Pasquinelli, MatteoNegarestani, Reza2018-09-252018-09-252015978-3-95796-066-5https://mediarep.org/handle/doc/3007Functionalist theories of mind come from heterogeneous directions and address an array of problems ranging from metaphysical to epistemic-semantic and engineering ones. Similarly, computational theories of mind cover different classes of computational complexity. The first part of this text examines what it means to combine the functional description of the human mind with the computational one. The second part addresses the ramifications of a computationalist-functionalist account of the mind as exemplified in Alan Turing’s proposal for realizing intelligent machinery. The implementation of a computationalist- functionalist account of the human mind in machines is depicted as a program that deeply erodes our capacity to recognize what human experience manifestly is. In doing so, it fractures the historical experience of what it means to be human. Yet this is a rupture that marks a genuine beginning for the history of intelligent machines.engCreative Commons Attribution Share Alike 4.0 Genericcomputational complexityfunctionalismhuman mindintelligent machinesTuringmaschine15010.25969/mediarep/1184978-3-95796-066-5http://dx.doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/685