
ambition would be predictive. 

Contemporary philosophy has made several contributions to 
the study of language and mind, and important developments 
such as Wittgenstein’s (2003) stance on language and the 
constitution of meaning rely in the use of ‘game’ as a 
deliberately open metaphor emphasizing the pragmatic nature 
of how speakers relate to language as a normative space. In 
that regard the idea that there might be a fruitful 
relationship between the language-as-a-game metaphor and a 
general study of games is not without merit. So, the overall 
intention will be to import some of those notions (and 
treatments), such as the aforementioned metaphor, the 
concept of agency (the capacity or the set of conditions 
that enable making decisions, according initially to a 
causal theory of action in Piñeros & Tenenbaum, 2003, 2), 
volitions, and the notion of dispositions as related to 
mental content; aiming to generate a possible argument to 
explain what a game is or how it could be understood from a 
general and purely abstract perspective. 

In the previous sense, the analysis that will result from 
the application of concepts originated from epistemology and 
philosophy of language to the notion of game will determine 
the possible performance and orientation of our exam which, 
as I will show, must be aimed at abandoning the predictive 
goal in a GTG (due reasons that I’ll explain in section 6).  

The argument will proceed as follows: First I’ll introduce 
the importance of the ‘language as a game’ metaphor for the 
contemporary philosophy of language, pointing out key 
aspects of how meaning (usually understood as an equivalent 
to mental content which is the content of mental states, a 
notion widely used by contemporary philosophy of mind, 
epistemology, and the philosophy of language) is understood 
as constitued by speakers insofar they relate to a normative 
space (language-game rules) that must be objective in itself 
(via Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private 
language paradox, 1982), and which has open the way for a 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

21 

contemporary use of the language-as-a-game metaphor as a 
kind of study of normative2 relations (between speakers and 
language-rules). 

Second, I’ll propose inverting the metaphor to study game-
as-language, presenting an argument which pays attention to 
the equivalent role of the speaker as an agent (since agents 
are language-rule followers), which is dependant of 
understanding agents as those who possess volitive states 
(or volitions) as a kind of mental content (just like meaning 
is a kind of mental content), showing how for the sake of 
the game as a rule system (or a normative space), constituing 
meaning as content or developing agency (through decision 
making) as content is basically the same. The hard part of 
this argument is making the case that there’s no real need 
for volitions to exist to explain how agency is possible, 
and how dispositions are not enough to explain agency (as a 
kind of spontaneity of individual action) altogether. 

Third, I’ll show how the notion of agency-as-content 
constitution is in danger following an assumption of what 
methaphysical necessity entails (a problem of reduction if 
we choose to give methaphysical priority to the normative 
space or the individuals-as-agents). This danger will show 
the theoretical need to ground the concept of game, whereas 
I’ll claim there’s an alternative to both options (norms are 
prior or agents/ content are prior) if we pay attention to 
some of the most important arguments in contemporary 
epistemology, suggesting an explanation of agency that 
doesn’t rely in it being an essential property of agents nor 
an essential property of the normative space. 

Fourth, I’ll finally conclude that the concept of agency 
must be understood as co-determinated by the game as a 
normative space, in which case agency can not be taken as a 
concept given a priori, but as the concept through which we 
can understand the relation between agents and rules. This 
explanation of how content is then constitued by this mutual 
relation requires the abandonment of the predictive ambition 
of a GTG since it would entail that the conditions 
constitutive of content of a game-as-a-language are immanent 
(developed from the game-agents relation).  

 
2 Representative works in normativism are McDowell & Pettit 1986, 
and Brandom 1994. 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

22 

2. LANGUAGE AS A GAME 

Our approach to the task originates in the use of the analogy 
of 'language as a game', which gained special relevance 
thanks to the influence of the Philosophical Investigations 
of L. Wittgenstein (2003) originally published in 1953, who 
decisively changed the way we understand language.  

Motivated by the desire to move away from the previous 
analytical characterization of language in his 1922 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (2016), which presented the 
logical form of the proposition as a type of rigorous 
generalization, Wittgenstein now proposed instead to 
understand language as a game, highlighting the diffuse 
character of this notion. 

Wittgenstein argued that most of the times the meaning of a 
word is its use (2003; §43), so the idea of an analytical 
(universal and a priori) grounding of meaning (akin to 
finding a logical structure of language which would possess 
metaphysical priority over natural language) would be 
against the pragmatical spirit of the Philosophical 
Investigations. 

Wittgenstein does not define what a game is, neither gives 
an analytic criterion through we could determine a 
particular language-game or clearly differentiate it from 
others. Instead, he uses the term ‘family resemblance’ 
(Familienähnlichkeit, 2003; §23), which is a purposefully 
vague term to show how games relate one to another. This led 
his philosophy to show how meaning should be constituted in 
a holistic way and through speakers’ usage, where words as 
meaning-use instances would need to be evaluated by other 
speakers as well (commonly understood as the ‘private 
language’ argument in 2003; §244-271). 

Saul Kripke famously brought up the evaluation aspect to the 
philosophical discussion in Wittgenstein on rules and 
private language (1982), taking as starting point the 
passages no. 201 and 202 from the Philosophical 
Investigations (2003) where Wittgenstein argues that the 
belief of following a rule is not a good enough criterion 
for following that rule. Kripke underlines that for 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

23 

evaluation to be possible the rules must be objective in 
themselves (1982; p. 110-111)3.  

Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein underlines that 
meaning is normative, and it’s been especially relevant to 
a philosophy of normativity which follow’s Kripke’s claims 
that meaning understood as kind of mental content is 
therefore normative as well (specially in McDowell & Petit, 
1986 and Brandom, 1994). 

My innitial hypothesis has been that it is possible to 
reverse this analogy, moving from language as a game, to the 
game as a language, pretending to obtain immediate returns 
on a (universal) notion of the game. But to show how such 
an argument is possible, it would first be necessary to 
address the core of the issue. 

What will allow the inversion of the analogy is to establish 
an analogy in turn between the concept of 'agency' (initially 
in line with the previously noted casual theory of action) 
and meaning or mental content. Being able to make the analogy 
between agency and meaning, respectively taking agency in 
relation to the normative space of the game (just as meaning 
is for language), and understanding both as types of content 
in relation to the normative space (of language or a game), 
will allow to show not only the relevance, but the fruits 
of the application of these notions from various branches 
of philosophy (epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy 
of language) to a GTG. 

Why is the notion of agency so important? Freedom is a 
crucial notion to understand what a game is (of any kind), 
not only from the perspective of J. Huizinga (1980), R. 
Caillois (2001), and E. Fink (2016): a stance on freedom 
must be presupposed in the very concept of agency for it to 
work. This merely points out that every belief possesses an 
ontological commitment of some sort, yet it’s especially 
relevant to clear out the implications of the metaphysical 
status of freedom as I’ll show, those implications put at 

 
3 Norms must be metaphysically prior to content, but this isn’t to 
say that norms are metaphysically prior to a community of 
evaluation. Kripke just wants to avoid a social or community-wide 
version of the dispositional theory of content (1982; p. 111-112). 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

24 

risk the notion of agency-as-content to be introduced in the 
next section. 

3. HOW TO REVERSE THE ANALOGY OF LANGUAGE AS A GAME? 

Here I’ll present an argument that will allow us to reverse 
the analogy of language as a game. However, this argument 
will be supported by other arguments important to 
epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of 
mind. 

i. The first step is to show that agency can be explained 
without resorting to causal processes of an 
essentially mental nature, where I’ll rely on the 
argument of G. Ryle in The concept of mind (2009), 
who rejects the idea that acts are based on volitions 
(understood as types of mental content whose function 
is to account for when an act is intentional or 
unintentional) as flawed, for it assumes a causal 
link between volitions and acts, which the same 
volitions can’t possess between each other otherwise 
it would lead to an infinite regress (p. 54).  

ii. Thus, if agency can’t be explained by ‘volitions’, 
then we could argue that there is not a big difference 
between ‘being able to say what we want to say’ in 
the twist of a given sentence, and ‘being able to say 
we did what we did’ in a given situation, since agency 
as a kind of content (the one that agency constitutes) 
could be explained dispositionally. That is, we could 
present agency in terms of a dispositional theory of 
content (equating meaning and agency as types of 
mental content). This doesn’t necessarily entail 
equating mental content with agency-content, we might 
as well expect both to be labeled as different kinds 
of content4 (both being content nonetheless), but such 
labels are not important as I’ll be focusing on the 
problematic aspect of them being dispositional. 

iii. I’ll refer now to an argument against content as 
determinable from a dispositional theory of content 

 
4 In fact, following the main thesis of Ryle’s The concept of mind 
(2009), mental content (if we are still able to label it like 
that) wouldn’t even be inside someone’s head. 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

25 

in Kripke (1982). Kripke’s argument postulates a 
possible mathematical operation that can be confused 
with another5 since both could produce the same result 
in a certain range, but a different result in another. 
The example uses a mathematical operation as an 
instance of an objective rule that would produce 
objective results, so there’s no ambiguity left. 
Kripke aims to show that being able to forget what 
specific rule we used in a past case would still yield 
the same objective result (it wouldn’t affect it at 
all), showing how even if we aren’t clear about our 
dispositions (i.e., we forgot what kind of rule we 
applied in each context) since the rules are objective 
themselves, dispositions are not needed to explain 

 
5 Kripke poses the following skeptical challenge: as a result of 
the operation of adding 68 + 57 we obtain the result of 125, however, 
let's look at the two uses of ‘plus’ that are exposed here, a) the 
operation (68 + 57) in its correct arithmetic use which results in 
125, b) the same operation in the sense of the metalinguistic use 
of the term addition (as the word that designates the arithmetic 
operation) and that leads us to the same result. Kripke's example 
lies in posing a skeptical challenge about the possibility that our 
metalinguistic use is wrong. What would happen if there were two 
operations that are possible to be confused with one another, ‘plus’ 
(x + y) and ‘quus’ (identical in all cases less than 68 + 57, but 
whose result in operations greater than or equal to 68 + 57 was 
different as 5)?  Given the right circumstances (altered states of 
consciousness, etc.) how could we assert that our metalinguistic 
use for obtaining 125 was 'plus' and not 'quus'?  
According to the skeptic in Kripke's example, the present use of 
addition would not be in question since it would be enough to ask 
the speaker which of the two operations they mean, in fact, this 
solution is taken as a dispositional theory of meaning, which would 
assume the use employed (arithmetic or metainguistic) as determined 
by our willingness to think about certain specific values in 
particular cases – this position is commonly linked to descriptive 
epistemologies such as Quine’s (specifically his thesis of the 
‘indeterminacy of meaning’). However, what about past uses of plus 
(in the case of quantities less than 68+57)? Could we say with 
certainty that our past use of plus always designated the usual 
addition or could it have been 'quus'?  
Kripke's main idea is that there is no solution in terms of our 
dispositions, since when asking about past uses it is not possible 
to point out such dispositions for all cases, because the relation 
of the use of a given rule (in 68+57) is normative, not descriptive 
as a dispositional solution to the argument would pretend (Kripke, 
1982; p. 37). Similarly, Kripke points out a certain resemblance to 
Hume's critique of causality in Wittgenstein's argument: "no past 
state of my mind can entail that I will give any particular response 
in the future." (Kripke, 1982; p. 53) 

 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

26 

how speakers (or agents in this case) are able to 
constitute contents. 

iv. Which would allow us to relate the constitution of 
meaning with the constitution of acts insofar as both 
can be understood as types of content… 

a. For content related to the normative space of 
language would be what we usually understand as 
meaning, and that somehow could be separated from 
the decision-making process (agency). 

b. While content for a game is in fact ‘decision 
making’, since the actions of an agent or player 
are the only meaningful things for the game to 
hold on to (understood as a normative space), that 
is the interaction between rules and actions 
carried out by agents, allowing us to reverse the 
analogy of language as a game. 

4. GAME AS A LANGUAGE 

The above argument showed that to explain agency there’s no 
need to invoke volitions as mental causes for actions since 
explaining what we do through our dispositions is sufficient 
to do it (just like it is for meaning and mental content). 
Then went to show that dispositions are not objective enough 
to constitute meaning-as-content and a normative relation 
with rules is required such that for agency-as-content the 
same condition would be needed. And since games are normative 
spaces -as content is concerned- there’s no real distinction 
between actions and words, allowing games to be understood 
as language6 just like language can be understood as a game. 

I would now be inclined to point out how the way in which 
players relate to the rules is constitutive of agency, but 
Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy (1982) 
showed that the analogy between language and games presents 
some possible options in the way in which rules (such as the 

 
6 In the sense of how language works and not that of a particular 
language. 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

27 

normative space of speakers or agents) and mental meaning 
or content can be constituted (in Glüer & Wikforss, 2018): 

1. The content engenders normativity (the content is 
metaphysically prior to the norms), 

2. Content determines normativity (norms are metaphysically 
prior to content). 

This perspective that determines the agency from either (1) 
or (2) would seem to lead us to understand it as: an 
essential property of the agents in the first case  (where 
content is metaphysically prior to norms) who would have to 
own agency before participating in any game (as the very 
condition to be able to play); or perhaps to assume that 
agency falls into the normative space of the game (the second 
case where norms are metaphysically prior), which would lead 
us to an approach where agency would be what the game 
determines as such, and where players are not fully free 
(metaphysically), but only to the extent that agency-as-
content is meaningful to the game. 

From the perspective of the normative space (2, norms are 
prior) there’s a couple of options to consider: first, 
normative space can mean either the rules of a specific game 
(the same game, e.g., chess, or a specific game carried out 
at a certain time and space, e.g., the 10th game between 
Carlsen and Anand on November 22, 2013) or the normative 
space of the totality of games. 

Referring to ‘the normative space of all games’ has the 
virtue of referring to a holistic understanding of what a 
game is, but it also entails the problem that it prevents 
us from being able to separate games in a conceptually rigid 
way from each other: one game would imply others and there 
would be no real border between them (just as Wittgenstein 
intended). This way leads to a dead end if the intention is 
to make some kind of conceptual delimitation when analyzing 
a certain game (either chess or the Magnus Carlsen game). 

Conceptual delimitation is possible if I refer by ‘the 
normative space’ to the rules of a game (whether it’s chess 
or Carlsen's match), but ends up determining in a very 
categorical way the sense of agency as that constituted from 
the actions recognized by the rules as meaningful (giving 
rise to a type of reductionism of agency to norms).  This 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

28 

of course has predictive utility since it allows the 
postulation of a model with adjustable knobs depending on 
the possible decisions to be placed in the system. It’s also 
circular in that the question of agency could not be answered 
in terms of what agency is7, but in terms of what the system 
preconfigures as agency. 

From the perspective of the player or agent (1, content is 
prior), we would have to assume that agency is already a 
precondition, which imposes other limits on the notion 
itself: insofar as the notion is no longer really significant 
for the conceptual analysis of a GTG, but only the 
repercussions of agency (the acts) would be significant for 
a GTG, in addition to postulating agency as a type of 
essentiality outside the scope of GTG’s analysis (thinking 
of freedom as essential to the human being). It also 
conflicts with the spirit of Ryle's argument (2009; p. 54) 
in that agency would rest if not on ghostly volitions, then 
on some other type of given content that would exercise the 
same function (to provide agency to acts). 

The latter perspective (1, content is prior) to some extent 
safeguards the reflective analysis (of aesthetics, narrative 
studies, semiotics, etc.), but delegates the study of agency 
to a discipline other than a GTG. Although it also shows the 
relationship between human beings and games under an 
essentiality, the analysis is anthropocentric and therefore 
leaves out the following questions: 

• Can animals play in the same way as human beings, 
that is, can their games constitute meaning? And... 

• Can artificial intelligences play? Where this 
question is the same as the previous one, but in a 
different context. 

 
7 ‘What is to be able to make decisions?’ Versus ‘what a certain 
system defines as a range of possible decisions? (Whereas choosing 
one is a matter of a criterion for rationality)’. The second ends 
up being circular as the rationality criterion is previously 
defined by what the system wants agency to be e.g., the best 
decision for an agent is one that ends up gaining information, 
spreading information, etc. In terms of an ‘open system of rules’ 
like the case of large language models, the question should point 
where the system jumps from a model of (predicting) language to a 
model of (predicting) knowledge. 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

29 

Then, neither AI's nor animals would be able to constitute 
content through a game. 

Both ways I mentioned in which players or agents relate to 
rules as a relation constitutive of agency (content or norms 
prior) put at risk the idea of agency-as-content as a central 
notion for a GTG. If norms are prior, agency-as-content ends 
up being circularly defined. If content is prior, it could 
be objected that agency-as-content is not novel enough to 
warrant a GTG a domain of its own, or that the analysis ends 
up being restricted to what anthropologically can be done 
with the concept of game (which otherwise opens relevant 
issues like animals and AI’s), even if the conceptualization 
I have presented so forth could be rich enough for game 
studies and other disciplines interested in the game 
phenomena. 

Before providing a solution to the present dilemma I will 
introduce some key elements to understand what kind of answer 
would be necessary. That is, what philosophers have learned 
from the study of the philosophy of language, epistemology, 
and philosophy of mind, and which I can now apply to concept 
of game aided by the metaphor of ‘game as language’. 

5. PHILOSOPHICAL LESSONS 

Some of the most influential arguments in contemporary 
philosophy of language, epistemology, and philosophy of mind 
reside in what is called an attack on the given, that is, 
on categories or concepts that are taken as pure, assumed, 
or necessary (in the metaphysical sense) for content, 
showing how the latter is not constituted hierarchically 
(e.g. from a first concept, first experience, etc.).  

Three of the most influential texts in this regard are "Two 
dogmas of empiricism" by W.V.O. Quine (1951), "Empiricism 
and the philosophy of mind" by W. Sellars (1991), and the 
Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein (2003, 
specifically the argument against private language). 

The idea behind the present section is to collate some of 
the lessons of these influential texts in relation to our 
previous exposition showing the relationship between agency 
and the normative space. 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

30 

In "Two dogmas of empiricism" (1951) Quine attacks two 
substantially important issues, first the idea that it is 
possible to clarify the notion of meaning (the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic propositions), and second, 
the idea of reductionism. 

According to Quine the notion of meaning is not only diffuse, 
but impossible to elucidate, considering that the use of 
meaning is not very different from the use of essence for 
classical philosophy. Meaning as content according to Quine, 
cannot be explained a priori (as a given content in a pure 
way). 

Reductionism falls into a similar criticism, since, on the 
one hand we should be able to reduce every instance of 
meaning (in the case of Quine's argument) to a set of 
experiences or a sense-datum vocabulary which is an 
unfeasible task, on the other, Quine points out that no 
statement is immune to evaluation, indicating that even 
logical laws can be revised. 

Assuming the previous lessons, it would be necessary to 
underline the problem that arises when trying to point out 
that agency would be explicable as something essential to 
the agents. If it is not possible to come up with a concrete 
notion that explains what agency is (for example, volition 
or freedom in the broadest sense), then we would be making 
a mistake similar to what Quine finds in the notion of 
meaning. In the same way, it arises with the claim that 
agency could be reduced to the normative space of game while 
the rules of games themselves are reviewable either because 
they are determined insufficient (they are not able to 
contemplate some behavior of the players) or too diffuse (in 
the case of children's games in which children can make the 
rules as they play), showing that reduction is not a good 
enough explanation for agency in the context of an universal 
concept of a game. 

Sellars' text "Empiricism and the philosophy of mind" (1991) 
contains the famous argument against the ‘myth of the given’. 
The given represents any type of content that is assumed as 
pure, e.g. categories, concepts, definitions, conditions, 
qualities, first experiences, etc. were Sellars concludes 
that if the given contents are not propositional then they 
have no epistemological utility (they can’t generate or 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

31 

transmit knowledge or information as content), and if they 
are propositional, then they are the result of another type 
of propositional content in turn (such as other inferences). 
Like Quine, Sellars also points to another kind of holism 
in the form of the logical space of reasons, the normative 
space (of all games and not of a game). 

The lesson to be taken would be that both norms (thinking 
of a game and not the normative space of all games) and 
agency are in a process of mutual mediation, and that 
therefore a state of pure rules or pure agency is not 
possible.  

Now, if combined these lessons with Wittgenstein’s idea in 
the Philosophical Investigations to abandon the logical form 
of the proposition (analytical definitions), we will arrive 
at a holistic notion of the normative space of all games, 
begging the question it would clash with the idea of being 
able to give a conceptual delimitation to the game as a unit 
of analysis. However, the possibility of avoiding this 
conclusion lies in reflecting on Wittgenstein's intention 
in establishing this diffuse condition of games. 

A non-analytic notion of games would therefore have to be 
presented on the base experience of play. There, the agency-
as-meaning or content arises in mediation with the norms and 
is not the result of the a priori condition of the norms: 
just as the agency cannot be the result of the norms, and 
neither the norms nor the agency can be taken as given nor 
appealing to some kind of essentiality returning to Quine’s 
critique. And although it is clear how we can possess an 
understanding of norms not a priori but pragmatically, being 
subject to revisions depending on what is needed case by 
case, the idea of agency as a non-essential attribute to 
players, or even human beings, is more problematic. 

6. CLOSING ARGUMENTS 

At the end of section 4, I mentioned that from the 
perspective of the player (who would have metaphysical 
priority over norms), agency is explained as a type of 
essentiality often attributed to human freedom that we 
qualify as anthropocentric (regarding the case of animals 
and artificial intelligences), leading us to ask if there 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

32 

is a non-human concept of freedom (agency taken as an 
essentiality).  

The objection is twofold, from the potential problem of non-
human players being unable to constitute content through 
games (one could even generalize that they would be unable 
to play because playing would already be a ‘human-ity’), and 
from the idea that an essentiality does not define or clarify 
what agency is supposed to be. 

I argue that the question so far is badly posed, and it 
should ask instead: whether the agency (i.e., its 
essentiality) should be posed a priori? This question allows 
us to avoid the anthropological trap in which we pigeonhole 
the concept of game. 

The error consists in assuming that the concept of agency 
(or freedom) is detached from the concept of game, that is, 
if the players are free, they are free externally to the 
game, or if the game gives agency to the players, it is the 
game that grounds the sense of agency without yet 
contemplating the de facto actions of the agents. 

In this sense, the concept of agency (or freedom) cannot be 
grounded univocally, either on the side of the player, or 
the game. Nor is it useful to problematize the possibility 
of the a priori condition of such a foundation since it 
would necessarily imply such a univocacy. The option I 
propose is to take the notion of agency as co-determined by 
the game and the player. 

Being able to play (as well as the desire to play) implies 
the necessary factual setting of the game, which is not 
something assumed a priori, neither on the side of the 
agents, nor on the side of the rules (even of a game that 
involves strict rules and social conventions). One is free 
to play since freedom refers to the freedom of players who 
are already (by definition) involved in the activity of 
playing. Therefore, the question about freedom would not be 
alien to the concept of the game, on the contrary, both 
would be concepts that determine each other. 

The player is free to the extent that it can leave the game 
yet continues to play it, but not as long as this possibility 
is determined a priori; since it is the fact of starting to 
play that determines whether the player can continue playing 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

33 

or stop to do so, otherwise the notion of agency leads to 
the contradictions that I have explored before. 

The solution would appear to be circular as in "the players 
are free because they play", but this would only be the case 
if we continue to expect an a priori determination of 
freedom, in fact, what I argue here is closer to "the players 
are free because they continue to play (or were free because 
they stopped playing)". 

Whether an agent can stop playing does not depend entirely 
on the agent, since the decision to stop playing makes sense 
only in the context of playing, and the game is a structure 
made possible by the (necessary) recognition that it is only 
a game. This last characteristic that would seem trivial 
extols it’s not-merely-ontological status, but the 
deontological status of the game insofar as ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
are aligned and that is expressed as the very concept of 
agency-as-freedom (mutually determined by rules and 
players). 

My proposal is precisely that the deontological status of 
the game is immanent to the play experience in order to 
achieve the conceptual delimitation that I seek: to be able 
to understand the game as a constitutive unit of content, 
allowing to talk about the game while inserting it into the 
normative space of all games without there being any real 
tension between both levels. 

Since the concept of immanence is loaded with a long 
metaphysical tradition, I propose advocating for a type of 
‘local’ immanence (opposed to global or classical 
immanence), understanding it as follows: if a question is 
conceptual, I ought to answer it through concepts in turn 
(without any other metaphysical assumptions needed in 
between), therefore, if the question of agency (or freedom) 
is posed in relation to play, it must be answered through 
the very concept of a game exhibiting it’s deontological 
status. 

The distinction between one game and another, or between one 
game and the normative space of all games, lies in the 
immanent development of the deontological status of a 
particular game: what makes it ‘what it is’ as a delimited 
unit but always in relation to other games or to the totality 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

34 

of games, since playing a game is an experience in context 
with playing or having played other games.  

The deontological status surpasses the limit present from 
one game to another, insofar as the question is relating to 
the context in question, i.e., asking about a game related 
to another, or asking about the normative space of all games, 
since the development I propose is to follow through 
immanence. Therefore, the notion of agency-as-freedom 
developing at the same time as the question itself implies 
a difference in the comprehension of both of those notions 
of what a game is implies (asking about one game or asking 
about the normative space of all games). 

Consequently, agency can no longer be a metaphysically 
grounded concept before there’s a discussion about agency 
in the context of a game. Though it can be provisionally 
defined. I can have an idea of what agency is supposed to 
be, but only the immanent development of actions through 
agency in a game (developing at the same time as the concept 
of a game) can show how agency is grounded as agency-as-
content. Just like using a word in a determinate context 
constitutes meaning-as-content, but to consider how that 
particular use of a word constitutes objectively any content 
requires the communal evaluation through a normative space. 

This is the sense behind the question about freedom when 
placed in the context of a game: Freedom is agency as 
metaphysically grounded through the development of agency-
as-content just like the game is grounded as a unit 
constitutive of content (such as meaning) in it’s deonto-
ontological status (that coincidence between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’). 

Although the scope of this paper ends at this proposal, I 
maintain that any other constituent element of the game (and 
that accounts for the deontological structure of the game 
itself) should also be understood as immanent. Therefore, a 
consequence of this conceptual development would be for a 
GTG to give up on the predictive aim of a possible notion 
of a game since agency could not be preconfigured in the way 
of a mathematical model expects it to be. 

A concept of game such as the one I propose has sufficient 
elements to support a GTG, since 1) it explains the objective 
constitution of content, 2) it allows to delimit a game 



BETWEEN AGENCY AND THE NORMATIVE SPACE 

35 

among others (without having the task of analyzing a game 
being an analysis of specific contexts),  and 3) its 
epistemologically normative, since it explains not only what 
is a game but what is not a game. It also underlines some 
of our initial goals: this grounding effort wasn’t 
‘traditional’ (not an a priori, universally necessary 
definition) since its metaphysical performance doesn’t 
entail a necessary priority over previous theoretical 
development, it is a holistic notion, and in that regard 
hopefully it can shed new light on concepts previously 
determined by game studies such as agency, the relationship 
between rules or actions and narrative, the possibility of 
aesthetically analyzing a game, semiotic analysis, etc. 

There’s still work to be done, specifically studying the 
pragmatic nature of the game, i. e. how it is possible to 
change the rules? How it is possible to epistemologically 
delimit the game not only from playing it but from 
observation alone (like when something seems like a game but 
is not, or when something does not seem like a game but is 
one)? The relationship between narrative and competition, 
among other topics that could be re-evaluated from the 
perspective of the deontological structure of the game that 
I have shown. 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

XAVIER ARANDA has a PhD in Philosophy. He conducts research 
on the topics of Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, 
Philosophy of Mind, Pragmatism, as well as German Idealism, 
specifically on GWF Hegel. He is a professor in the 
Philosophy Department at the University of Guanajuato, 
Mexico, since 2017. 

REFERENCES 

Brandom, Robert, 1994, Making it Explicit, Harvard University 
Press, USA, 741 p. 

Caillois, Roger, 2001, Man, play and games, Meyer Barash (trans.), 
University of Illinois Press, USA, 208 p. 

Houlgate, Stephen, 2005, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic: From Being 
to Infinity, Purdue University Press. 

Fink, Eugen, 2016, Play as symbol of the world and other writings, 
Ian Alexander Moore & Christopher Turner (trans.), Indiana 
University Press, USA, 360 p. 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

36 

Hegel, GWF, 1969, Werke, Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel 
(eds.), Band 6 (Wissenschaft der Logik II, S II), Suhrkamp, 
Germany. 

Glüer, Kathrin and Wikforss, Åsa, (2018), "The Normativity of 
Meaning and Content", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/meaning-
normativity/>. 

Huzinga, Johan H., 1980, Homo Ludens, a study of the play-elemente 
in culture, Routledge Ed., UK, 220 p. 

Kripke, Saul, 1982, Wittgenstein on rules and private language, 
Harvard University Press, USA, 150 p. 

Piñeros Glasscock, Juan S. and Sergio Tenenbaum, 2023, "Action", 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/action/>. 

Quine, W. V., 1951, “Two dogmas of empiricism”, The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Enero), Duke University Press, URL = 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181906>. 

Sellars, Wilfrid, 1991, Science Perception and Reality, Ridgeview 
Publishing Company, USA, 376 p. 

Stern, Robert, 2002, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel and 
the Phenomenology of Spirit, London: Routledge. 

Westphal, Kenneth R., 1989, Hegel’s epistemological realism, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, UK, 309 p. 

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 2016, Tratado Lógico-Filosófico, Jesús 
Padilla Gálvez (trad.), Tirant Humanidades Ed., España, 250 p. 

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 2003, Investigaciones Filosóficas, García y 
Moulines (trad.), col. Filosofía Contemporánea, UNAM Editorial, 
México, 548 p. 

McDowell, J. and P. Pettit, 1986, “Introduction,” in Subject, 
Thought, and Context, P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), Clarendon 
Press, UK. 



 

37 

 
 
 
File #2 

Title: (Un)Restricted Play 

Subtitle: How Prospective Game Developers view the 
Boundaries of Games 
Author(s): Paula Goerke 

Limitations are a key component of life and of video games. 
However, these limitations do not create themselves, they 
are made by the people behind the curtains – the game 
developers. While there is plenty of research focusing on 
the game industry itself, there is very little knowledge 
about the game developers themselves. To fill this research 
gap, four interviews with prospective game developers were 
conducted and analyzed using qualitative content analysis 
regarding their image of humanity and ideas of the 
limitations of and within games. The results show that there 
are six main categories of limitations identified by the 
interviewees; however, these categories do not match the 
theoretical assumptions extracted from the existing 
literature to the full extent. This research allows some 
first insights into the perceptions of limitations, and 
therefore a part of the images of humanity, of (prospective) 
game developers. 

It shows that, according to the prospective game developers, 
it is less technology or ethical doubts that influence game 
development but rather social and interactive aspects. 
Furthermore, games offer opportunities to overcome 
boundaries found in the real world. 

Keywords: game design, game development, game studies, image 
of humanity, video games 

----- 



FREEDOM | OPPRESSION | GAMES & PLAY 

38 

1. INTRODUCTION 

Limitations, both natural and artificial, are an inherent 
part of human life, restricting humans in their movements, 
their thoughts, their interactions, and their general 
freedom. One opportunity to escape such real-life 
limitations is through (video) games. As players play – 
online or offline, alone or with friends, on a console or 
their computers – they step out of their everyday lives and 
become someone or something else. While their bodies may 
remain in the same position for hours, their minds experience 
new adventures, no longer bound by the limitations of their 
human existence. 

However, the freedom that players experience in their 
virtual adventures is not completely unrestricted. Rather, 
it is heavily influenced by the many constraints imposed by 
the game developers - the people who conceived the game and 
whose actions brought it to life. Therefore, this in-game 
freedom can only be properly enjoyed within the limits that 
its creators allow(ed) and have thought of. The question, 
then, is how these game developers perceive the boundaries 
of games. 

The question of how individuals perceive boundaries and 
limitations is situated within one of the greatest questions 
in the humanities, “What is man?” (Kant as cited in 
Fahrenberg, 2014) and is therefore part of each individual’s 
image of humanity – the way a person thinks about what 
humanity is like (Fahrenberg, 2014). While these questions 
have been asked by representatives of many different fields 
and disciplines, there is very little research on the current 
images of humanity held by people in software development 
in general and video game development in particular. 

Because these fields, more than others, need to be current 
and on the pulse of the times, it is incredibly important 
to study not only those who have a lot of experience in the 
discipline but also those who are just starting out, as it 
is their actions and behaviors that will shape the future. 
In the following paper, the people working in the field of 
video game development are referred to as game developers. 
As there are many possible ways to refer to the people 
working in this industry, in the context of this paper, the 
term game developer was chosen as it can be used to refer 
to any person working in the context of game development, 



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e.g., game designers, programmers, artists, or audio 
engineers. 

Based on these conclusions, the following research question 
was originally formulated: How do university students who 
want to work as game developers express themselves regarding 
their image of humanity based on selected topics? However, 
as the present paper focuses only on the subject area of 
perceived limitations, the aim is solely to answer the 
following subquestions: What boundaries do prospective game 
developers perceive in the context of video games? And how 
can these boundaries be overcome? To answer these questions, 
four interviews were conducted, analyzed, and discussed in 
relation to existing research. The paper concludes with a 
summary of the main findings, limitations of the research, 
and implications for the future. 

2. HUMANS AS GAME CREATORS 

While games are an integral part of human life, the ways in 
which they are created can vary widely. Children's play is 
sometimes claimed to begin at an infant age (Huizinga, 1951), 
and game creation begins as early as preschool and continues 
to develop as they get older (Vygotsky, 1967). However, this 
free play is not the only form of play that people encounter 
throughout their lives. It is more often "professional" 
games that people think of when they talk about them.  

Games can be a great way to experience and explore freedom. 
Children make up their rules of play as they go along and 
take on different roles almost naturally, and the same 
tendencies can be seen when players turn to sandbox games 
such as Minecraft (Mojang Studios, 2011). These games offer 
the players opportunities to create, adventure, and interact 
with the game’s environment without a linear narrative they 
must follow (Gabbiadini et al., 2017), which is very similar 
to the free and unrestricted play described by Huizinga 
(1951). Minecraft can even be used to support players in 
expressing their creativity and improving their innovative 
skills (Rahimi & Shute, 2021). However, while playing games, 
be it as a child or an adult, on a computer or on the street, 
is a means to freely express oneself or experience what it 
is like to take on a role different from their regular 
everyday life, the industry behind professional game 
development is a diverse multi-million dollar industry 
consisting of many different fields, such as game design, 



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game art, game programming, level design, and sound 
engineering (game - Verband der deutschen Games-Branche, 
2018). These roles can be taken up by different people, 
depending on the available time, human and financial 
resources they might even all be performed by a single 
person. To encompass this vast variety of professions and 
professionals in the field, this paper uses the term game 
developer to refer to any person participating in the 
production of a game, unless specification is required. 

As diverse as the industry itself is, so is the research in 
this field. Some researchers may focus on economic factors 
of game development, such as the gender composition of 
development teams and studios (Bailey et al., 2021); others 
may examine the impact of societal events, such as the COVID-
19 pandemic, on gaming (Pallavicini et al., 2022), or how 
gaming can be used for learning purposes (Amin & Wahyudin, 
2022). In addition, there are many studies that focus on the 
process of video game development and research on video game 
development. 

In this regard, Martin (2018) noted that research on video 
games has intensified in recent years, but the development 
processes remain unclear. However, it can be taken as a fact 
that the video game development industry is 
interdisciplinary. 

In a literature review, Berg Marklund et al. (2019) addressed 
these processes in greater detail, with the goal of tracing 
the understanding of industry personnel in particular. They 
found that while the development processes are referred to 
as agile, it is not an adequate term; development is 
spontaneous and based on the developers' own experiences, 
but truly agile methods are not used. However, these working 
methods are reflected in the structures of the processes. 
In addition, the researchers found that the perceptions of 
developers and the actual development processes do not 
necessarily have to coincide. 

In another study, Dubois and Weststar (2022) examined the 
shift in the game industry towards a focus on "games as a 
service". Along with this change in the games themselves, 
there are also changes in work processes, employees' 
perceptions of their work, and their perceptions of 
themselves. 



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Lysova and Khapova (2019) were even more explicit about 
video game developers, specifically their paths into such 
an uncertain industry that exists without explicit career 
structures. For this reason, individuals develop more 
creative and individualized paths into the industry, which 
they need to back up with appropriate knowledge of the 
business field. It is only through this knowledge that they 
have been able to create spaces in the industry that they 
can fill themselves. 

However, there is a general problem with this research: 
surveys tend to have small sample sizes, which is especially 
problematic in a world as heterogeneous as video game 
development. In addition, access to the industry is often 
difficult for researchers (O’Donnell, 2014). 

While these results show that there is some research on 
video game development in various fields, there is very 
little research on the actual people and their thoughts and 
motivations behind the development. The current paper offers 
a first attempt to fill one of these research gaps by 
examining the image of humanity of game developers, 
specifically prospective game developers - students who were 
studying to work in the field while the research was taking 
place. 

3. IMAGES OF HUMANITY 

“What is man?” as asked by Kant (as cited in Fahrenberg, 
2014) is one of the greatest questions in the humanities and 
has been examined by pedagogues, philosophers, and 
economists alike. One of the best-known sentiments regarding 
this question was expressed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his 
Social Contract: “Man was born free, and everywhere he is 
in chains” (Rousseau, 2002). However, this is only one of 
many possible perceptions of mankind. Every individual, 
expert or layperson, has some kind of image of humanity, and 
it is these basic beliefs that influence and shape their 
work and interactions with other people. 

Images of humanity are defined as the “set of assumptions 
and beliefs about what human beings are by nature” 
(Fahrenberg, 2014). They are responsible for an individual’s 
decisions, actions, and opinions. They are formed on the 
basis of people’s experiences, their education, and the 



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society in which they live (Galliker, 2015). These images 
of humanity often include different dimensions, such as 
culture, body, and social aspects. One thing that greatly 
influences humans is the boundaries they encounter 
throughout their lives. These boundaries not only exist 
between and within humans, but also separate them from the 
non-human, from technology, or from gods (Wulf & Zirfas, 
2014). Understanding the boundaries that humans face also 
allows them to be positioned in relation to the freedoms 
they can enjoy, or how these freedoms can be restricted. 

One of the most important images of humanity regarding 
(video) games is the Homo Ludens as described by Johan 
Huizinga. This explanatory model states that human culture, 
and therefore humans, and play are inherently interwoven, 
meaning that all aspects of life, the serious and less 
serious, are in fact play. Additionally, Huizinga attests 
humans some form of irrationality as beings, as play is 
irrational, yet humans still play. He also sets play in 
relation to freedom, meaning that forced play can no longer 
be called such. Still, some forms of play seem more like a 
need than a want of the participating parties, and still, 
even in this need, there is freedom, freedom to do things 
because they are pleasurable and have to be done for the 
individual's happiness (Huizinga, 1951). 

While images of humanity are often considered as basic 
beliefs that are mainly implicit and can only be described 
as theoretical concepts, for the purpose of this paper, it 
has to be assumed that such an image of humanity can be 
studied empirically (Fahrenberg, 2014; Galliker, 2015). When 
it comes to images of humanity in relation to play and even 
more so games, different approaches can be taken. 

Some researchers view the avatars in games as manifestations 
of the players' image of humanity; others analyze player 
interactions with each other as representations of their 
perceptions of humanity; and others still research the 
possibilities of images of humanity to be formed through the 
simulation-aspects of a computer game. When doing so, the 
images of humanity underlie different boundaries, as the 
options of the medium restrict what can be portrayed. At the 
same time, these images of humanity have a deeper purpose – 
as the one portrayed in the game needs to be internalized 
by the players to fully engage with the game (Schröter & 
Thon, 2012). 



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While there have been all these different kinds of research 
in regard to images of humanity and their acquisition, 
representation and manifestation in video games, there is 
less research on the people who design and make these games, 
even less so for students who are currently attending 
universities to later work in such a field. However, as 
these are the people who were researched in preparation for 
this paper, some examples of images of humanity in technology 
by students will be presented here. 

Berger and Ziegler (2021) examined the motives, beliefs, and 
interests of first-year teachers to further understand their 
paths, studies, and career choices. To do so, they 
interviewed 499 students, of whom 366 were studying to teach 
at grammar schools and 133 were studying to teach at 
vocational schools, since the winter semester 2016/17. Their 
study showed that the students had similar motives and 
convictions, even if they had different educational 
histories and experiences. 

Kleinn et al. (2013) examined the image of the world of 
computer science students regarding humans, technology, and 
the world. The study consisted of group discussions held 
with students from five German universities, as well as 
narrative individual interviews with up to five students. 
The results showed that the students have a primarily 
positive image of technology, but are aware of possible 
issues and limitations. These limitations encompass many 
different aspects: the complexity of computer science, which 
means that there are many different ways and possibilities 
to achieve the outlined goal; the fact that it is impossible 
to properly portray both humans and technology using only 
technology, and it is therefore impossible to portray 
reality; and also, that there are things that simply 
shouldn’t be attempted to replicate using computer science. 
However, not all students interviewed perceived these 
boundaries; some of them mentioned no practical or moral 
limitations at all (Schinzel, 2013). 

Lehmann and Ebner (2011) used two studies to determine the 
metaphors used by students of economic education to describe 
teaching, which consisted of a total of 514 students from a 
German university. They concluded that humans need to use 
multiple metaphors and phrases to define complex phenomena, 
as they cannot break these things down into simple words. 



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Based on this previous research, it can be assumed that 
students who choose the same field of study will have a 
similar image of humanity, even if their individual paths 
are different from one another. Furthermore, students who 
choose to study computer science, while aware of its 
possibilities, are also capable of identifying its 
limitations. Thus, interviewing students who have chosen to 
pursue a prospective career in game development will offer 
insights into their complex images of humanity of people in 
this field, including possible limitations and restrictions. 
However, these results also show that there is only limited 
research available regarding the images of humanity of 
students and even less so on the images of humanity of people 
working in video game development, so that the present paper 
can add to the existing knowledge not only of students but 
also about game developers and their perceptions of the 
world. 

As the theoretical concept of images of humanity was used 
as the base framework for the overarching research, it still 
needs to be discerned in the context of the present paper. 
However, while the research on which this paper is based 
aimed to completely encompass the image of humanity as held 
by the interviewees, the present paper focuses solely on the 
aspect of boundaries as these are the ones which are most 
closely related to the questions of freedom. Both in relation 
to the game developers and the prospective players. 

4. BOUNDARIES IN GAME DEVELOPMENT 

Boundaries, when considered in the context of images of 
humanity as part of pedagogical anthropology, exist in two 
states: firstly, there are boundaries within humanity, which 
are represented by dichotomies like male and female or sick 
and healthy; secondly, there are boundaries of humanity, 
such as the distinctions to God, technology and animals 
(Wulf & Zirfas, 2014). Regarding the present paper, 
different boundaries seem to be relevant. The limitations 
of technology appear to be prevalent due to two reasons: for 
one, technology has been heavily influencing humans in the 
last years, opening up the question of how humanity has to 
be redefined in the context of digitization (Ahrens, 2014). 
Secondly, technology plays a big part in the development of 
video games, on the one hand because it is used for the 
development, like different game engines, development 
platforms and programming languages, on the other hand 



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because new technological advancements influence the game 
development, like the development of VR- and AR-Technologies 
allowed new forms of interaction within games and the further 
usage of wearable devices made mobile gaming ideas more 
feasible for companies (Camps-Ortueta et al., 2021). 

Furthermore, it seems that ethical norms and morals play a 
crucial role in defining the boundaries of games. Again and 
again, scientific research is conducted on how games can be 
designed to teach ethics (e.g., Bagus et al., 2021), how 
different moral concepts can be conveyed through gaming 
(e.g., Hodge et al., 2019), or how ethical the implementation 
of certain game mechanics is (e.g., Neely, 2021). It has 
also been shown time and again that these facets can 
represent limits. For example, higher monetary investments 
can lead to better game results, because real money can be 
used to buy a higher amount of loot boxes or premium items, 
and consequently, lower investment opportunities, both 
financially and in terms of time resources, lead to a worse 
game result (Neely, 2021). In terms of content, the ethical 
and moral ideas of the culture in which a game is embedded 
can represent a boundary that is enforced and checked by 
external bodies such as the USK in Germany, PEGI in Europe, 
or the EXRB in Canada and the USA (Dogruel & Joeckel, 2013). 

Another aspect that needs to be considered when developing 
games is the analysis of the potential target group as well 
as the associated boundaries with said group. These can 
include but are not limited to the consideration of motor, 
cognitive, and mental difficulties. For game development, 
this can include offering options to overcome these 
boundaries, so that players feel empowered rather than 
incompetent (Bayrak, 2020). However, many mainstream video 
games are still a long way from being accessible, and the 
approaches taken are not of a high enough quality and lead 
to further segregation of disabled players. In addition, 
tools that allow developers to improve accessibility are not 
necessarily accessible themselves, therefore hindering the 
development of more accessible video games (Aguado-Delgado 
et al., 2020). 

Based on these theoretical insights, which were already 
partially confirmed by Kleinn et al. (2013), it is assumed 
that the prospective game developers will identify two main 
categories of boundaries with regard to their game 
development: technological limitations, both in the sense 
of soft- and hardware, and ethical and moral limitations, 



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influencing both game content and development. Potentially, 
issues of accessibility might also come up. However, no 
assumptions can be made regarding the weight of these 
boundaries or what other limitations people who work in the 
field might perceive. 

5. METHOD 

To answer the stated research questions, a qualitative 
research design was chosen as it allows an explorative 
approach to previously lesser researched areas of interest 
(Kelle, 2014). To do so, four semi-structured interviews 
with students fitting the selection criteria were conducted. 
They were transcribed and analyzed using qualitative content 
analysis, which allowed a focus on the content of the 
interviews, both explicit and implicit. The analysis used 
both deductive and inductive approaches, which were then 
combined to identify different categories. To do so, the 
interviews were first analyzed separately; afterward they 
were set in relation to each other. 

The interviewees represented two different German 
universities, one offering degrees in educational science 
and one offering degrees in media informatics and 
interactive entertainment. However, no matter their chosen 
degree, all interviewed students had had contact with 
theoretical or practical aspects of video game development, 
such as taking up the roles of game designers or artists in 
student led game projects or researching the possibilities 
of game based education. The four interview partners were 
equally divided between the two degrees, bachelor’s and 
master’s degrees, and identified 50 % as female and 50 % as 
male. 

As the original interviews were framed by the much bigger 
research question regarding the images of humanity held by 
the university students, they encompassed six different 
subject areas (subject, space, culture, body, social, and 
limitations) and took between 40 and 72 minutes. However, 
this paper, as stated previously, solely focuses on the 
limitations perceived by the interviewees. The students were 
asked the following questions regarding this subject area: 
What boundaries do players encounter in video games? How can 
these boundaries be overcome? As the interviews were 
analyzed as a whole and not individually by subject areas, 
some of the results regarding the limitations in the 



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following section, are based on answers given in other 
segments. Before the interviews started, the interviewees 
were presented with definitions of both images of humanity 
and video games. Images of humanity were defined as the 
assumptions and ideas someone has about the nature of humans, 
which are shaped by the individual’s world views and 
influence their decisions, actions and opinions. Video games 
were defined as electronic games, that are presented via a 
monitor and controlled using a tool, such as a computer 
mouse, keyboard, or controller. As an alternative term, the 
phrase computer game was introduced. These definitions need 
to be kept in mind regarding the answers given by the 
prospective game developers. 

6. RESULTS 

After independently analyzing the four interviews, 16 
subcategories in six main categories were identified. These 
offered a wide range of different perceptions of the 
boundaries encountered by players and game developers. 
However, the aspects identified by the interview partners 
did not necessarily match the expectations that were formed 
based on the literary research. 

7. TECHNOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES 

Technology plays a big part in the development of video 
games, as it is one of the key requirements to be able to 
work with and experience video games. However, the 
prospective game developers barely mentioned such 
technological aspects. 

The one technological limitation that was mentioned is the 
devices used by both the game developers and the players, 
as one group can only create within the specifications set 
by their equipment and the other group can only experience 
within those specifications. For the game developers, this 
means that available software and hardware influences the 
quality and details of the developed game. For players, the 
software and hardware they use can influence how close to 
the best possible game experience they can get. Playing on 
a substandard computer means that players won’t be able to 
experience the graphics, and therefore the environment and 
story, to the fullest extent possible. 



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8. DEVELOPER CENTERED BOUNDARIES 

In addition to these technological aspects that influence 
the work that can be done by the game developers, the 
interviewees identified another boundary that primarily 
affects them themselves. This boundary is closely related 
to the forming of the individual images of humanity by the 
prospective game developers as they relate to their 
experiences, which shape their present and future work and 
perception of the world and the people within it. 

The skills, abilities, and personal experiences of game 
developers are a limitation, as an individual can only work 
within their own field of experience and shine when they do 
things that they are good at. The interviewees were concerned 
with the limited experiences that they have had, both in 
life in general and in the world of game development. 

9. ECONOMICAL BOUNDARIES 

Associated with this developer centered boundary, which is 
mainly concerned with the individual characteristics of 
persons, there are also overarching economical boundaries 
in the developmental process. The interviewees mainly 
referred to time constraints in this context. 

Time constraints or limitations exist in multiple ways. The 
objective of the game to be developed influences the 
development time, meaning that more elaborate games require 
more time investment from the developers. Depending on the 
approach taken by the studio or the developers, this has 
different consequences. If they are operating under strict 
time constraints, there might only be limited content which 
can be developed in this time. At least as long as ethical 
and moral standards of work are adhered to. If it is more 
important to develop certain content before the game's 
release, release times might have to be pushed back. 

This indicates that the objectives of development limit the 
developers themselves. They have to adhere to the set 
schedule for the game and operate within these boundaries. 
According to the interviewees, these plans should only take 
up a fragment of the actual existing time to develop and 
need to be complied with, as development always takes longer 
than expected. 



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10. PLAYER CENTERED BOUNDARIES 

While these previously mentioned boundaries affect the 
general ability of developers and players to interact with 
and develop games, there are also limitations for and within 
the players themselves. The prospective game developers 
identified four subcategories regarding these player-
centered boundaries. 

One limitation players encounter is access options, which 
includes the technology they can use to play video games, 
both hard- and software. While this boundary is mainly an 
issue faced before being able to play the game, other 
limitations are faced during game play, especially 
concerning other players. One of these limitations, as 
perceived by the game developers, is the physical distance 
between players, as they can be located all over the globe, 
even though they feel a lot closer to each other when playing 
a game together.1  

Another boundary is the limit of interaction, which shapes 
the possibilities of interaction the players have both with 
the in-game world, like items, the environment, and NPCs, 
as well as other player characters. While interacting in the 
real-world, humans face a near endless array of 
possibilities of how to interact with each other and the 
world around them; however, when playing a video game, only 
those interactions implemented by the developers can 
properly be used by players. This is both a technical 
boundary and an emotional boundary, hugging a person who is 
upset feels different when touching them than it does when 
pressing a button to have your Avatar perform the same action 
in a virtual world. 

 
1 While the interviewees also saw the possibilities of overcoming 
such boundaries of distance using games (see below), physical 
borders, especially the difference between different countries, 
were mentioned. The interviewees did not further elaborate on this 
aspect of limitations; however, one possible explanation might be 
that the interviews were conducted in German asking about possible 
“Grenzen”, which can be translated both to boundaries and borders 
in English. Therefore, the prospective game developers might have 
been referring to this other meaning of the term “Grenzen”. 
Another possible explanation would be the differences in culture 
between different countries and players in these countries. 
However, as the argument wasn’t elaborated further, these are only 
possible explanations of the perception of distance as a boundary. 



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The prospective game developers also identified some 
limitations on what games can impart, as not every piece of 
knowledge can be conveyed using a video game as a medium. 
At the same time, video games are underestimated by educators 
and the public as they can be a huge aid in trying to convey 
information to players. 

11. LIMITS OF CONTENT 

Not only are the players themselves limited by certain 
boundaries implemented by the game developers, but these 
limitations also affect the content that is provided in a 
game. Regarding this super category, the prospective game 
developers identified different subcategories. 

One important aspect is the spatial limits players encounter 
while playing video games. This includes both the players’ 
view of the video game and the space in which they can move 
their avatar. The players’ view includes everything of the 
game that they can perceive at the moment they are playing. 
This space includes all the assets that have been implemented 
by the developers to be part of the game. Behind the borders 
of these spaces, there is nothing. 

The end of the game is another limitation identified by the 
prospective game developers. This means that players can 
only experience the amount of content intended by the game 
developers within the rules set by the world. 

Another boundary identified by the prospective game 
developers are the limits of experience. According to them, 
some experiences cannot be taught using video games and that 
touching and interacting with artifacts can be more 
beneficial to learning than sitting in front of a (computer) 
screen. 

Video games are also subject to ethical and moral 
limitations, which some prospective game developers view as 
something non-negotiable that should not be crossed, whether 
in real life or in the game context. One example is the 
possibility of exploring homophobic themes, which might be 
allowed in some countries but should not be part of video 
games. The ethical and moral limitations are influenced by 
both the developer’s personal background and history, as 
well as external organizations tasked with youth protection. 



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These examples show that there are different limitations to 
the content in a video game. These limitations affect the 
players in different kinds of ways, like the choices they 
can make and the stories they can experience. 

12. OVERCOMING BOUNDARIES 

While the prospective game developers identified a variety 
of limitations that shape video games, they also focused on 
the possibilities of overcoming these boundaries. This 
applies both to technological and personal aspects. 

On the most basic level, both players and developers can 
overcome the identified technological boundary, the 
limitations provided by the hardware they use, by upgrading 
their equipment. This allows developers to have an easier 
time during development and players to experience games more 
vividly (e.g., if they are able to play using higher graphics 
settings). Furthermore, players can use other technology to 
overcome boundaries of technology. For example, they utilize 
tools such as Discord (Discord Inc., 2015) and TeamSpeak 
(TeamSpeak Systems, Inc., 2001), to communicate with other 
players verbally or in writing even when the games they are 
playing are not offering their own measures to do so. 

Additionally, one of the main traits of players identified 
by the prospective game developers is the need to overcome 
boundaries set by the game developers and, therefore, the 
game. A reason for this need to overcome is the emotional 
connection players form with the games they play and the 
emotional investment they feel. The players want to continue 
playing. One way to overcome these boundaries is the creation 
and implementation of mods, short for modifications, which 
work as an expansion to a game and allow the players to add 
additional content to the game provided by the developers. 
In this step, players stop being consumers of a game but can 
become producers, game developers who create new game 
content. 

Furthermore, games allow different ways to overcome social 
limitations. For example, it is possible for players to 
overcome their own prejudices. Interviewees explained that 
people might not want to interact with others based on their 
looks; however, when playing, these looks become irrelevant. 
While other aspects of sociability, and the overcoming of 



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52 

boundaries in this context, could be imagined, they did not 
come up during the interviews. 

However, the interviewees did mention the possibility of 
transcending the boundaries of one’s own experiential 
spaces. Games allow players a change of perspective, both 
on their own lives and the lives of others, which they 
otherwise would only experience from an outside perspective. 

Finally, while playing a game can bring to light the physical 
distance between players, as mentioned before, it also 
allows players to meet people from all over the world in the 
first place. More specifically, this means that individuals 
can get to know people from all kinds of cultures and classes 
just because they play the same game, even if there are no 
other commonalities. This also applies to players whose 
personal circumstances might not allow them to live the way 
they want to. In these cases, video games offer the 
possibility of overcoming the individuals’ limitations. 

In summary, video games can be an answer to the different 
limitations people encounter in their day-to-day life. 
According to the prospective game developers, players are 
not only aware of these possibilities, but they actively try 
to overcome these boundaries by developing their own 
content. Even the act of simply playing a game can be viewed 
as overcoming the limitations of their own lives. 

13. DISCUSSION 

After presenting these different super- and sub-categories 
of the research, it becomes clear that the freedom 
experienced by both game developers and players is strongly 
influenced by different boundaries. At the same time, it can 
be seen that only a few parts of the students' answers 
coincide with the expected points: for example, aspects of 
technology were named as limitations by only one person, and 
the areas of ethics and morality, as well as happiness, 
received no attention at all. Across the four respondents, 
however, similar ideas of boundaries emerged, within which 
the respondents placed different emphasis ba